Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)

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2024 INSC 414
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REPORTABLE 
   
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).              OF 2024 
             (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) NO(S).        OF 2024) 
            (D.No. 42896/2023) 
 
 
 
PRABIR PURKAYASTHA          ….APPELLANT(S) 
 
 
VERSUS 
 
 
STATE(NCT OF DELHI)         …RESPONDENT(S) 
 
      
J U D G M E N T 
 
 
Mehta, J. 
 
1. Leave granted. 
2. The instant appeal by special leave is preferred on behalf of 
the appellant for assailing the order dated 13 th October, 2023  
passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi whereby 
the learned Single Judge dismissed the  Criminal Miscellaneous 
Case No. 7278 of 2023 filed by the appellant seeking the following 
directions: - 
 

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"A. Declare the arrest of the Petitioner as illegal and in gross 
violation of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner guaranteed 
under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India in relation 
to FIR No. 224/2023 dated 17.08.2023 PS Special Cell, Lodhi 
Road, Delhi Police; 
B. Declare and set aside the Remand Order dated 04.10.2023 
passed by the Ld. Special Judge, Patiala House Court as null 
and void as the same being passed in complete violation of all 
constitutional mandates including failure to consult and to be 
defended by legal practitioner of his choice during the Remand 
Proceedings, being violative of Petitioner's right guaranteed 
under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 
C. Direct immediate release of the Petitioner from custody in 
FIR No. 224/2023 dated 17.08.2023 PS Special Cell, Lodhi 
Road, Delhi Police." 
 
Brief Facts: - 
3. The officers of the PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi 
carried out extensive raids at the residential and official premises 
of the appellant and the company, namely, M/s. PPK Newscli ck 
Studio Pvt. Ltd. (“said company”)  of which the appellant is the 
Director in connection with FIR No. 224 of 2023 dated 17th August, 
2023 registered at PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi for the 
offences punishable under Sections 13 , 16, 17, 18, 22C of the  
Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967(for short  “UAPA”) read 
with Section 153A , 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 
1860(hereinafter being referred to as the ‘IPC’).  During the course 
of the search and seizure proceedings, numerous documents and 
digital devices belonging to the appellant, the company and other 

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employees of the company were seized.  The appellant was arrested 
in connection with the said FIR on 3 rd October, 2023 vide arrest 
memo(Annexure P-7) prepared at PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, 
New Delhi. 
4. It is relevant to mention here that the said arrest memo is in 
a computerised format and does not contain any column regarding 
the ‘grounds of arrest’ of the appellant.  This very issue is primarily 
the bone of contention between the parties to the appeal. 
5. The appellant was presented in the Court of Learned 
Additional Sessions Judge -02, Patiala House  Courts, New 
Delhi(hereinafter being referred to as the ‘ Remand Judge’) on 4th 
October, 2023, sometime before 6:00 a.m. which fact is manifested 
from the remand order(Annexure P-1) placed on record of appeal 
with I.A. No. 217857  of 2023.  The appellant was remanded to 
seven days police custody vide order dated 4th October, 2023. 
6. The proceedings of remand have been seriously criticized as 
being manipulated by Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for 
the appellant and aspersions of subsequent insertions in the 
remand order have been made . Hence, it would be apposite to 
reproduce the remand order dated 4th October, 2023 in pictorial 
form so as to form a part of this judgment. 

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7. The appellant promptly questioned his arrest and the police 
custody remand granted by the learned Remand Judge vide order 
dated 4th October, 2023 by preferring Criminal Miscellaneous Case 
No. 7278 of 2023 in the High Court of Delhi which stands rejected 
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi  vide 
judgment dated 13th October, 2023.  The said order is subjected to 
challenge in this appeal by special leave. 
 
Submissions on behalf of the appellant: - 
 
8. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel representing the 
appellant canvassed the following submissions in order to question 
the proceedings of arrest and remand of the appellant: - 
(i) That the FIR No. 224 of 2023(FIR in connection of which 
appellant was arrested)  is virtually nothing but a second 
FIR on same facts because prior thereto, another F IR No. 
116 of 2020 dated 26th August, 2020 had been registered 
by PS EOW, Delhi Police (“EOW FIR”) alleging violation of 
Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) regulations and other laws 
of the country by the appellant and the company, thereby 

