Indian Law Research

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala

Decision date:

23 August 2024 · 2024 INSC 625

Extent of bar against the grant of anticipatory bail in SC/ST offences

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Source and extraction notes

Official source

Draft summary

AI-assisted historical explanation. Independently checked against the source by an AI reviewer. Not reviewed by a lawyer. This historical summary does not certify the current legal position.

In one sentence

The SC/ST Act’s anticipatory-bail bar requires a prima facie case under the Act.

Question decided

Can a court examine the ingredients of an alleged atrocity before applying the bail bar?

Key holdings

Outcome

The High Court order was set aside and protection in the event of arrest was granted on conditions.

Source PDF pages: 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 69, 70.

Plain-English explanation

An offence under the SC/ST Act requires more than the fact that the complainant belongs to a protected community. The Court considered the specific statutory ingredients and the alleged conduct before deciding whether the special anticipatory-bail restriction applied. It concluded that the threshold was not met in this case. This is a limited screening inquiry, not a licence to conduct a full trial at the bail stage or dismiss genuine caste-based abuse as ordinary criticism. The judgment also addresses lawful arrest and the importance of reading penal provisions carefully. A useful website explanation should identify the actual offence alleged and the required connection to caste, while making clear that the statutory bar continues to operate where a prima facie case is disclosed.

Relevant law

Opinions

Two-judge bench; Justice J.B. Pardiwala authored the judgment.

Research notes and limits

Check the ingredients of the particular offence rather than extending observations about one clause to the entire Act.

Judgment - source material

All pages of the downloaded court document follow, including separate opinions, annexures and any final joint order. This is machine-extracted original text, not an AI rewrite. Use the PDF to check exact wording.

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Source PDF page 1

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2024 INSC 625
 
 
        REPORTABLE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2622 OF 2024 
   (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 8081 OF 2023) 
 
SHAJAN SKARIA                   ……APPELLANT 
 
   VERSUS 
 
THE STATE OF KERALA & ANR.                    ……RESPONDENT(S) 
 
    
    
      J U D G M E N T

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Criminal Appeal No. 2622 of 2024           Page 1 of 69 
 
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.: 
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following 
parts: - 
A. FACTUAL MATRIX ...................................................................................2 
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT ....................... 10 
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COMPLAINANT ................. 13 
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE................................... 15 
E. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS .......................................... 16 
F. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ......................................................... 20 
G. ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 21 
i. Evolution of the concept of anticipatory bail ................................ .................... 21 
ii. Whether Section 18 of the Act, 1989 imposes an absolute bar on the grant 
of anticipatory bail in cases registered under the said Act? ..........................  27 
a. Significance of the expression “arrest of any person” appearing in Section 
18 of the Act, 1989 ................................................................................................................. 41 
iii. When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in a given  
FIR/complaint? ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 47 
iv. Whether the averments in the FIR/complaint in question disclose 
commission of any offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989? ............. 51 
a. Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing in Section 
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 ........................................................................................................ 55 
v. Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989 is prima facie 
made out in the FIR/complaint in question? ................................ ..................... 63 
vi. Whether mere knowledge of the caste identity of the complainant is 
sufficient to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989?  ..... 64 
H. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 69

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Criminal Appeal No. 2622 of 2024           Page 2 of 69 
 
1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 30.06.2023 passed by the 
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Criminal Appeal No. 906 of 2023 filed by 
the appellant herein by which the High Court dismissed the appeal and thereby 
affirmed the order dated 16.06.2023 passed by the Special Judge for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 , Ernakulam 
Division declining to grant anticipatory bail to the appellant herein in connection 
with the First Information Report No. 899 of 2023 lodged by the complainant 
(Respondent No. 2) at the Elamakkara Police Station, District Ernakulam for the 
offence punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) respectively of the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities ) Act, 1989 
(the “Act, 1989”). 
 
A. FACTUAL MATRIX 
 
 
2. On 24.05.2023, the appellant herein, in his capacity as the Editor of an online 
news channel named “Marunandan Malayali” published a video on YouTube, 
an online video sharing platform, levelling certain allegations against the 
complainant. The English translation of the video transcript is reproduced 
hereinbelow: - 
“Thumb 
Every one's afraid of P.V. Srinijan who grew up like a mafia don!  
 
Title 
Who made P.V. Srinijan a mafia don?

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Criminal Appeal No. 2622 of 2024           Page 3 of 69 
 
 
Content  
It was before a few days; the outside world knew about the news. 
The pride of Kerala, Kerala blasters was holding a selection trial 
which was for children under the age of 17. Children and parents 
had to wait for hours in front of the stadium at Panampally 
Nagar, Ernakulam which was owned by the Sports Council.  
The Stadium was closed, because P.V . Srinijan, District Sports 
Council President and MLA of Kunnathunad had alleged that 
Kerala blasters had a debt to clear with Kerala Sports Council. 
Media took on the news and people got furious over it. With 
hesitation the gates were finally opened. Yesterday evening 
Srinijan said sorry, he said that he knew nothing about the 
incident and he was being targeted. Former National Sports Star 
and present Sports Council President, Sharaf Ali came out with 
strong stand that; o ne, Kerala blasters didn't owe any money. 
Two, even if they owed money it's a matter for the sports council 
to deal with. The most important fact is that there is not any due, 
because all the grounds belong to the State Sports Council, the 
District Sports Council doesn't have any relation. Sharaf Ali also 
said that P.V. Srinijan doesn't have a say in it.  
There are no arrears in the contract between Kerala Blasters and 
Kerala Sports Council. The Kerala State Sports Council has 
informed the Council in writing. The District Sports Council has 
no right to block.  
So why did Srinijan do the dirty work, who gave him the right to 
do so? Today evening another news came out. Including the 
sports hostel at Ernakulam, Panampalli Nagar and district sports 
development is being obstructed by Srinijan, the former Sports 
Council President and the National Sports Star Olympian Mercy 
Kutty said.  
The hostel at Panampally Nagar Sports Academy was one of the 
biggest sports hostels in Kerala. With arrival of Srinijan and the 
present President the administration got completely changed. 
After that food was also not served at the hotel. Now vigilance 
investigation is going on. All the bills are fakes and the Sports 
Council's investigation is being piled up.  
Who should Kerala believe, Sharaf Ali, Mercy Kuttan or 
Srinijan? Sharaf Ali and Mercy Kuttan have shown their skills.

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They are national sports stars and are responsible and know how 
to act according to the situation at hand. They aren't political, so 
Kerala is more likely to believe these sports stars.  
Srinijan is lying, it's the latest example Srinijan’s dramatic moves 
to slowly bring it under his control. My question isn't this, 
whenever a scandal, corruption or illegal activities take place we 
will find Srinijan name under it. Srinijan is infamous, still the 
CPM which made Srinijan a candidate should remember he 
wasn't even a communist. He was a leader of the youth congress.  
The footage of the DYFI demonstration against Srinijan’s 
relation to corruption and black money transactions are still 
available.  
First, CPM gives seat to him. Secondly, the people of the locality 
elect him. The MLA Post is the best example that the people of 
Kerala would allow any corrupt and black money dealer to 
become a leader. By being at the MLA position, Srinijan has only 
done damage to the state.  
We know that it  is hard for Kerala to invite industries over, 
because here political parties will raise red flags against it. 
Therefore, even those industries in Kerala are leaving. There are 
only a few industries who are born here and pays taxes correctly 
to the State. One such industry is the Kitex run by Kitex Sabu. 
The one who made Kitex Sabu to move to Telangana from Kerala 
was Srinijan.  
It was with Srinijan's consent that authorities used to pester Kitex 
and being a close friend to the CM Pinarayi Vijayan, Sabu had 
to come out to deal with the issue which made Sabu to leave the 
state and move his entire industry into Telangana. This is the 
situation of an entrepreneur who gave jobs to millions and 
Srinijan is solely responsible for it. To destroy the enterprise, he 
made the employees get arrested in false charges, killed a person. 
The authorities were haunting the enterprise. It  is said as  
Kadambrayar waste water, but investigation hasn't been fruitful. 
But we know that the waste is being generated from the 
Bhramapuram Plant which was l ater burnt. Now the dust and 
ashes are going to the Kadambrayar Lake. No one has a 
complaint about it. He made a businessman to move out of the 
State who was providing jobs to millions. Srinijan has many other 
allegations against him.

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Srinijan’s father-in-law was the Chief Justice of Supreme Court. 
There are allegations that during those days he made crores 
illegally which were even raised by the CPM.  
Reason for Srinijan’s sudden growth in wealth is due to 
corruption has been come to knowledge. But no one has the guts 
to start an investigation against him. Because he has high 
connections even in the judiciary. Even an audio clip came out 
that he had used his relations in judiciary to bring down the Kitex 
Industry. The first was the account of Srinijan’s destruction of 
the sports sector in order to bring it under his jurisdiction. The 
second was the conspiracy to drive out a businessman out of the 
State.  
Viewers might remember the news I have given out about 
Prithviraj where it talked about the legal notice he had sent me. 
After receiving the legal notice, I have studied in depth about the 
film industry. From what I have learnt, there are some shocking 
facts related to it. I am just waiting for more proof. Knowingly or 
unknowingly Srinijan has a presence in the film industry.  
It is not as we thought, we can see Srinijan at most film sites. 
Srinijan is the middle man in film industry for many. Which 
means he is the one who provides funds the most in the film 
industry.  
But he does this with legal security. We are gathering evidences 
and as we find it true we will publish it.  
Just focus on one thing. When Srinijan gave affidavit for 
participating in the competition he had to struggle to gather 
money because he had lots of black money. If he were to use it, 
he would get caught. So, he needed money in his account, so it is 
said that he borrowed money from some movie producers to show 
in record. I investigated some of the movie producers listed in the 
records. These producers borrow from others including Srinijan 
to make movies.  
In short, Srinijan acts as a young mafia don. Srinijan has 
presence in movie industry, sports sector and politics. Srinijan 
will go to any extreme to eliminate those who dares to stand 
against him. Srinijan has high connections in judiciary. We 
shouldn't question judiciary. But there are some judicial officers