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causing loss to the exchequer.  A copy of the said FIR was, 
however, not provided to the appellant.  By treating the 
EOW FIR as disclosing predicate offences, the Directorate 
of Enforcement(for short “ED”) registered an Enforcement 
Case Information Report(for short ‘ECIR’)  for the offences 
punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of 
Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short ‘PMLA’) .  The ED 
carried out extensive search and seizure operations at 
various places including the office of the company-M/s. 
PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd. , of which the appellant is 
the Director. 
(ii) The company assailed the ECIR by filing Writ Petition(Crl.) 
Nos. 1129 of 2021 and 1130 of 2021  wherein interim 
protection against coercive steps was granted by High 
Court of Delhi on 21st June, 2021.  The appellant was also 
provided interim protection in an application seeking 
anticipatory bail vide order dated 7th July, 2021. 
(iii) The FIR No. 224  of 2023 has been registered purely on 
conjectures and surmises  without there being any 
substance in the allegations set out in the report.  The 
contents of the FIR  which were provided to the appellant 

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at a much later stage discloses a  purely fictional story 
without any fundamental facts  or material warranting 
registration of the FIR. 
(iv) Admittedly, the copy of FIR No. 224 of 2023 was neither 
made available in the public domain nor a copy thereof 
supplied to the appellant until his arrest and remand 
which is in complete violation of the fundamental Right to 
Life and Personal Liberty enshrined in Articles 20, 21 and 
22 of the Constitution of India. 
(v) Shri Sibal pointed out that the learned Remand Judge , 
vide order dated 5th October, 2023, allowed the application 
filed by the appellant seeking certified copy of the said FIR 
which was provided to the learned counsel for the 
appellant in the late evening on 5th October, 2023, i.e., well 
after the appellant had been remanded to police custody. 
(vi) That the grounds of arrest were not informed to the 
appellant either orally or in writing and that such action is 
in gross violation of the constitutional mandate under 
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of 
the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter being 
referred to as the ‘CrPC’). 

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(vii) Reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel on the 
judgment of this Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of 
India and Others 1 and it was contended that the mere 
passing of successive remand orders would not be 
sufficient to validate the initial arrest, if such arrest was 
not in conformity with law.  Learned senior counsel urged 
that this Court in the c ase of Pankaj Bansal (supra) 
interpreted the provision of Section 19(1) of PMLA which is 
pari materia to the provisions contained in Section 43B(1) 
of the UAPA.  Thus, the said judgment fully applies to the 
case of the appellant. 
(viii) Shri Sibal referred to the observations made in the 
judgment of Pankaj Bansal(supra) and urged that since 
the grounds of arrest were not furnished to the appellant 
at the time of his arrest and before remanding him to police 
custody, the continued custody  of the appellant is 
rendered grossly illegal and a nullity in the eyes of law 
because the same is hit by the mandate of Article 22(1) of 
the Constitution of India. 
 
1 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244 

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(ix) Shri Sibal further urged that the view taken by a two-
Judge Bench of this Court in  Ram Kishor Arora v. 
Directorate of Enforcement2 holding the judgment in 
Pankaj Bansal (supra) to be prospective in operation 
would also not come in the way of the appellant in seeking 
the relief.  He pointed out that the judgment in the case of 
Pankaj Bansal (supra) was pronounced on 3 rd October, 
2023 whereas the illegal remand order of the appellant was 
passed on 4th October, 2023 and hence, the law laid down 
in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra) is fully applicable to 
the case of the  appellant despite the interpretation given 
in Ram Kishor Arora(supra). 
(x) That the arrest of the appellant is in gross violation of the 
provisions contained in Article 22 of the Constitution of 
India, hence, the appellant is entitled to seek a direction 
for quashment of the remand order and release from 
custody forthwith. 
(xi) That the action of the Investigating Officer in arresting and 
in seeking remand of the appellant is not only mala fide 
but also fraught with fraud of the highest order.   
 
2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682 

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(xii) Referring to the remand order dated 4 th October, 2023, it 
was contended that the appellant was kept confined 
overnight by the Investigating Officer without conveying 
the grounds of arrest  to him.   He was presented in the 
Court of the learned Remand Judge on 4th October, 2023 
in the early morning without informing Shri Arshdeep 
Khurana, the Advocate engaged on behalf of the appellant 
who was admittedly in contact with the Investigating 
Officer because he had attended the proceedings  at the 
Police Station Lodhi Colony, post the appellant’s arrest.  In 
order to clandestinely procure police custody remand  of 
the appellant , the Investigating Officer,  presented the 
appellant at the residence of learned Remand Judge before 
6:00 a.m. by informing a remand Advocate Shri Umakant 
Kataria who had never been engaged by the appellant to 
plead his cause. 
(xiii) Learned Remand Judge remanded the accused to police 
custody at 6:00 a.m. sharp as is evident from the remand 
order(supra). Shri Arshdeep Khurana, t he appellant’s 
Advocate was informed about the order granting remand 
by a WhatsApp message at 7:07 a.m. but the same was an 

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exercise in futility because there was no possibility that the 
learned Advocate could have reached the residence of the 
learned Remand Judge in time to oppose the prayer for 
remand. 
(xiv) That, a s a matter of fact, the remand application had 
already been accepted at 6 :00 a.m. which fact is 
manifested from the time appended at the end of the 
remand order(supra). The learned Remand Judge signed 
the proceedings by recording the time as 6:00 a.m. Hence, 
there is no escape from the conclusion that the remand 
order was passed without supplying copy of the grounds 
of arrest to the appellant or the Advocate engaged by him.  
The appellant was intentionally deprived from information 
about the grounds of his arrest and thereby he and his 
Advocate were  prevented from opposing the prayer of 
police custody remand and from seeking bail. 
(xv) He further urged that the  stand taken by the respondent 
that the grounds of arrest were conveyed to the learned 
counsel for the appellant well before the learned Remand 
Judge passed the remand order is unacceptable on the 
face of the record because the time of passing the remand 

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order is clearly recorded in the order dated 4 th October, 
2023 as 6:00 a.m.  Admittedly, the grounds of arrest were 
conveyed to Shri Arshdeep Khurana, Advocate for the  
appellant well after 7:00 a.m.  It was contended that the 
noting made by the learned Remand Judge in  the order 
dated 4 th October, 2023 that the learned counsel for the 
appellant was heard on the application for remand is a 
subsequent insertion clearly visible from the remand 
order.  The fact of  subsequent insertion of these lines is 
fortified from the fact that the appellant had already been 
remanded to police custody by the time the Advocate was 
informed and the copy of the remand application  
containing the purported grounds of arrest  was 
transmitted to him. 
(xvi) That the foundational facts in the FIR No. 224 of 2023 are 
almost identical to the allegations set out in the EOW FIR. 
The appellant had been granted protection against arrest 
by the High Court of Delhi in the EOW FIR.  Owing to this 
protection, the mala fide  objective of the authorities in 
putting the appellant behind bars was not being served 
and, therefore,  a new FIR No. 224 of 2023 with totally 

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cooked up allegations came to be registered and the 
appellant was illegally deprived of his liberty without the 
copy of the FIR been provided and without the grounds of 
arrest being conveyed to the appellant. 
9. On these grounds, Shri Sibal  implored the Court to accept 
the appeal, set aside the impugned orders and direct the release of 
the appellant from custody in connection with the above FIR. 
 
Submission on behalf of the respondent: - 
 
 
10. Per contra , Shri Suryaprakash V. Raju, learned ASG, 
appearing for the respondent  vehemently and fervently opposed 
the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant 
and made the following pertinent submissions:- 
(i)   He urged that the judgment in the case of Pankaj 
Bansal(supra) has been held to be prospective in operation by 
this Court in the case of Ram Kishor Arora(supra). 
(ii)   The appellant was remanded to police custody on 4th October, 
2023 whereas the judgment in the case of Pankaj 
Bansal(supra) was uploaded on the website of this Court in 
the late hours of 4 th October, 2023 and hence, the arresting 
officer could not be expected to ensure compliance of the 

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directions given in the said judgment. He thus urged that the 
alleged inaction of the Investigating Officer in furnishing the 
grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant cannot be called 
into question as the judgment in Pankaj Bansal(supra) was 
uploaded and brought in public domain after the remand order 
had been passed. 
(iii) Without prejudice to the above, learned ASG urged that as per 
the appellant’s version set out in the pleadings filed before the 
High Court of Delh i, he was actually remanded to the police 
custody after 7:00 a.m.  With reference to these pleadings, Shri 
Raju contended that the appellant cannot be heard to urge 
that he was remanded to the police custody in an illegal 
manner and without the grounds of arrest having been  
conveyed to him in writing. 
(iv) Learned ASG referred to the provisions contained in Article s 
22(1) and 22(5)  of the Constitution of India and urged that 
there is no such mandate in either of the provisions that the 
grounds of arrest or detention should be conveyed in writing 
to the accused or the detenue, as the case may be. 
(v)  He urged that the right conferred upon the appellant by Article 
22(1) of the Constitution of India to consult and to be defended 

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by a legal practitioner was complied with in letter and spirit 
because the relative of the appellant, namely, Shri Rishabh 
Bailey, was informed before producing the appellant before the 
learned Remand Judge.  Admittedly, Shri Rishabh Bailey had 
intimated the appellant’s Advocate, Shri Arshdeep Khurana 
regarding the proposed proceedings of police custody remand 
of the appellant.   
(vi) He urged that the Advocate transmitted a written objection 
against the prayer for police custody remand over WhatsApp 
through the Head Constable Rajendra Singh and the learned 
Remand Judge has taken note of the said objection opposing 
remand in the remand order dated 4th October, 2023 and thus 
it would be futile to argue that the order granting remand is 
illegal in any manner. 
(vii)Learned ASG  further contended that now the investigation 
has been completed and charge sheet has also already been 
filed and, thus, the illegality/irregularity, if any, in the arrest 
of the appellant and the grant of initial police custody remand 
stands cured and hence, the appellant cannot claim to be 
prejudiced by the same. 