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Criminal Appeal No. 2622 of 2024           Page 6 of 69 
 
who are corrupt and Srinijan aids them. But no one is bold 
enough to question him.  
CPM has given Srinijan more power. Even the opposition is 
afraid to stand up against him. Even the judiciary is turning a 
blind eye. Even Kitex Sabu who fought against this leaves at one 
point.  
Why is everyone afraid of him? Why is Kerala letting Srinijan to 
grow as a young mafia don?” 
3. The complainant  who is a Member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly  
representing the Kunnathunad constituency, a seat reserved for the members of 
the Scheduled Castes, aggrieved by the publication of the aforesaid video, filed 
a written complaint before the ACP, Central Police Station, Ernakulam alleging 
inter alia that the video was published by the appellant in order to publicise, 
abuse and insult the complainant, who is a member of a Scheduled Caste . The 
contents of the complaint are reproduced as under: 
“I am the elected candidate for the Kunnathunad Assembly 
Constituency. Shri Sajan S karia (Editor, News Reader and 
Publisher), Smt. Ann Mary George (Managing Editor & CEO), 
Shri Riju (Chief Editor) are using the online TV Channel named 
Marunadan Malayali (TC 17/3164 (11) Pattom Palace P.O., 
Pattom Thiruvananthapuram, PIN 695004) & are continuously 
concocting and spreading false news against me through different 
social media, which have no basis of any kind. Such false news are 
created and spread in order to ridicule and humiliate me, as a 
member of the Scheduled Caste Pulaya Community.  
Shajan Skaria and aforesaid persons used my photo and uploaded 
a defamatory video against me through the Youtube Channel 
named Marunadan Malayali on 24.03.2023 with the title reading 
‘PV Sreenijan , who rose so suddenly as a Mafia Don’ and the 
same was shared through other social media as well.

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He raised a false allegation against me, who is the President of 
District Sports Council that there is a vigilance inquiry going on 
against me regarding running of a sports hostel. Besides he also 
alleged that I am trying to destroy the business ventures and I have 
falsely implicated and jailed the employees of Kitex. He also made 
a very serious allegations against me that I have murdered one 
person. 
Shajan S karia and the aforesaid persons are making efforts 
through their channel and other social media to me as a murderer, 
without any basis. That after the aforesaid video was uploaded, 
many people have shared the same on different social media 
platforms. On see ing this video, many persons from within the 
State of Kerala outside telephoned me and talked about this matter 
and raised doubts as to whether I am such a person or not. I doubt 
that the above actions of Shajan S karia, Smt. Ann Mary George 
and Shri Riju is a part of their efforts to intentionally destroy the 
public faith that I enjoy in the society.  
The video published through the Online News Channel 
Marunadan Malayali on 24.05.2023 containing only false news 
and false averments, is knowingly made with the knowledge that I 
belong to Scheduled Caste Pulaya community and thus only to 
deliberately humiliate and ridicule me among the general public. 
Shajan Skaria, Smt. Ann Mary George, Shri Riju who belongs to 
Christian Community , knowing it fully well that I belong to 
Scheduled Caste Pulaya Community, has uploaded and spread the 
video as aforesaid with th e deliberate intention of humiliating, 
ridiculing me among the general public. The same is an offence 
and is punishable under Section 3(r)  and 3(u) of the Scheduled 
Caste and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 
1989. 
That I faced severe humiliation, loss and damages due to the 
aforesaid actions of Shajan S karia, Smt. Ann Mary George and 
Shri Riju. Hence it is prayed that necessary legal action be taken 
against Shajan S karia, Smt. Ann Mary George and Shri Riju 
against creating and spreading of false news through online 
channel and other social media under the Sections of the 
Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act, 1989, sections of IT Act and Sections of IPC.  
Sd/xx P.V. Sreenijan

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Attaching the CD.”  
 
4. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 899 of 2023 dated 09.06.2023 
came to be registered against the appellant and two other  persons, who are not 
parties to the present appeal, for offences punishable under Section 120(o) of the 
Kerala Police Act (the “KP Act”) and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) respectively 
of the Act, 1989.  
 
5. A plain reading of the FIR would indicate that the appellant is not a member of 
the Scheduled Caste and he is alleged to have published and disseminated a 
video containing disparaging content about the complainant with a view to 
publicise, abuse and insult the complainant. The complainant has alleged that 
the video has caused him a lot of humiliation, mental pain and agony. The 
complainant has also alleged that the video was uploaded by the appellant with 
the intention to humiliate and ridicule him among the general public with the 
knowledge that the complainant is a member of the Pulaya community, which is 
a Scheduled Caste. 
 
6. Apprehending his arrest, the appellant went before the Court of Special Judge 
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989, 
Ernakulam Division, praying for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the “CrPC”). The Special Judge, vide order

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Criminal Appeal No. 2622 of 2024           Page 9 of 69 
 
dated 16.06.2023 , rejected the anticipatory bail application of the appellant, 
holding that the allegations in the FIR are prima facie sufficient to attract the 
offence under the Act, 1989 and the bar of Section 18 of the said Act prohibits 
the court from exercising powers under Section 438 of the CrPC.  
 
7. The appellant challenged the order passed by the Special Judge before the High 
Court of Kerala , wherein the High Court, vide order dated 30.06.2023 
(“impugned order ”), affirmed the order passed by the Special Judge and 
refused to grant anticipatory bail to the appellant.  Relevant observations made 
by the High Court in the impugned order are extracted hereinbelow: -  
“8. Now the question arises whether the offence under 
Section 3(1)(r) will be attracted, in the absence of 
reference to the caste status of the second respondent in 
the news item. In my opinion that question cannot be 
decided, oblivious of the object behind the enactment and 
the reason for amending the Act in 2019. The Act was 
brought into force for preventing the commission of 
atrocities against members of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes and to establish Special Courts for the 
trial of such offen ces and provide relief and 
rehabilitation to the victims of such offences. The Act 
was amended on finding that, despite various measures 
to improve the socio -economic conditions of the 
scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, they still 
remained vulnerable.  Of course, as held by the Apex 
Court in Hitesh Verma and Ramesh Chandra Vaishya 
(supra), all insults or intimidation will not be an offence 
under the Act, unless such insult or intimidation is on 
account of the victim belonging to the Scheduled Castes 
or Scheduled Tribes. As observed earlier, materials on 
record do indicate that the video is intended to insult and 
humiliate the second respondent. At this stage, the court

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can only go by the allegations in the complaint and the 
attendant circumstances. The allegation is specific to the 
effect that the appellant has been insulting and 
humiliating the second respondent only for the reason 
that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste . The attendant 
circumstances are the wanton nature of the allegations 
and the repeated news items published against the 
second respondent. Going by the wording of Section 
3(1)(r), reference to the caste name of the victim is not 
necessary for attracting t he offence. This is clear from 
the distinction between the wording of Section 3(1) (r) 
and 3(1)(s). As such, it is not possible to hold that there 
are no prima facie materials to attract the offence under 
Section 3(1)(r).  
In view of the finding on Section 3(1)(r), I am not 
venturing to decide whether the offence under Section 
3(1)(u) is attracted or not. For the aforementioned 
reasons, the impugned order of the Special Court is 
upheld.  
In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed.” 
 (Emphasis supplied)  
 
8. In view of the aforesaid, the appellant is before this Court with the present 
appeal.  
 
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT 
 
 
9. Mr. Sidharth Luthra and Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned Senior Counsel 
appearing for the appellant made the following submissions:  
a. The appellant had no intention to insult the complainant and merely 
stated the facts without mentioning the name of the complainant’s caste

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or community. The appellant being a journalist, had published facts 
gathered through research and sources. 
b. The High Court failed to take into consideration that the complainant 
has not alleged that the appellant intentionally insulted or intim idated 
him with an intent to humiliate him as a member of the Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. A perusal of the telecast makes 
it clear that the appellant did not refer to the caste or community of the 
complainant. Even if the statements made in  the video are said to be 
defamatory, the same by itself is not sufficient to attract an offence 
under the Act, 1989.  
c. The complainant has not alleged that the appellant by words , either 
written or spoken , had promoted or attempted to promote feelings of 
enmity, hatred or ill-will against the members of the Scheduled Castes 
or Scheduled Tribes. Thus, no offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act 
1989 is made out against the appellant.  
d. The High Court failed to consider the judgments of the co -ordinate 
benches in XXX v. State of Kerala  reported in ILR 2022 4 Ker. 620  
and State of Kerala v. Hassan reported in 2002 (2) KLT 505, wherein 
it has been reiterated that the offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 
1989 would be attracted only if the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will 
are promoted or attempted to be promoted against members of the

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Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a class and not on criticizing 
an individual member.  
e. The decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand  
reported in  (2020) 10 SCC 710  held that an offence under Section 
3(1)(r) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member 
of the Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a 
member of the Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that 
the victim belongs to such caste.  
f. The decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668 held that 
every insult or intimidation would not amount to an offence under 
Section 3(1)(x) of the Act , 1989 unless, such insult or intimidation is 
targeted at the victim because he is a member of a particular Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe.  
g. The High Court failed to consider the decision of this Court in Prathvi 
Raj Chauhan v. Union of India reported in (2020) 4 SCC 727 wherein 
it was held that if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case 
for applicability of the provisions of the Act, 1989 then the bar created 
by Section 18 and Section 18A(i) would not apply.

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C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COMPLAINANT 
 
 
10. Mr. Haris Beeran, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
complainant/Respondent No.2 made the following submissions:  
a. The appellant is a habitual offender in creating controversies by 
intentionally propagating false and defamatory campaigns against 
respectable members of society with the sole purpose of attracting 
subscriptions to his web platform. 
b. The Act, 1989 was enacted with the object to prevent the commission 
of offences and atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribes. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 underscores the 
crucial aspect of intentional insult and intimidati on with the specific 
intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled 
Tribe. The primary aim of the Act , 1989 is to ameliorate the socio -
economic conditions of the community as they have been historically 
deprived of numerous civil rights. Therefore, an offence under the Act, 
1989 is established when a member of these vulnerable s ections of 
society is subjected to humiliation and harassment.  
c. The appellant had wilfully disseminated the news against the 
complainant, containing false assertions, deliberately aimed at 
portraying the complainant in poor light in society on the ground that 
he was a member of a Scheduled Caste.