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(viii)He vehemently urged that there are significant differences in 
the language employed in Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 
43A and 43B of the UAPA and, thus, the law as laid down by 
this Court in Pankaj Bansal(supra) does not come to the aid 
of the appellant in laying challenge to the remand order. 
(ix) Learned ASG  further urged that there is a presumption 
regarding the correctness of act s performed in discharge of 
judicial functions and hence, the noting recorded  in the 
remand order dated 4 th October, 2023 that the Advocate for 
the appellant had been heard on the remand application and 
that the grounds of arrest had been conveyed to the appellant 
cannot be questioned or doubted.  He thus implored the Court 
to dismiss the appeal and affirm the order passed by the High 
Court of Delhi. 
 
Rejoinder on behalf of learned counsel for the appellant: - 
 
11. Shri Sibal, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted 
that the argument advanced by learned ASG that the provisions 
contained in Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 43A and 43B of 
the UAPA operate in different spheres, is misconceived.  He urged 

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that language of both the provisions is pari materia and hence, the 
law laid down in Pankaj Bansal (supra) fully covers the 
controversy at hand. 
12. Shri Sibal emphasised that on a plain viewing of the order 
dated 4 th October, 2023, it is clear that the lines indicating the 
sending of the copy of the remand application to the learned 
counsel for the appellant and the opportunity of hearing provided 
to the Advocate through telephone call have been subsequently 
inserted in the order.  He thus urged that the plea advanced by 
Shri Raju, learned ASG that there is a presumption regarding the 
correctness of judicial proceedings cannot be accepted as a gospel 
truth in the peculiar facts of the case at hand.  He contended that 
applying the same principle to the remand order dated 4th October, 
2023 is counter productive to the stand taken by learned ASG  
inasmuch as, the order records the time of passing as 6 :00 a.m. 
whereas the Advocate was admittedly informed after 7 :00 a.m.  
Thus, there was no possibility of the remand application being sent 
to the Advocate or he being heard before passing of the remand 
order.  He, thus, reiterated his submissions and sought acceptance 
of the appeal. 
 

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Discussion and conclusion: - 
 
13. We have given our thoughtful considerations to the 
submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the material 
placed on record. 
14. Since, learned ASG has advanced a fervent contention 
regarding application of ratio of Pankaj Bansal(supra) urging that 
there is an inherent difference between the provisions contained in 
Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 43 A and 43B of the UAPA, it 
would first be apposite for us to address the said submission.   
15. In the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra), this Court after an 
elaborate consideration of the provisions contained in PMLA, CrPC 
and the constitutional mandate as provided under Article 22 held 
as below: - 
“32. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the 
Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who is 
arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. 
This being the fundamental right guaranteed to the 
arrested person, the mode of conveying information of the 
grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to 
serve the intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 
of the Act of 2002 enables the person arrested under Section 
19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that unless 
the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a 
person would not be entitled to g rant of bail. The twin 
conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the Court 
must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the public 
prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the arr ested person is not 

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guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to 
commit any offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it 
would be essential for the arrested person to be aware of the 
grounds on which the authorized officer arrested him/her 
under Sectio n 19 and the basis for the officer's ‘reason to 
believe’ that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the 
Act of 2002. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of 
these facts that he/she would be in a position to plead and 
prove before the Special Court that there are grounds to believe 
that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief 
of bail. Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, 
as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and 
Section 19 of the Act of 2002, is meant to serve this higher 
purpose and must be given due importance. 
36. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy 
of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished 
to the arrested person as a matter of course and without 
exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this 
would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a 
matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such grounds of 
arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by 
such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed 
in a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested 
person against the word of the authorized officer as to 
whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this 
regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as 
Basant Bansal is concerned. Though the ED claims that 
witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest 
were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither 
here nor there as he di d not sign the document. Non -
compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested 
person straightaway, as held in  V. Senthil Balaji (supra). Such 
a precarious situation is easily avoided and the consequence 
thereof can be obviated very simply by furnishing the written 
grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorized officer in terms 
of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, to the arrested person under 
due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse 
dixit of the authorized officer. 
37. The second reason as to why this would be the proper 
course to adopt is the constitutional objective underlying 
such information being given to the arrested person. 
Conveyance of this information is not only to apprise the 
arrested person of why he/she is being arrested but also to 
enable such person to seek legal counsel and, thereafter, 
present a case before the Court under Section 45 to seek 
release on bail, if he/she so chooses.  In this regard, the 
grounds of arrest in  V. Senthil Balaji  (supra) are placed on 
record and we find that the same run into as many as six pages. 

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The grounds of arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation 
to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal have not been produced 
before this Court, but it was contended that they were produced 
at the time of remand. However, as already noted earlier, this 
did not serve the intended purpose. Further, in the event their 
grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it would be well -
nigh impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or Basant Bansal to 
record and remember all that they had read or heard being read 
out for future recall so as to avail legal remedies. More so, as a 
person who has just been arrested would not be in a calm and 
collected frame of mind and may be utterly incapable of 
remembering the contents of the grounds of arrest read by or 
read out to him/her. The very purpose of this constitutional 
and statutory protection would be rendered nugatory by 
permitting the authorities concerned to merely read out or 
permit reading of the grounds of arrest, irrespective of their 
length and detail, and claim due compli ance with the 
constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) and the 
statutory mandate under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. 
38. We may also note that the grounds of arrest recorded by the 
authorized officer, in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, 
would be personal to the person who is arrested and there 
should, ordinarily, be no risk of sensitive material being 
divulged therefrom, compromising the sanctity and integrity of 
the investigation. In the event any such sensitive material finds 
mention in such grounds of arrest recorded by the authorized 
officer, it would always be open to him to redact such sensitive 
portions in the document and furnish the edited copy of the 
grounds of arrest to the arrested person, so as to safeguard the 
sanctity of the investigation. 
39. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and 
purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of 
Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the arrested 
person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be 
necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds 
of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of 
course and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High 
Court in  Moin Akhtar Qureshi  (supra) and the Bombay High 
Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra), which hold to 
the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. In the case on 
hand, the admitted position is that the ED's Investigating 
Officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds 
of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also 
disputed by the appellants. As this form of communication 
is not found to be adequate to fulfil compliance with the 
mandate of Article  22(1) of the  Constitution and Section 
19(1) of the Act of 2002, we have no hesitation in holding 
that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of 

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Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 . Further, as already 
noted supra, the clandestine conduct of the ED in proceeding 
against the appellants, by recording the second ECIR 
immediately after they secured interim protection in relation to 
the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of 
arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants 
and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of the ED 
and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.” 
        (emphasis supplied) 
 
16. Section 19 of the PMLA and Section s 43A, 43B and 43C of 
the UAP A are reproduced hereunder  for the sake of ready 
reference: - 
   
  Section 19 of the PMLA 
“19. Power to arrest. —(1) If the Director, Deputy Director, 
Assistant Director or any other officer authorised in this behalf 
by the Central Government by general or special order, has on 
the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (the 
reason for such belief to  be recorded in writing) that any 
person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this 
Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, 
inform him of the grounds for such arrest.  
 
(2) The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any 
other officer shall, immediately after arrest of such person 
under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order along with 
the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, 
to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope, in the 
manner, as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating 
Authority shall keep such order and material for such period, 
as may be prescribed.  
 
(3) Every person arrested under sub -section (1) shall, within 
twenty-four hours, be taken to a [Special Court or] Judicial 
Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, 
having jurisdiction:  
 
Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the 
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the 
[Special Court or] Magistrate’s Court.” 
 

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Sections 43A, 43B and 43C of the UAPA  
 
“43A. Power to arrest, search, etc .—Any officer of the 
Designated Authority empowered in this behalf, by general or 
special order of the Central Government or the State 
Government, as the case may be, knowing of a design to commit 
any offence under this Act or has reason to believe from 
personal knowledge or information given by any person and 
taken in writing that any person has committed an offence 
punishable under this Act or from any document, article or any 
other thing which may furnish evidence of the commission of 
such offence or fro m any illegally acquired property or any 
document or other article which may furnish evidence of 
holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for 
seizure or freezing or forfeiture under this Chapter is kept or 
concealed in any building, conveyance or place, may authorise 
any officer subordinate to him to arrest such a person or search 
such building, conveyance or place whether by day or by night 
or himself arrest such a person or search a such building, 
conveyance or place.  
43B. Procedure of arrest, seizure, etc. —(1) Any officer 
arresting a person under section 43A shall, as soon as may be, 
inform him of the grounds for such arrest.  
(2) Every person arrested and article seized under section 43A 
shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the officer-in-
charge of the nearest police station.  
(3) The authority or officer to whom any person or article is 
forwarded under sub -section (2) shall, with all convenient 
dispatch, take such measures as may be necessary in 
accordance with the provisions of the Code.  
43C. Application of provisions of Code. —The provisions of 
the Code shall apply, insofar as they are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Act, to all arrests, searches and seizures 
made under this Act.” 
 