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d. The false and derogatory remarks were spread with full awareness of 
the complainant’s status as a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste, 
having been elected as an MLA in 2021 from a seat reserved for 
members of the Scheduled Caste community. The appellant’s 
deliberate actions of insult and humiliation undeniably constitute the 
offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. 
e. The appellant himself has stated that the complainant is an MLA 
representing the Kunnathunad Constituency. This makes his intentions 
clear as it is common knowledge that the said constituency is reserved 
for members belonging to the Scheduled Castes.  
f. The complainant has been singled out by the appellant for the sole 
reason that he belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The Appellant has made 
unsubstantiated allegations and aspersions against the complainant and 
has gone to the extent of calling him a ‘murderer’ and ‘mafia don’. 
g. The appellant has not spared even the former Chief Justice of India 
who happens to be the  father-in-law of the complainant and a person 
belonging to a Scheduled Caste . The appellant has intentionally 
humiliated the father -in-law of the complainant, assassinating his 
character as he also belongs to the Scheduled Caste community. The 
appellant has not even spared the judiciary by levelling defamatory 
allegations.

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h. The act of the appellant, as alleged , constitutes an offence under 
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) respectively of the Act , 1989 and 
anticipatory bail cannot be granted in view of the bar under Section 18 
of the Act, 1989.  
i. Despite many notices issued by the investigating officers, the appellant 
has failed to turn up for the purpose of interrogation.  
j. The appellant could be said to have exhibited a pattern of wilful non -
compliance of the court orders, thereby showcasing a flagrant 
disregard for the courts. In a different case where anticipatory bail was 
granted to him, the appellant subsequently stopped attending the court 
proceedings and failed to cooperate in the investigation. The High 
Court took note of such behaviour and warned the appellant that his 
anticipatory bail could be revoked. Therefore, there is a substantial risk 
in granting anticipatory bail to the appellant.  
 
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE 
 
 
11. Mr. P.V. Dinesh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State 
(Respondent No. 1 herein) made the following submissions: 
a. The complainant is an MLA from Kunnathunad constituency which is 
reserved for members of the Scheduled Caste and the telecast of the

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video was with a clear knowledge that the complainant belongs to a 
Scheduled Caste community. 
b. To constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act , 1989, it is 
not necessary to mention the caste of the person. The video was 
uploaded with the intention to cause insult and humiliate the 
complainant and thereby promote feelings of hatred and ill will. 
c. The appellant has filed a petition before the Kerala High Court to quash 
the FIR and the same is currently pending.  
 
E. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
 
12. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, it is necessary 
for us to look into few relevant provisions of the Act , 1989, the CrPC and the 
KP Act: 
Section 3 of the Act 1989: 
Punishments for offences of atrocities.—  
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste 
or a Scheduled Tribe,— 
… 
…. 
….

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(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to 
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled 
Tribe in any place within public view; 
… 
(u) by words either written or spoken or by signs or by 
visible representation or otherwise promotes or attempts 
to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill -will against 
members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled 
Tribes; 
Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
shall not be less than six months but which may extend 
to five years and with fine 
 
Section 18 of the Act 1989:  
Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons 
committing an offence under the Act.— 
Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in 
relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on 
an accusation of having committed an offence under this 
Act. 
 
Section 438 of the CrPC: 
Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending 
arrest.— 
[(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may 
be arrested on accusation of having committed a non -
bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the 
Court of Session for a direction under this section that in 
the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and 
that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter 
alia, the following factors, namely:--- 
(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation;

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(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact 
as to whether he has previously undergone 
imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of 
any cognizable offence; 
(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from 
justice; and. 
(iv) where the accusation has been made with the 
object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by 
having him so arrested, 
either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim 
order for the grant of anticipatory bail: 
Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case 
may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim 
order under this sub -section or has rejected the 
application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open 
to an officer in -charge of a police s tation to arrest, 
without warrant the applicant on the basis of the 
accusation apprehended in such application. 
(1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-
section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less 
than seven days notice, together with a copy of such 
order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the 
Superintendent of Police, with a v iew to give the Public 
Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard 
when the application shall be finally heard by the Court, 
(1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory 
bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the 
application and passing of final order by the Court, if on 
an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the 
Court considers such presence necessary in the interest 
of justice.] 
(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes 
a direction under sub -section (1), it may include such 
conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of 
the particular case, as it may think fit, including--

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(i) a condition that the person shall make himself 
available for interrogation by a police officer as and 
when required; 
(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or 
indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise 
to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so 
as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the 
Court or to any police officer; 
(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India 
without the previous permission of the Court; 
(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under 
sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were 
granted under that section. 
(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant 
by an officer in charge of a police station on such 
accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest 
or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give 
bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate 
taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant 
should be issued in the first instance against that person, 
he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the 
direction of the Court under sub-section (1). 
[(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case 
involving the arrest of any person on accusation of 
having committed an offence under sub -section (3) of 
section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or 
section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] 
Section 120 of the KP Act:  
Penalty for causing nuisance and violation of public 
order.—  
If any person,—  
… 
(o) causing, through any means of communication, a 
nuisance of himself to any person by repeated or

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undesirable or anonymous call, letter, writing, message, 
e-mail or through a messenger ;  
… 
shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment 
which may extend to one year or with fine which may 
extend to five thousand rupees or with both. 
 
F. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION  
 
 
13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone 
through the materials on record, the following issues fall for our consideration: 
 
a. Whether Section 18 of the Act, 1989 imposes an absolute bar on the grant 
of anticipatory bail in cases registered under the said Act? 
 
b. When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in a given 
FIR/complaint? 
 
c. Whether the averments in the FIR/complaint  in question  disclose 
commission of any offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989? 
 
d. Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989 could be said 
to have been prima facie made out in the FIR/complaint in question? 
 
e. Whether mere knowledge of the caste identity of the complainant is 
sufficient to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989?

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G. ANALYSIS   
 
 
i.  Evolution of the concept of anticipatory bail  
 
14. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 did not contain any specific provision 
analogous to Section 438 of the CrPC. In Amir Chand v. The Crown, reported 
in 1949 SCC OnLine Punj 20, the question before the Full Bench was whether 
Section 498 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 empower ed the High Court 
or the Sessions Court to grant bail to a person who ha d not been placed under 
restraint by arrest or otherwise. The Full Bench answered the reference as under:  
“…The very notion of bail presupposes some form of previous 
restraint. Therefore, bail cannot be granted to a person who 
has not been arrested and for whose arrest no warrants have 
been issued. Section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, does not 
permit the High Court or the Court of Session to grant bail to 
anyone whose case is not covered by sections 496 and 497, 
Criminal Procedure Code. It follows, therefore, that bail can 
only be allowed to a person who has been arrested or detained 
without warrant or appears or is brought before a Court. Such 
person must be liable to arrest and must surrender himself 
before the question of bail can be considered. In the case of a 
person who is not under arrest, but for whose arrest warrants 
have been issued, bail can be allow ed if he appears in Court 
and surrenders himself. No bail can be allowed to a person at 
liberty for whose arrest no warrants have been issued . The 
petitioners in the present case are, therefore, not entitled to 
bail. The question referred to the Full Bench  is, therefore, 
answered in the negative.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
15. Under the 1898 Code, the concept of anticipatory or pre-arrest bail was absent 
and the need for introduction of a new provision in the CrPC empowering the

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High Court and Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail  was pointed out by 
the 41st Law Commission of India in its report dated September 24, 1969 . The 
report pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the CrPC enabling 
the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail. It observed 
in para 39.9 of its report (Volume I): 
Anticipatory bail 
“39.9 The suggestion for directing the release of a person on 
bail prior to his arrest (commonly known as “anticipatory 
bail”) was carefully considered by us. Though there is a 
conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a Court to 
grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no 
such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The 
necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because 
sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in 
false causes for the purpose of disgracing them or for other 
purposes by getting detained in jail for some days . In recent 
times, the a ccentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is 
showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, 
where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person 
accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise 
misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification 
to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for 
some days and then apply for bail”  
We recommend the acceptance of this suggestion. We are 
further of the view that this special power should be conferred 
only on the High Court and the Court of Session, and that the 
order should take effect at the time of arrest or thereafter. 
In order to settle the details of this suggestion, the following 
draft of a new section is placed for consideration: 
‘497-A. (1) When any person has a reasonable apprehension 
that he would be arrested on an accusation of having 
committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High 
Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this

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section. That court may, in its discretion, direct that in the 
event of his arrest, he shall be released on bail. 
(2) A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against that 
person shall, while taking steps under Section 204(1), either 
issue summons or a bailable warrant as indicated in the 
direction of the court under sub-section (1). 
(3) If any person in respect of whom such a direction is made 
is arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police 
station on an accusation of having committed that offence, 
and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time 
while in the custody of such officer to give bail, such person 
shall be released on bail.’ 
We considered carefully the question of laying down in the 
statute certain conditions under which alone anticipatory bail 
could be granted. But we found that it may not be practicable 
to exhaustively enumerate those conditions; and moreover, 
the laying dow n of such conditions may be construed as 
prejudging (partially at any rate) the whole case. Hence we 
would leave it to the discretion of the court and prefer not to 
fetter such discretion in the statutory provision itself. 
Superior courts will, undoubtedly , exercise their discretion 
properly, and not make any observations in the order 
granting anticipatory bail which will have a tendency to 
prejudice the fair trial of the accused.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
16. The suggestion made by the Law Commission was, in principle, accepted by the 
Central Government which introduced clause 447 in the  
Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970 with a view to conferring 
express power on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory 
bail. The said clause of the draft bill was enacted with certain modifications and 
became Section 438 of the CrPC.