17. Upon a careful perusal of the statutory provisions(reproduced 
supra), we find that there is no significant difference in the 
language employed in Section 19(1) of the PMLA and Section 

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43B(1) of the UAPA which can persuade us to take a view that the 
interpretation of the  phrase ‘inform him of the grounds for such 
arrest’ made by this Court  in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra) 
should not be applied to an accused arrested under the provisions 
of the UAPA.   
18. We find that the provision regarding the communication of 
the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 
43B(1) of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) 
of the PMLA.  The contention advanced by learned ASG that there 
are some variations in the overall provisions contained in Section 
19 of the PMLA and Section 43 A and 43B of the UAPA would not 
have any impact on the statutory mandate requiring the arresting 
officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under 
Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest because as stated above, 
the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same 
in both the statutes. As a matter of fact, both the provisions find 
their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 
22(1) of the Constitution of India. Hence, applying the golden rules 
of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important 
constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of 

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24 
 
committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, 
have to be uniformly construed and applied.  
19. We may note that the modified application of Section 167 
CrPC is also common to both the statutes.  Thus, we have no 
hesitation in holding that the interpretation of statutory mandate 
laid down by this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra) on 
the aspect of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest 
in writing has to be applied pari passu to a person arrested in a 
case registered under the provisions of the UAPA. 
20. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that 
any person arrested for allegation of commission of offences under 
the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s) has 
a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about the 
grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of 
arrest have to be furnished to the arrested person  as a matter of 
course and without exception at the earliest.   The purpose of 
informing to the arrested person the grounds of arrest is salutary 
and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this information would be the only 
effective means for the arrested person to consult his Advocate; 
oppose the police custody remand  and to seek bail.  Any other 
interpretation would tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the 

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25 
 
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the 
Constitution of India. 
21. The Right to Life and Personal Liberty is the most sacrosanct 
fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution of India.   Any a ttempt to encroach upon this 
fundamental right has  been frowned upon by this Court in a 
catena of decisions. In this regard , we may refer to following 
observations made by this Court in the case of Roy V.D. v. State 
of Kerala3:-  
“7. The life and liberty of an individual is so sacrosanct that it 
cannot be allowed to be interfered with except under the 
authority of law. It is a principle which has been recognised and 
applied in all civilised countries. In our Constitution Article 21 
guarantees protection of life and personal liberty not only to 
citizens of India but also to aliens.” 
 
 Thus, any attempt to violate such fundamental right, 
guaranteed by Articles, 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, 
would have to be dealt with strictly. 
22.  The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows 
from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement 
of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and 
remand.  Mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, 
would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality 
 
3 (2000) 8 SCC 590 

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26 
 
committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of 
initial police custody remand to the accused. 
23. Learned ASG referred to the language of Article 22(5) of the 
Constitution of India and urged that even in a case of preventive 
detention, the Constitutional scheme does not require that the 
grounds on which the order of detention has been passed should 
be communicated to the detenue in writi ng.  Ex facie, we are not 
impressed with the said submission. 
24. The contention advanced by learned ASG based on the 
language of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India persuaded us 
to delve deeper on the issue as to whether it is mandatory to 
communicate the grounds of arrest or detention  in writing to the 
accused or the detenue, as the case may be, even though the 
constitutional mandate under Articles  22(1) and 22(5) of the 
Constitution of India does not explicitly require that the grounds 
should be communicated in writing. 
25. A Constitution Bench of this Court examined in detail the 
scheme of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in the case of 
Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and Others4 and held that 
the communication of the grounds of detention to the detenue in 
 
4 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 

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27 
 
writing and in a language which he understands is imperative and 
essential to provide an opportunity to detenue of making an 
effective representation against the detention and in case, such 
communication is not made, the order of detention would stand 
vitiated as the guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution 
was violated. The relevant para is extracted hereinbelow: 
“ 7. ….. clause (5) of Article 22 requires that the grounds of his 
detention should be made available to the detenue as soon as 
may be, and that the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the Order should also be afforded to 
him. In order that the detenue should have that 
opportunity, it is not sufficient that he has been physically 
delivered the means of knowledge with which to make his 
representation. In order that the detenue should be in a 
position effectively to make his representation against the 
Order, he should have knowledge of the grounds of 
detention, which are in the nature of the charge against 
him setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the 
authorities attribute to him. Communication, in this 
context, must, therefore, mean impa rting to the detenue 
sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order 
of Detention is based. In this case the grounds are several, 
and are based on numerous speeches said to have been 
made by the appellant himself on different occasions and 
different dates. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or 
explanation given by the police officer serving those on the 
detenue would not amount to communication, in this 
context, must mean bringing home to the detenue effective 
knowledge of the facts and c ircumstances on which the 
Order of Detention is based. 
 