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17. The Law Commission, in para graph 31 of its  48th Report (1972), made the 
following comments on the aforesaid clause: 
“The Bill introduces a provision for the grant of anticipatory 
bail. This is substantially in accordance with the 
recommendation made by the previous Commission. We 
agree that this would be a useful addition, though we must 
add that it is in very exception al cases that such a power 
should be exercised. 
We are further of the view that in order to ensure that the 
provision is not put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous 
petitioners, the final order should be made only after notice 
to the Public Prosecutor. The initial order should only be an 
interim one. Further, the relevant section should make it clear 
that the direction can be issued only for reasons to be 
recorded, and if the court is satisfied that such a direction is 
necessary in the interests of justice. 
It will also be convenient to provide that notice of the interim 
order as well as of the final orders will be given to the 
Superintendent of Police forthwith.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
18. It is apparent  on a plain reading of the  Statement of Objects and Reasons 
accompanying the Bill for introducing Section 438 in the C rPC that the 
legislature felt that it was  imperative to evolve a device by which an alleged 
accused is not compelled to face ignominy and disgrace at the instance of 
influential people who try to implicate their rivals in false cases.  The purpose 
behind incorporating Section 438 in CrPC was to recognise the importance of 
personal liberty and freedom in a free and democratic country. A careful reading 
of this section reveals that the legislature was keen to ensure respect for the

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personal liberty by pressing in service the age-old principle that an individual is 
presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the court.  [See: Siddharam 
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others  reported in (2011) 1 
SCC 694] 
 
19. Discussing in the context of anticipatory bail, this Court, in Siddharam (supra), 
discussed the relevance and importance of personal liberty as under:  
“36. All human beings are born with some unalienable rights 
like life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The importance of 
these natural rights can be found in the fact that these are 
fundamental for their proper existence and no other right can 
be enjoyed without the presence of right to life and liberty. 
Life bereft of liberty would be without honour and dignity and 
it would lose all significance and meaning and the life itself 
would not be worth living. That is why “liberty” is called the 
very quintessence of a civilised existence. 
37. Origin of “liberty” can be traced in the ancient Greek 
civilisation. The Greeks distinguished between the liberty of 
the group and the liberty of the individual. In 431 BC, an 
Athenian statesman described that the concept of liberty was 
the outcome of two  notions, firstly, protection of group from 
attack and secondly, the ambition of the group to realise itself 
as fully as possible through the self -realisation of the 
individual by way of human reason. Greeks assigned the duty 
of protecting their liberti es to the State. According to 
Aristotle, as the State was a means to fulfil certain 
fundamental needs of human nature and was a means for 
development of individuals' personality in association of 
fellow citizens so it was natural and necessary to man. Plat o 
found his “republic” as the best source for the achievement 
of the self-realisation of the people. 
xxx xxx xxx

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43. A distinguished former Attorney General for India, M.C. 
Setalvad in his treatise War and Civil Liberties observed that 
the French Convention stipulates common happiness as the 
end of the society, whereas Bentham postulates the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number as the end of law. Article 19 
of the Indian Constitution averts to freedom and it enumerates 
certain rights regarding individual freedom. These rights are 
vital and most important freedoms which lie at the very root of 
liberty. He further observed that the concept of civil liberty is 
essentially rooted in the philosophy of individualism. 
According to this doctrine, the highest development of the 
individual and the enrichment of his per sonality are the true 
function and end of the State. It is only when the individual has 
reached the highest state of perfection and evolved what is best 
in him that society and the State can reach their goal of 
perfection. In brief, according to this doctrine, the State exists 
mainly, if not solely, for the purpose of affording the individual 
freedom and assistance for the attainment of his growth and 
perfection. The State exists for the benefit of the individual. 
 
xxx xxx xxx 
 
49. An eminent English Judge, Lord Alfred Denning observed: 
“By personal freedom I mean freedom of every 
law-abiding citizen to think what he will, to say 
what he will, and to go where he will on his lawful 
occasion without hindrance from any person…. It 
must be matched, of course, with social security by 
which I mean the peace and good order of the 
community in which we live.” 
50. An eminent former Judge of this Court, Justice H.R. 
Khanna in a speech as published in 2 IJIL, Vol. 18 (1978), p. 
133 observed that 
“… L iberty postulates the creation of a climate 
wherein there is no suppression of the human 
spirits, wherein, there is no denial of the 
opportunity for the full growth of human 
personality, wherein head is held high and there is 
no servility of the human mind  or enslavement of 
the human body.””

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ii. Whether Section 18 of the  Act, 1989 imposes an absolute bar on the 
grant of anticipatory bail in cases registered under the said Act? 
 
20. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Bill, 1989 is extracted hereinbelow:  
“Statement of Objects and Reasons. 
1. Despite various measures to improve the socio -economic 
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, 
they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil 
rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, 
humiliations and harass ment. They have, in several brutal 
incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious 
crimes are committed against them for various historical, 
social and economic reasons. 
2. Because of the awareness created amongst the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through spread of education, 
etc. they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being 
taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights 
and resist practices of untouchability against them or demand 
statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and 
forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and 
terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes try to preserve the ir self -respect or honour of their 
women, they become irritants for the dominant and the 
mighty. Occupation and cultivation of even the Government 
allotted land by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes is resented and more often these people become victims 
of attacks by the vested interests. Of late, there has been an 
increase in the disturbing trend of commission of certain 
atrocities like making the Scheduled Castes persons eat 
inedible substances like human excreta and attacks on and 
mass killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the circumstances, the 
existing laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and 
the normal provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 have been

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found to be inadequate to check these crimes. A special 
legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed 
by non -Scheduled Castes and non -Scheduled Tribes has, 
therefore, become necessary. 
3. The term 'atrocity' has not been defined so far. It is 
considered necessary that not only the term 'atrocity' should 
be defined but stringent measures should be introduced to 
provide for higher punishments for committing such 
atrocities. It is also prop osed to enjoining on the States and 
the Union territories to take specific preventive and punitive 
measures to protect the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes fr om being victimised and where atrocities are 
committed, to provide adequate relief and as sistance to· 
rehabilitate them.” 
 
21. It is evident from the aforesaid that  the purpose of the Act , 1989 is to prevent 
the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to provide for  establishment of special courts for 
the trial of such offences and to make provisions for the relief and rehabilitation 
of the victims of such offences. 
 
22. The Act, 1989 could be said to have been  enacted to improve the social and 
economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been 
historically subjected to various indignities, humiliations and harassment  
besides deprivation of life and property  on account of their caste identity . The 
legislation, thus, intends to punish the acts  committed against the vulnerable 
sections of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community.

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23. Section 18 of the Act, 1989  which makes the remedy of anticipatory bail 
unavailable in cases falling under the Act, 1989 reads thus:  
“18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons 
committing an offence under the Act.— 
Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to 
any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation 
of having committed an offence under this Act.” 
 
24. It is manifest from a plain reading of Section 18 referred to above that it bars the 
applicability of Section 438 of the CrPC in respect of offences under the Act, 
1989. The legislature in its wisdom though t fit that the benefit of anticipatory 
bail should not be made available to the accused in respect of offences under the 
Act, 1989, having regard to the prevailing social conditions which give rise to 
such offences and  the apprehension that the perpetrators of such atrocities are 
likely to threaten and intimidate the victims and prevent or obstruct them in the 
prosecution of such offences , if the y are allowed to avail the benefit of 
anticipatory bail.  
 
25. The constitutional validity of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 fell for the 
consideration of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram K rishna 
Balothia reported in (1995) 3 SCC 221 . The challenge essentially was on the 
following two grounds:

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a. Section 18 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution  as the benefit of 
Section 438 of the CrPC is available to an accused for offences under the 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) but the same is not available for offences 
under the Act, 1989.  
b. Section 18 is also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution which protects 
the life and personal liberty of every person in this country.  
 
26. The Respondents in the aforesaid case had filed writ petitions before the High 
Court of Madhya Pradesh,  challenging the constitutional validity of certain 
provisions of the Act, 1989. Although the High Court negatived some part of the 
challenge, yet it held that Section 18 of the Act, 1989 was unconstitutional as it 
was violative of Articles 14 and 21 respectively of the Constitution of India.  
 
27. The aforesaid decision of the High Court was challenged before this Court which 
allowed the appeals and held that Section 18 of the Act, 1989 cannot be 
considered as violative of Articles 14 and 21 respectively of the Constitution. It 
was held that the offences enumerated under the Act, 1989 fall into a separate 
and special category. The Court considered Article 17 of the Constitution which 
expressly deals with abolition of “untouchability” and forbids its practice in any 
form and took the view that the off ences enumerated under Section 3(1) of the 
Act, 1989 arise out of the practice of “untouchability”. Having regard to the

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same, it was held that Section 18 of the Act, 1989 does not violate Article 14 of 
the Constitution in any manner.  
 
28. On the aspect of Article 21  of the Constitution , it was held by this Court  that 
although Article 21 protects the life and personal liberty of every person in this 
country, which also includes the right to live with dignity, yet it cannot be said 
that Section 438 of the CrPC is an integral part of Article 21. The Court took 
notice of the fact that there was no provision similar to Section 438 in the 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and ultimately concluded that anticipatory bail 
is not granted as a matter of right. It is essentially a statutory right conferred long 
after the coming into force of the Constitution. Therefore, it was observed, that 
the non-application of Section 438 to a certain distinct category of offences 
cannot be considered as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Relevant 
observations made by the Court are reproduced hereinbelow:  
“6. It is undoubtedly true that Section 438 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, which is available to an accused in 
respect of offences under the Penal Code, is not available in 
respect of offences under the said Act. But can this be 
considered as violative  of Article 14? The offences 
enumerated under the said Act fall into a separate and special 
class. Article 17 of the Constitution expressly deals with 
abolition of ‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any 
form. It also provides that enforcement of any disability 
arising out of ‘untouchability’ shall be an offence punishable 
in accordance with law. The offences, therefore, which are 
enumerated under Section 3(1) arise out of the practice of 
‘untouchability’. It is in this context that certain special 
provisions have been made in the said Act, including the

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impugned provision under Section 18 which is before us. The 
exclusion of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
in connection with offences under the said Act has to be 
viewed in the context of the prevailing social conditions which 
give rise to suc h offences, and the apprehension that 
perpetrators of such atrocities are likely to threaten and 
intimidate their victims and prevent or obstruct them in the 
prosecution of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to 
avail of anticipatory bail. In this connection we may refer to 
the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Bill, 1989, when it was introduced in Parliament.  
[….] The above statement graphically describes the social 
conditions which motivated the said legislation. It is pointed 
out in the above Statement of Objects and Reasons that when 
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes assert 
their rights and demand statutory protection, vested interests 
try to cow  them down and terrorise them. In these 
circumstances, if anticipatory bail is not made available to 
persons who commit such offences, such a denial cannot be 
considered as unreasonable or violative of Article 14, as these 
offences form a distinct class by  themselves and cannot be 
compared with other offences. 
7. We have next to examine whether Section 18 of the said Act 
violates, in any manner, Article 21 of the Constitution which 
protects the life and personal liberty of every person in this 
country. Article 21 enshrines the right to live with human 
dignity, a  precious right to which every human being is 
entitled; those who have been, for centuries, denied this right, 
more so. We find it difficult to accept the contention that 
Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral 
part of Article 21. In t he first place, there was no provision 
similar to Section 438 in the old Criminal Procedure Code.  
[…] Looking to the cautious recommendation of the Law 
Commission, the power to grant anticipatory bail is conferred 
only on a Court of Session or the High Court. Also, 
anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of right. It is 
essentially a statutory righ t conferred long after the coming 
into force of the Constitution. It cannot be considered as an 
essential ingredient of Article 21 of the Constitution. And its 
non-application to a certain special category of offences 
cannot be considered as violative of Article 21.