(emphasis supplied) 
 
 
26. Further, this Court in the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel 
v. Union of India and Ors. 5, laid down that the grounds of 
 
5 (1981) 2 SCC 427 

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28 
 
detention must be communicated to the detenu e in writing in a 
language which he understands  and if the grounds are only 
verbally explained, the constitutional mandate of Article 22(5) is 
infringed.  The relevant para is extracted hereunder: - 
“20. …. “Communicate” is a strong word. It means that 
sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 
“grounds” should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu 
in writing in a language which he understands. The whole 
purpose of communicating the “g round” to the detenu is to 
enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. 
If the “grounds” are only verbally explained to the detenu 
and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which 
he understands, then that purpose is not served , and the 
constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed…..” 
(emphasis supplied) 
 
27. From a holistic reading of various judgments pertaining to 
the law of preventive detention including the Constitution Bench 
decision of this Court in Harikisan(supra), wherein, the 
provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India have been 
interpreted, we find that it has been the consistent view of this 
Court that the grounds on which the liberty of a citizen is curtailed, 
must be communicated in writing so as t o enable him to seek 
remedial measures against the deprivation of liberty. 
28. Thus, there is no hesitation in the mind of this Court that the 
submission of learned ASG that in a case of preventive detention, 

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29 
 
the grounds of detention need not be provided to a detenue in 
writing is ex facie untenable in eyes of law.  
29. The language used in Article 22(1) and  Article 22(5) of the 
Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds 
is exactly the identical.  Neither of the constitutional provisions 
require that the ‘grounds’ of “arrest” or “detention”, as the case 
may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to 
this important fac et of the fundamental right as made by the 
Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of 
the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of 
the Constitution of India insofar the requirement to communicate 
the grounds of arrest is concerned. 
30. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that  the 
requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds 
of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an 
offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided 
under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is 
sacrosanct and cannot be breached  under any situation. Non-
compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory 
mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered 
illegal, as the case may be. 

Source PDF page 30

30 
 
31. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(1) have already 
been interpreted by this Court in Pankaj Bansal (supra) laying 
down beyond the pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be 
communicated in writing to the person arrested of an offence at 
the earliest.  Hence, the fervent plea of learned ASG that there was 
no requirement under law to communicate the grounds of arrest  
in writing to the accused appellant is noted to be rejected. 
32. Now, coming to the facts of the case at hand.  Indisputably, 
FIR No. 224 of 2023 came to be registered on 17 th August, 2023.  
Copy of the FIR was never brought in public domain as the same 
was not uploaded on the website by the Investigating Agency.  
Admittedly, the copy of the FIR was not provided to the appellant 
despite an application having been made in this regard on his 
behalf till after the order of police custody remand was passed by 
the learned Remand Judge. 
33. The copy of the FIR was provided to Shri Arshdeep Khurana, 
learned Advocate representing the accused for the first time on 5th 
October, 2023 and hence, till the time of being deprived of liberty, 
no communication had been made to the appellant regarding the 
grounds on which he had been arrested. 

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31 
 
34. The accused was arrested on 3 rd October, 2023 at 5:45 p.m. 
as per the arrest memo(Annexure P-7).  As per Section 43C of the 
UAPA, the provisions of CrPC shall apply to all arrests, search and 
seizures made under the UAPA insofar as they are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Act.  As per Section 57 CrPC read with 
Section 167(1) CrPC, the appellant was required to be produced 
before the concerned Magistrate within twenty-four hours of his 
arrest.  The Investigating Officer, therefore, had a clear window till 
5:44 p.m. on 4th October, 2023 for producing the appellant before 
the Magistrate concerned and to seek his police custody remand, 
if so required.  There is no dispute that Shri Arshdeep Khurana, 
learned Advocate, engaged on behalf of the  appellant had 
presented himself at the police station on 3 rd October, 2023 after 
the appellant was arrested and the mobile number of the Advocate 
was available with the Investigating Officer.  Inspite thereof, the 
appellant was presented before the learne d Remand Judge at his 
residence sometime before 6 :00 a.m. on 4 th October, 2023.    A 
remand Advocate, namely, Shri Umakant Kataria was kept present 
in the Court purportedly to  provide legal assistance to the 
appellant as required under A rticle 22(1) of the Constitution of 
India.   Apparently, this entire exercise was done in a clandestine 