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      xxx xxx xxx 
9. Of course, the offences enumerated under the present case 
are very different from those under the Terrorists and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. However, 
looking to the historical background relating to the practice 
of ‘untouchability’ and the social attitudes which lead to the 
commission of such offences against Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, there is justification for an apprehension 
that if the benefit of anticipatory bail is made available to the 
persons who are alleged to have committed such offences, 
there is every likelihood of their misusing their liberty while 
on anticipatory bail to terrorise their victims and to prevent a 
proper investigation. It is in this context that Section 18 has 
been incorporated in the said Act. It cannot be considered as 
in any manner violative of Article 21. 
10. It was submitted before us that while Section 438 is 
available for graver offences under the Penal Code, it is not 
available for even “minor offences” under the said Act. This 
grievance also cannot be justified. The offences which are 
enumerated under Section 3 are offences which, to say the 
least, denigrate members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes in the eyes of society and prevent them from leading a 
life of dignity and self -respect. Such offences are co mmitted 
to humiliate and subjugate members of Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes with a view to keeping them in a state of 
servitude. These offences constitute a separate class and 
cannot be compared with offences under the Penal Code. 
xxx xxx xxx 
12. In the premises, Section 18 of the said Act cannot be 
considered as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the 
Constitution.” 
 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
29. However, over a period of time, the courts across the country  started taking 
notice of the fact that the complaints were being lodged under the Act, 1989 out 
of personal and political vendetta.  The courts took notice of the fact that the

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provisions of the Act, 1989 were being misused to some extent for purposes not 
intended by the legislation. To overcome the bar of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, 
the persons against whom such complaints were being lodged started invoking 
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 
 
30. Taking note of the aforesaid, this Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. 
State of Maharashtra and Another  reported in (2018) 6 SCC 454 , while 
quashing the proceedings instituted against the appellant therein under the 
provisions of the Act, 1989 thought fit to issue the following directions: 
“79.1. Proceedings in the present case are clear abuse of 
process of court and are quashed. 
79.2. There is no absolute bar against grant of anticipatory 
bail in cases under the Atrocities Act if no prima facie case is 
made out or where on judicial scrutiny the complaint is found 
to be prima facie mala fide. 
79.3. In view of acknowledged abuse of law of arrest in cases 
under the Atrocities Act, arrest of a public servant can only 
be after approval of the appointing authority and of a non -
public servant after approval by the SSP which may be 
granted in appropri ate cases if considered necessary for 
reasons recorded. Such reasons must be scrutinised by the 
Magistrate for permitting further detention. 
79.4. To avoid false implication of an innocent, a preliminary 
enquiry may be conducted by the DSP concerned to find out 
whether the allegations make out a case under the Atrocities 
Act and that the allegations are not frivolous or motivated. 
79.5. Any violation of Directions 79.3 and 79.4 will be 
actionable by way of disciplinary action as well as contempt. 
79.6. The above directions are prospective.”

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31. The Parliament took notice of the aforesaid directions and thought fit to carry 
out certain amendments in the Act, 1989  vide the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018. The 
relevant portion is extracted hereinbelow:  
“2. After section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the 
following section shall be inserted, namely:—  
"18A. (1) For the purposes of this Act,—  
(a) preliminary enquiry shall not be required for registration 
of a First Information Report against any person; or  
(b) the investigating officer shall not require approval for the 
arrest, if necessary, of any person, against whom an 
accusation of having committed an offence under this Act has 
been made and no procedure other than that provided under 
this Act or the Code shall apply.  
(2) The provisions of section 438 of the Code shall not apply 
to a case under this Act, notwithstanding any judgment or 
order or direction of any Court.". 
 
32. The provisions inserted by way of carving out Section 18 -A of the Act, 1989 
referred to above were made the subject matter of challenge in Prathvi Raj 
Chauhan (supra). In the said case, it was argued before a three-Judge Bench of 
this Court that Section 18 -A inserted by way of amendment was only with a 
view to nullify the judgment of this Court in Subhash Kashinath  (supra) 
referred to above . This Court noted that it was not in dispute that the bar of 
Section 18-A in the Act, 1989 had been enacted because of the judgment passed

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by this Court in Subhash Kashinath (supra) more particularly in view of the 
directions contained in para graphs 79.3 and 79.5 therein. The court also noted 
that t he review petition s filed by the Union of India in Subhash Kashinath 
(supra) were allowed and the directions contained in paragraphs 79.3 to 79.5 
referred to above were ordered to be recalled.  
 
33. In such circumstances, th is Court observed that the examination of the 
Constitutional validity of Section 18-A brought by way of  the amendment had 
been rendered academic. However, the Bench proceeded to look into the matter. 
Justice Arun Mishra,  speaking for himself and Justice Vineet Saran  held as 
under:  
“10. Section 18-A(i) was inserted owing to the decision of this 
Court in  Subhash Kashinath  [Subhash Kashinath 
Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454 : (2018) 
3 SCC (Cri) 124], which made it necessary to obtain the 
approval of the appointing authori ty concerning a public 
servant and the SSP in the case of arrest of accused persons. 
This Court has also recalled that direction on Review Petition 
(Crl.) No. 228 of 2018 decided on 1 -10-2019 [Union of 
India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761] . Thus, the 
provisions which have been made in Section 18 -A are 
rendered of academic use as they were enacted to take care 
of mandate issued in Subhash Kashinath [Subhash Kashinath 
Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454 : (2018) 
3 SCC (Cri) 124] whic h no more prevails. The provisions 
were already in Section 18 of the Act with respect to 
anticipatory bail. 
11. Concerning the applicability of provisions of Section 438 
CrPC, it shall not apply to the cases under the 1989 Act. 
However, if the complaint does not make out a prima facie

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case for applicability of the provisions of the 1989 Act, the 
bar created by Sections 18 and 18 -A(i) shall not apply. We 
have clarified this aspect while deciding the review petitions. 
12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under 
Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of 
provisions on settled parameters, as already observed while 
deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear, and 
no argument to the contrary has been raised. 
13. The challenge to the provisions has been rendered 
academic. In view of the aforesaid clarifications, we dispose 
of the petitions.” 
   
34. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat , while concurring with the judgment rendered by 
Justice Mishra, assigned his own reasons which are reproduced hereinbelow:  
“32. As far as the provision of Section 18-A and anticipatory 
bail is concerned, the judgment of Mishra, J. has stated that 
in cases where no prima facie materials exist warranting 
arrest in a complaint, the court has the inherent power to 
direct a pre-arrest bail. 
33. I would only add a caveat with the observation and 
emphasise that while considering any application seeking 
pre-arrest bail, the High Court has to balance the two 
interests : i.e. that the power is not so used as to convert the 
jurisdiction into that u nder Section 438 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, but that it is used sparingly and such orders 
made in very exceptional cases where no prima facie offence 
is made out as shown in the FIR, and further also that if such 
orders are not made in those classes of cases, the result would 
inevitably be a miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of 
law. I consider such stringent terms, otherwise contrary to the 
philosophy of bail, absolutely essential, because a liberal use 
of the power to grant pre -arrest bail wo uld defeat the 
intention of Parliament.”

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35. Thus, the decision in Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra) makes it abundantly clear 
that even while upholding the validity of Section 18 -A of the Act, 1989, th is 
Court observed that if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for 
applicability of the provisions of the Act, 1989 then the bar created by Sections 
18 and 18-A(i) shall not apply and thus the court would not be precluded from 
granting pre-arrest bail to the accused persons.  
 
36. Justice Ravindra Bhat, in his concurring judgment , observed that while 
considering any application seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with an offence 
alleged to have been committed under the provisions of the Act, 1989, the courts 
should balance two interests – On one hand they should ensure that the power is  
not exercised akin to the jurisdiction under Section 438 of the CrPC while on the 
other hand they should ensure that the power is used sparingly in exceptional 
cases where no prima facie  offence is made out as shown in the FIR or the 
complaint. It was observed that in cases where no prima facie materials exist in 
a complaint which would warrant the arrest of the accused, the court would have 
the inherent power to direct a pre-arrest bail.  
 
37. The applicability of Section 438 of the CrPC to cases registered under the Act, 
1989 was also dealt with by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vilas Pandurang 
Pawar and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2012) 8 
SCC 795. The specific issue framed and answered by this Court was whether an

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accused charged with various offences under the IPC along with offences under 
the Act, 1989 would be entitled for an anticipatory bail under Section 438 of 
CrPC.  
 
38. It was observed by this Court that although Section 18 of the Act, 1989 creates 
a bar for invoking Section 438 of the CrPC  yet the courts are entrusted with a 
duty to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence 
under the Act, 1989 is prima facie made out or not. It was further observed that 
while considering the application for anticipatory bail, the scope for appreciation 
of evidence and other material is limited and the courts are not expected to 
undertake an intricate evidentiary inquiry of the materials on record. The 
relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:  
“9. Section 18  of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking 
Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court 
to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out 
whether an offence under  Section 3(1)  of the SC/ST Act has 
been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a 
specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or 
intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste 
name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory 
bail. 
10. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 
438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the 
grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered 
against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no 
Court shall entertain application for anticipatory bail, unless 
it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. 
Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope 
for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is 
limited. Court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of 
the evidence on record . When a provision has been enacted

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in the  Special Act  to protect the persons who belong to the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has 
been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, 
the provision in the Special Act  cannot be easily brushed 
aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
39. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala reported in 
(2021) 1 SCC 733  while discussing in the context of Section 7 of the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, ela borated on the 
requirement of the existence of a prima facie case under Section 18 of the Act, 
1989 for the bar of anticipatory bail to become applicable, as follows:  
“25. Thus, even in the context of legislation, such as the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act 1989, where a bar is interposed by the 
provisions of Section 18 and Sub -section (2) of Section 18-A 
on the application of Section 438 of the CrPC, this Court has 
held that the bar will not apply where the complaint does not 
make out “a prima facie case” for the applicability of the 
provisions of the Act.  A statutory exclusion of the right to 
access remedies for bail is construed st rictly, for a purpose. 
Excluding access to bail as a remedy, impinges upon human 
liberty. Hence, the decision in Chauhan (supra) held that the 
exclusion will not be attracted where the complaint does not 
prima facie indicate a case attracting the applicability of the 
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
40. This Court, in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra 
and Others reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602, while discussing a similarly worded 
provision in the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, held 
as follows:

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“13. We would, therefore, at this stage like to administer a 
word of caution to the Designated Courts regarding 
invoking the provisions of TADA merely because the 
investigating officer at some stage of the investigation 
chooses to add an offence under same (sic  some) 
provisions of TADA against an accused person, more often 
than not while opposing grant of bail, anticipatory or 
otherwise. The Designated Courts should always consider 
carefully the material available on the record and apply 
their mind to see whether the provisions of TADA are even 
prima facie attracted.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
a. Significance of the expression “arrest of any person” appearing in 
Section 18 of the Act, 1989 
 
41. It is clear from the aforesaid discussion that Section 18 of the Act, 1989 does not 
impose an absolute fetter on the power of the courts to examine whether a prima 
facie case attracting the provisions of the Act, 1989 is made out or not. As 
discussed, Section 18 stipulates that in any case which involves the arrest of any 
person on the accusation of having committed an offence under the Act, 1989, 
the benefit of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of CrPC would not be available 
to the accused. We have deliberated on the significance of the expression “arrest 
of any person” appearing in the text of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 and are of 
the view that Section 18 bars the remedy of anticipatory bail only in those cases 
where a valid arrest of the accused person can be made as per Section 41 read 
with Section 60A of CrPC.

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42. Section 60A of CrPC provides that no arrest shall be made except in accordance 
with the provisions of CrPC or any other law for the time being in force and 
providing for arrest. Section 41 of CrPC confers upon the police the power to 
arrest without warrant in certain situations as specified therein. Sections 41(1)(b) 
and 41(1)(ba) respectively of CrPC read as follows:  
“41. When police may arrest without warrant .—(1) Any 
police officer may without an order from a  Magistrate and 
without a warrant, arrest any person—  
xxx xxx xxx  
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or 
credible information has been  received, or a reasonable 
suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less 
than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether 
with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, 
namely:— 
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of 
such complaint, information, or  suspicion that such 
person has committed the said offence; 
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is 
necessary— 
(a) to prevent such person from committing any 
further offence; or 
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or 
(c) to prevent such person from causing the 
evidence of the offence to disappear or  tampering 
with such evidence in any manner; or 
(d) to prevent such person from making any 
inducement, threat or promise to any person  
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to

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dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the  
Court or to the police officer; or 
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence 
in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, 
and the police officer shall record while making 
such arrest, his reasons in writing. 
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the 
arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of 
this sub -section, record the reasons in writing for not 
making the arrest.  
(ba) against whom credible information has been received 
that he has committed a cognizable  offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven 
years whether with or without fine or with death sentence and 
the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of  that 
information that such person has committed the said 
offence.”  
 
43. A plain reading of the above provision shows that an arrest can be effected if 
there is a reasonable complaint, credible information or reasonable suspicion and 
the police officer has a reason to believe that such offence has been committed 
by the accused person and the arrest is necessary. It is worth noting that the 
words ‘complaint’, ‘information’ and ‘suspicion’ are qualified by the adjectives 
‘reasonable’, ‘credible’ and ‘reasonable’ respectively. Similarly, the police 
officer is required to have a ‘reason to believe’ based on the information he has 
received that the accused person has committed the alleged offence.  
 
44. It is settled law that arrest cannot be made merely because it is lawful to do so. 
The exercise of the power to arrest has been qualified by a twofold requirement

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– first, of having a reasonable belief that the accused person has committed the 
offence and secondly, that there is a need to arrest the accused person.  This 
Court in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 held that 
non-observance of the requirements stipulated under Sections 41 and 41A of 
CrPC respectively before effecting arrest would entitle the accused to be 
enlarged on bail. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow:  
“25. The consequence of non -compliance with Section 41 
shall certainly inure to the benefit of the person suspected of 
the offence. Resultantly, while considering the application for 
enlargement on bail, courts will have to satisfy themselves on 
the due compliance of this provision. Any non -compliance 
would entitle the accused to a grant of bail.” 
 
45. In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, 
this Court laid emphasis on the phrases “credible information” and “reasonable 
suspicion” as they appear in Section 41 of CrPC and held as follows:   
“5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts 
scars forever. Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is 
a battle between the lawmakers and the police and it seems 
that the police has not learnt its lesson: the lesson implicit and 
embodied in CrPC. It has not come out of its colonial image 
despite six decades of Independence, it is largely considered 
as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered 
a friend of public. The need for caution in exercising the 
drastic power of arrest has been emphasised time and again 
by the courts but has not yielded desired result. Power to 
arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure 
of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest 
is one of the lucrative sources  of police corruption. The 
attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is

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despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers 
who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive. 
6. Law Commissions, Police Commissions and this Court in 
a large number of judgments emphasised the need to maintain 
a balance between individual liberty and societal order while 
exercising the power of arrest. Police officers make arrest as 
they believe that they possess the power to do so. As the arrest 
curtails freedom, brings humiliation and casts scars forever, 
we feel differently. We believe that no arrest should be made 
only because the offence is non -bailable and cognizable and 
therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so. The existence 
of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the 
exercise of it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, 
the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. 
No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere 
allegation of commission of an offence made against a 
person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that 
no arrest is made without a reasonable satisfaction reached 
after some investigation as to the genuineness of the 
allegation. Despite this legal position, the legislature did not 
find any improvement. Numbers of arrest have not decreased. 
Ultimately, Parliament had to intervene and on the 
recommendation of the 177th Report of the Law Commission 
submitted in the year 2001, Section 41 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (for short “CrPC”), in the present form came to 
be enacted. It is interesting to note that such a 
recommendation was made by the Law Commission in its 
152nd and 154th Report submitted as back in the year 1994. 
The value of the proportionality permeates the amendment 
relating to arrest. 
xxx xxx xxx 
7.3. In pith and core, the police officer before arrest must put 
a question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What 
purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only 
after these questions are addressed and one or the other 
conditions as  enumerated above is satisfied, the power of 
arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first the 
police officers should have reason to believe on the basis of 
information and material that the accused has committed the 
offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied

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further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more 
purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of 
Section 41 CrPC. 
xxx xxx xxx 
 
10. We are of the opinion that if the provisions of Section 41 
CrPC which authorises the police officer to arrest an accused 
without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant 
are scrupulously enforced, the wrong committed by the police 
officers intentionally or unwittingly would be reversed and 
the number of cases which come to the Court for grant of 
anticipatory bail will substantially reduce. We would like to 
emphasise that the practice of mechanically reproducing in 
the case diary all or most of the reasons contained in Section 
41 CrPC for effecting arrest be discouraged and 
discontinued.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
46. The aforesaid discussion indicates that the term ‘arrest’ appearing in the text of 
Section 18 of the Act, 1989 should be construed and understood in the larger 
context of the powers of police to effect an arrest and the restrictions imposed 
by the statute and the courts on the exercise of such power. Seen thus, it can be 
said that the bar under Section 18 of the Act, 1989 would apply only to those 
cases where prima facie materials exist pointing towards the commission of an 
offence under the Act, 1989. We say so because it is only when a prima facie 
case is made out that the pre-arrest requirements as stipulated under Section 41 
of CrPC could be said to be satisfied.

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iii. When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in a given  
FIR/complaint?  
 
47. Prima facie is a Latin term that translates to “at first sight” or “based on first 
impression”. The expression “where no prima facie materials exist warranting 
arrest in a complaint or FIR ” should be understood as “ when based on first 
impression, no offence is made out as shown in the FIR or the complaint”. This 
means that when the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under the 
Act, 1989 are not made out upon the reading of the complaint, no case can be 
said to exist prima facie.   
 
48. As a sequitur, i f the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under the 
Act, 1989 are not disclosed on the prima facie reading of the allegations levelled 
in the complaint or FIR, then in such circumstances , as per the consistent 
exposition by various decisions of this Court,  the bar of Section 18 would not 
apply and the courts would not be absolutely precluded from granting pre-arrest 
bail to the accused persons.  
 
49. In our opinion, the aforesaid is the only test that the court should apply, when an 
accused prays for anticipatory bail in connection with any offence alleged to 
have been committed under the provisions of the Act, 1989. In a given case, an 
accused may argue that although the allegations levelled in the FIR or the

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complaint do disclose the commission of an offence under the Act, 1989, yet the 
FIR or the complaint being p alpably false on account of political  or private  
vendetta, the court should consider the plea for grant of anticipatory bail despite 
the specific bar of Section 18 of the Act, 1989.  However, if the accused puts 
forward the case of malicious prosecution  on account of  political or private 
vendetta then the same can be considered only by the High Court in exercise of 
its inherent powers under Section 482  of the Code or in exercise of its 
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, 
powers under Section 438 of the CrPC cannot be exercised once the contents of 
the complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie  case. In other words, if all the 
ingredients necessary for constituting the offence are borne out from the 
complaint, then the remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to the 
accused.  
 
50. The duty to determine prima facie existence of the case is cast upon the courts 
with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to the accused. 
The courts should not shy away from conducting  a preliminary  inquiry to 
determine if the narration of facts in the complaint/FIR in fact discloses the 
essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under the Act, 1989. It is 
expected of the courts to apply their judicial mind to determine whether the 
allegations levelled in the complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy the ingredients 
constituting the alleged offence. Such application of judicial mind should be

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independent and without being influenced  by the provisions figuring in the 
complaint/FIR. The aforesaid role of the courts assumes even more importance 
when a prima facie finding on the case has the effect of precluding the accused 
person from seeking anticipatory bail, which is an important concomitant of 
personal liberty of the individual. 
    
51. The aforesaid position is also apparent from a plain construction of the text of 
Section 18 of the Act, 1989. The words “having committed an offence under this 
Act” denote that it is only when the accusation in the complaint clearly points 
towards the commission of an offence under the Act, 1989 that the bar of Section 
18 would apply. The minimum threshold for determining whether an offence 
under the Act has been committed or not is to ascertain whether all the 
ingredients which are necessary to constitute  the offence are prima facie  
disclosed in the complaint or not. An accusation which does not disclose the 
necessary ingredients of the offence on a prima facie reading cannot be said to 
be sufficient to bring into operation the bar envisaged by Section 18 of the Act, 
1989. Holding otherwise would mean that even a plain accusation, devoid of the 
essential ingredients required for constituting the offence, would be enough for 
invoking the bar under Section 18. In our considered view, such an approach 
would not be in line with the dictum as laid by this Court while upholding the 
Constitutionality of Sections 18 and 18-A respectively of the Act, 1989.

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52. Having said so, we would also like to state that the case at hand is  of a unique 
nature and one that falls in a separate category. With the advent of internet and 
social media, cases like the one we are dealing with are likely to come up more 
frequently. In the present case, the basis of the FIR is the YouTube video and 
some other digital materials alleged to have been published by the appellant in 
the public domain . It is not the case of the complainant that the appellant 
subjected him to insults or humiliations in some public gathering, the details of 
which can only be gathered by recording the statements of witnesses. The entire 
incriminatory material based upon which the complaint came to be lodged was 
available in the public domain by virtue of having been uploaded on social media 
platforms. We had the occasion to threadbare go through the transcript of the 
YouTube video. We may only say that in cases like the one in hand, the courts 
should have the discretion to look into the materials based upon which the 
complaint has been registered, in addition to verifying the averments made in 
the complaint. If on a prima facie reading of the materials referred to in the 
complaint and the complaint itself, the ingredients necessary for constituting the 
offence are not made out, then the bar of Section 18 would not be applicable and 
it would be open to the courts to consider the plea for the grant pre-arrest bail on 
its own merits.

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iv. Whether the averments in the FIR/complaint in question  disclose 
commission of any offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989? 
 
53. It is the case of the complainant as well as the State that considering the rash and 
derogatory statements alleged to have been made by the appellant herein, he 
could be said to have prima facie committed the offence under Sections 3(1)(r) 
and 3(1)(u) respectively of the Act, 1989.  
 
54. We shall first proceed to examine whether the necessary ingredients to constitute 
the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are prima face disclosed on a 
plain reading of the FIR. Section 3(1)(r) reads thus:  
“Section 3 of the Act 1989: 
Punishments for offences of atrocities. — [(1) Whoever, not 
being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— 
XXX  XXX  XXX  
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate 
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any 
place within public view;” 
          (Emphasis supplied) 
 
55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 
1989 are:  
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or 
Scheduled Tribe;

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b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe;  
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and 
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.  
 
56. It is relevant to note that Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is similarly worded as 
the erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the Act,  1989 which was in force prior to its 
substitution with effect from 26.01.2016. 
 
57. In the case at hand, the appellant is alleged to have  published a video on 
YouTube, containing a s lew of reckless statements in the form of  allegations 
levelled against the complainant. We are not supposed to look into the veracity 
or the truthfulness of such allegations as contained in the video. We are only 
trying to understand that even if all the statements alleged to have been made by 
the appellant are believed to be true whe ther any offence under Section 3(1)(r) 
of the Act, 1989 could be said to have been  prima facie  committed. In our 
opinion, the answer should be in the negative.  
 
58. We say so for t he reason that all insults or intimidations to a member of the 
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under the 
Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on  the ground that  the victim 
belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. There is nothing in the transcript

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of the uploaded video to indicate even prime facie that those allegations were 
made by the appellant only on account of the fact that the complainant belongs 
to a Scheduled Caste. From the nature of the allegations made by the appellant, 
it appears that he is at inimical terms with the complainant. His intention may be 
to malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the reason that the 
complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste.  
 
59. In the aforesaid context, we may refer  to and rely upon a three-Judge Bench 
decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma (supra). The relevant observations are 
reproduced below: 
“13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would 
indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation 
with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or 
a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will 
not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or 
intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve 
the socio-economic conditions of t he Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. 
Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a 
member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to 
indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of 
title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either 
the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has 
a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. 
Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have  
invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 
has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties 
are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure 
established by law. Such action is not for the reason that 
Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste.

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xxx  xxx  xxx 
17. In another judgment reported as  Khuman Singh v. State 
of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 
: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104] , this Court held that in a case 
for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the 
deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough 
to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was 
nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the 
appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled 
Caste. The Court held as under: 
“15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence 
must be such so as to attract the offence under 
Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have 
been committed against the person on the ground 
that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact 
that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” 
Scheduled Caste is not disputed. The re is no 
evidence to show that the offence was committed 
only on the ground that the victim was a member of 
the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction 
of the appellant -accused under Section 3(2)(v) of 
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 
 
18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely 
on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste 
unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of 
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the 
victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties 
are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of 
hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the 
property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the 
offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
60. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the 
Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member

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of a Scheduled Caste  or a Scheduled Tribe,  unless there is an intention to 
humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community. In 
other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional 
insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or 
Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because 
it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe . On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is 
attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the 
person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 
We say so because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to 
provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted 
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their 
caste status.  
 
a. Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing in Section 
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 
 
 
61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) 
of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who 
is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or 
intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of 
caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or

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intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or 
to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper 
castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables” , the notions of ‘purity’ and 
‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type 
envisaged by the Act, 1989.  
 
62. We would like to refer to the observations of t his Court in Ram K rishna 
Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon the idea of “humiliation” as it has 
been used under the Act, 1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences 
enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a separate category as they arise from 
the practice of ‘untouchability’ and thus the Parliament was competent to enact 
special laws treating such offences and offenders as  belonging to a  separate 
category. Referring to the Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 
it was observed by this Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 
1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and subjected to humiliation and 
indignations upon assertion of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of 
untouchability. For this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult  or 
intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract 
the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to 
subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation.

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63. V. Geetha in  her paper titled  Bereft of Being: The Humiliations of 
Untouchability1 describes humiliation as an experience that is “felt, held and 
savoured in the very gut of our existence.”  Humiliation, in her understanding, 
can either be suffered as a one-time occurrence which bruises the self-esteem or 
pride of an individual, or it can be “suffered as a condition that is degrading and 
wounding.” In the words of Gopal Guru, humiliation is not so much a physical 
injury but is in the nature of a psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar 
on the heart.  
 
64. Explaining the social structures that perpetuate humiliation, Gopal Guru, in  an 
introduction to his book 2 writes that “humiliation is almost endemic to social 
life that is active basically through asymmetries of intersecting sects of attitudes 
– arrogance and obeisance, self -respect and servility and reverence and 
repulsion. Discussing on how the basis of humiliation varies in different 
societies, depending upon the social context, he observes that the idea and 
practice of humiliation “continues to survive in different forms depending upon 
the specific nature of the social context. For example, in the West it is the attitude 
of race that is at the base of humiliation. In the East, it is the notion of 
untouchability that foregrounds the form and content of humiliation.”  
 
 
1 Humiliation: Claims and Context, Oxford University Press, First Edition (2009), pp. 95 -107 
2 Humiliation: Claims and Context (supra), pp. 1-22

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65. While Gopal Guru makes the aforesaid observation in the context of different 
societies in relation to one another, such as the East and the West, in our opinion 
the observations are  equally applicable to specific individual societies as well 
wherein multiple varying grounds of humiliation like gender, caste, race, etc. 
can co-exist and apply to the same or different individuals and groups.   
 
66. Bhikhu Parekh in his paper titled Logic of Humiliation3 attempts to differentiate 
humiliation from other concepts that it is generally confused with. He gives the 
example of the ticket inspector who threw Gandhi off the train in South Africa 
to argue that humiliation might, but need not, involve physical cruelty. On the 
contrary, he contends that a man who starves another to death and tortures him, 
shows cruelty but does not necessarily humiliate him. He argues the same 
regarding the difference between insult and humiliation and observes that 
although humiliation generally involves insult, yet insult alone is not sufficient 
to constitute humiliation.  
 
67. On the social context of humiliation, Parekh writes that “organised or 
institutionalized humiliation exists when social institutions and practices 
embody disrespect for, and systematically violate the self -respect of, groups of 
individuals.” Drawing a distinction between systemic and regimented 
 
3 Humiliation: Claims and Context (supra), pp. 23-40

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humiliation on the one hand as distinguished from isolated incidents of 
humiliation on the other, he observes that while the latter is present in modern 
liberal societies, the former is found in societies structured on the basis of 
slavery, racial segregation, untouchability, caste system, hierarchical status, etc. 
According to him, the reason for the same is that the modern liberal societies, 
though marked by deep economic, political and other inequalities, allow for 
vertical mobility owing to the fluid nature of the inequalities. Whereas, societies 
based on race, caste system, etc. are grounded in inequalities like colour, birth, 
ethnicity, etc. which are unalterable  and deeply entrenched in the very 
foundational fabric of such  a society. The inflexible nature of the basis of 
inequalities leads to the existence of a  more structural and systemic form of 
humiliation, as the perpetrator is assured of its place in the structure of the 
society owing to its immobility. Since no one can be assured of the same in a  
modern liberal society which is marked by vertical mobility in the social 
structure, there is no incentive for anyone to have a regimented system of 
humiliation.  
 
68. Resistance is internal to humiliation, and some scholars have argued that 
humiliation is only defined on the basis of the claims made against it. Thus, those 
who are humiliated also inherently possess the capacity to protest against it . 
However, those who protest also run the risk of inciting opposition from those 
who want to push the traditionally humiliated groups to the margins. This

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apprehension of opposition and push back from the dominant against the 
marginalised is also evident from the Statements of Objects of the Act, 1989, as 
discussed by this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra).  
 
69. What appears from the aforesaid discussion is that the expression “intent to 
humiliate” as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must necessarily be 
construed in the larger context in which the concept of humiliation of the 
marginalised groups has been understood by various scholars. It is not ordinary 
insult or intimidation which would amount to  ‘humiliation’ that is sought to be 
made punishable under the Act, 1989. The Parliament, by way of different 
legislations, has over the years sought to target humiliation based on different 
grounds and identities which exist in the society. The Protection of Women from 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 seeks to punish humiliation based on gender 
inequalities by specifically including the term ‘humiliation’ in the definition of 
“domestic violence”. Similarly, The Sexual Harassment of Women at 
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 includes treatment 
causing humiliation to a female employee and which may likely affect her health 
and safety within the definition of sexual harassment.  
 
70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term ‘humiliation’ as it 
appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way 
that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled

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Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated 
with the caste identity of such members. 
 
71. We would also like to refer to Section 7(1)(d) of The Protection of Civil Rights 
Act, 1955  (“Civil Rights Act ”) at this juncture to give a more meaningful 
construction to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. The provision reads as follows:  
“7. Punishment for other offences arising out of 
“untouchability”.—(1) Whoever—  
xxx xxx xxx  
(d) insults or attempts to insult, on the ground of 
“untouchability”, a member of a Scheduled Caste;  
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less 
than one month and not more than six months, and also with 
fine which shall be not less than one hundred rupees and not 
more than five hundred rupees.”   
 
72. It is clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid provision that any insult against 
a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of 
“untouchability” was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six 
months under the Civil Rights Act. With the passage of time, it was realised by 
the legislature that the Civil Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle 
caste-based offences and the practice of “untouchability”, leading to the 
enactment of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for combating 
such practices. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus, be seen in the 
context of Section 7(1)(d) of the Civil Rights Act. Seen thus, the words “with an

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intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” become 
inseparable from the underlying idea of “untouchability” which is sought to be 
remedied and punished by the Act, 1989.  
 
73. A two -Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) 
explained that for a n act of intentional insult to attract the offence under 
erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) 
of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. 
Relevant observations is extracted hereinbelow:  
“18. […]The legislative intent seems to be clear that every 
insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not 
amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act 
unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the 
victim because of he  being a member of a particular 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot 
(bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place 
within public view, this would obviously constitute an act 
intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive 
language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, 
who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may 
not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words 
are laced with casteist remarks. […]”  
 
74. Having regard to the reprehensible conduct and the nature of the  derogatory 
statements made, the appellant , at best could be said to have  prima facie 
committed the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. 
If that be so , it is always open for the complainant to prosecute the appellant 
accordingly. However, the complainant could not have invoked the provisions

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of the Act, 1989 only on the premise that he is member of Scheduled Caste, more 
so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of the transcript of the video and the 
complaint fails to disclose that the actions of the appellant were impelled by the 
caste identity of the complainant.  
 
v. Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989 is prima 
facie made out in the FIR/complaint in question? 
 
75. Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989 reads thus:  
“Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever, not 
being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— 
xxx   xxx   xxx 
(u) by words either written or spoken or by signs or by visible 
representation or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote 
feelings of enmity, hatred or ill -will against members of the 
Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes; 
xxx   xxx   xxx 
Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than six months but which may extend to five years 
and with fine”  
     (Emphasis supplied) 
 
76. The basic ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the 
Act, 1989 are:   
a. Accused should not be a member of the Schedule Caste or Scheduled 
Tribe;

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b. Accused should by words, either written or spoken , or by signs or by 
visible representation or otherwise; 
c. Promote or attempt to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill -will 
against members of the Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribes.  
 
77. In our opinion, there is nothing to even prima facie indicate that the appellant by 
publishing the video on YouTube promoted or attempted to promote feelings of 
enmity, hatred or ill-will against the members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled 
Tribes. The video has nothing to do in general with the members of Scheduled 
Caste or the Scheduled Tribe . His target was just the complainant alone.  The 
offence under Section 3(1)(u) will come into play only when any person is trying 
to promote ill feeling or enmity against the members of the scheduled castes or 
scheduled tribes as a group and not as individuals.  
 
vi. Whether mere knowledge of the caste identity of the complainant is 
sufficient to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989?  
 
78. It was also sought to be argued that the appellant knew very well that the 
complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste and despite such knowledge if he  
went on to  make derogatory utterances in the video then the offence under 
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) respectively of the Act, 1989 could be said to have 
been prima facie made out.

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79. We find no merit in the aforesaid submission. Wherever the legislature intended 
that mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of Scheduled Caste 
or Scheduled Tribe would be sufficient to  constitute an offence under the Act, 
1989, it has said so in so many words. We may reproduce some of the relevant 
provisions where knowledge that the complainant belongs to the Scheduled 
Castes or Scheduled Tribes is sufficient in itself to constitute the offence:  
“3. Punishments for offences atrocities.-(1) 
xxx   xxx   xxx 
(w)(i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a 
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she 
belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, when 
such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the 
recipient’s consent;  
(ii) uses words, acts or gestures of a sexual nature towards a 
woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, 
knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled 
Tribe.” 
xxx   xxx   xxx 
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a 
Scheduled Tribe,─ 
xxx   xxx   xxx 
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 
1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years 
or more against a person or property  [knowing that such 
person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled 
Tribe or such property belongs to such member], shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine;

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(va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a 
person or property, knowing that such person is a member of 
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe  or such property 
belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such 
punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 
1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine;]” 
     (Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
80. At the cost of repetition, the  words in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act , 1989  are 
altogether different. Mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of 
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r) 
of the Act, 1989. As discussed earlier, the offence must have been committed 
against the person on the ground or for the reason that such person is a member 
of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. When we are considering whether prima 
facie materials exist , warranting arrest of the appellant, there is  nothing to 
indicate that the allegations/statements alleged to have been made by the 
appellant were for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled 
Caste.  
 
81. The High Court in its impugned order has observed  “materials on record do 
indicate that the video is intended to insult and humiliate the second 
respondent.” The High Court may be right in observing that the intention of the 
appellant could have been to insult and humiliate the complainant but the High 
Court failed to consider whether such insult or humiliation was on account of or 
for the reason that the complainant belongs to Scheduled Caste. Is it the case of

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the complainant that  had he not belonged to a Scheduled Caste, the appellant 
would not have levelled the allegations? The answer lies in the question itself.  
 
82. A penal statute must receive strict construction. A principle of statutory 
interpretation embodies the policy of the law, which is in turn based on public 
policy. The court presumes, unless the contrary intention appears, that the 
legislator intended to co nform to this legal policy.  A principle of statutory 
interpretation can, therefore, be described as a principle of legal policy 
formulated as a guide to the legislative intention.  
 
83. Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) has observed that  “the 
strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in four ways: in the 
requirement of express language for the creation of an offence; in interpreting 
strictly words setting out the elements of an offence; in requiring the fulfilment 
to the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment; and 
in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal 
procedure and jurisdiction.” 
 
84. William F. Craies in Statute Law (7th Edn. at p. 530) while referring to U.S. v. 
Wiltberger [5 L Ed 37 : 18 US (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820)] observes thus:  
“The distinction between a strict construction and a more free 
one has, no doubt, in modern times almost disappeared, and 
the question now is, what is the true construction of the

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statute? I should say that in a criminal statute you must be 
quite sure that the offence charged is within the letter of the 
law. This rule is said to be founded on the tenderness of the 
law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle 
that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, and 
not in the judicial department, for it is the legislature, not the 
court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
85. In Tuck & Sons v. Priester  reported in (1887) 19 QBD 629 (CA) , which was 
followed in London and Country Commercial Properties Investments Ltd. v. 
Attorney General reported in (1953) 1 WLR 312 : (1953) 1 All ER 436, it was 
observed thus:  
“We must be very careful in construing that section, because 
it imposes a penalty. If there is a reasonable interpretation, 
which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must 
adopt that construction. Unless penalties are imposed in clear 
terms, th ey are not enforceable. Also, where various 
interpretations of a section are admissible it is a strong 
reason against adopting a particular interpretation if it shall 
appear that the result would be unreasonable or oppressive.” 
             (Emphasis supplied) 
 
86. Blackburn, J. in Willis v. Thorp reported in (1875) LR 10 QB 383 observed that 
“when the legislature imposes a penalty, the words imposing it must be clear 
and distinct.” 
 
87. We have construed Section 18 of the Act, 1989 keeping in mind the aforesaid 
principles of statutory construction. We are of the view that taking any other

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view than the one taken by us would be unreasonable, oppressive and not in tune 
with the consecrated principles of our Constitution.  
 
H. CONCLUSION 
 
 
88. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The 
impugned order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.  
 
89. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant by police in connection with 
the First Information Report No. 899 of 2023 lodged at the Elamakkara Police 
Station, he shall be released on bail subject to terms and conditions , which the 
Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.  
 
90. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.  
 
…………………………………..J. 
         (J.B. Pardiwala) 
 
 
………………………………….J. 
(Manoj Misra) 
 
New Delhi 
 
August 23, 2024