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32 
 
manner and was nothing but a blatant attempt to circumvent the 
due process of law ; to confine the accused to police custody 
without informing him the grounds on which he has been arrested; 
deprive the accused of the opportunity to avail the services of the 
legal practitioner of his choice so as to oppose the prayer for police 
custody remand, seek bail  and also to mislead the Court.   The 
accused having engaged an Advocate to defend himself, there was 
no rhyme or reason as to why, information about the proposed 
remand application was not sent in advance to the Advocate 
engaged by the appellant. 
35. It is apparent that the appellant had objected to the 
appearance of the remand counsel before the learned Remand 
Judge and this is the reason, the Investigating Officer undertook a 
charade of informing of the Advocate engaged by the appellant on 
mobile.  The learned Remand Judge recorded the presence of Shri 
Arshdeep Khurana, Advocate, mentioning that he had been 
informed and heard on the remand application through telephone 
call.  The initial information about the accused appellant being 
presented before the learned Remand Judge  was sent by the 
arresting officer to the appellant’s relative Shri  Rishab Bailey at 
around 6 :46 a.m. and he,  in turn, informed the Advocate Shri 

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33 
 
Arshdeep Khurana around 7:00 a.m.  These facts are manifested 
from perusal of the call logs presented for the perusal of the Court.  
Thus, by the time, the Advocate engaged by the accused appellant 
had been informed, the order of remand had already been passed.  
Unquestionably, till that time, the grounds of arrest had not been 
conveyed to the appellant in writing. 
36. The learned ASG had argued that the grounds of arrest were 
set out in the remand application which was transmitted through 
WhatsApp to Advocate Shri Arshdeep Khurana.  However, the fact 
remains that the remand application was transmitted to the 
Advocate Shri Arshdeep Khurana after the remand had been 
granted by the learned Remand Judge which was at 6:00 a.m. as 
per the recording made in the remand order (reproduced supra).  
The contention of the learned ASG that there is variance in time of 
passing of the remand order as per the pleadings made on behalf 
of the accused appellant before the High Court of Delhi does not 
impress us in view of the time recorded in the remand order. 
37. Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi held at para 
No. 31 of the impugned order that the respondent had taken a 
categoric stand that the grounds of arrest were informed to the 
appellant orally and the same were also conveyed in writing as per 

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34 
 
the details set out in the memo of arrest.  However, learned ASG 
fairly did not advance any such argument  based on the arrest 
memo. 
38. The interpretation given by the learned Single Judge that the 
grounds of arrest were conveyed to the accused in writing vide the 
arrest memo is unacceptable on the face of the record because the 
arrest memo does not indicate the grounds of arrest being  
incorporated in the said document.  Column No. 9 of the arrest 
memo(Annexure P -7) which is being reproduced hereinbelow 
simply sets out the ‘reasons for arrest’ which are formal in nature 
and can be generally attributed to any person arrested on 
accusation of an offence whereas the ‘grounds of arrest’ would be 
personal in nature and specific to the person arrested. 
“9. Reason for arrest 
 
a. Prevent accused person from committing any further 
offence. 
 
b. For proper investigation of the offence. 
 
c. To prevent the accused person from causing the evidence 
of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in 
any manner. 
 
d. To prevent such person from making any inducement 
threat or promise to any person acquainted the facts of the case 
so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court 
or to the Police officer. 
 
e. As unless such person is arrested, his presence in the 
Court whenever required cannot be ensured.” 
 

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35 
 
39. The remand order dated 4th October, 2023(reproduced supra) 
records that the copy of the remand application had been sent to 
the learned Advocate engaged by  the accused appellant through 
shriApp.  A bare perusal of the remand order is enough to satisfy 
us that these two lines were subsequently inserted in the order 
because the script in which these two lines were written is much 
finer as compared to the remaining part of the order and moreover, 
these two lines give a clear indication of subsequent insertion.  It 
is quite possible that the learned Remand Judge may have heard 
the learned counsel for the appellant after signing the remand 
order and thus, these lines were inserted later without intending 
any harm or malintention but the fact remains that the order of 
remand had already been passed at 6 :00 a.m . and hence, the 
subsequent opportunity of hearing, if any, provided to the counsel 
was nothing but an exercise in futility.   
40. Learned ASG  had argued that the copy of the remand 
application forwarded over WhatsApp to the learned counsel for 
the accused appellant gives a complete picture about the grounds 
of arrest.  We feel that any comment on the contents of the remand 
application and whether the same actually convey ed intelligible  
grounds of arrest to the accused or whether the same are so vague 

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36 
 
that it would be impossible to understand, may prejudice the trial 
of the case. 
41.  We may, however, briefly mention that the grounds of arrest 
as conveyed to the Advocate are more or less a narration of facts 
picked up from the FIR which in itself does not indicate any 
particular incident or event which gave rise to the alleged offences.  
However, the law is well settled that the FIR is not an 
encyclopaedia and is registered just to set the process of criminal 
justice in motion.  The Investigating Officer has the power to 
investigate the matter and collect all relevant material which would 
form the basis of filing of charge sheet in the Court concerned. 
42. Extensive arguments were advanced by Shri Sibal , with 
reference to the stipulations made in Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 22C 
of the UAPA in order to contend that even if the FIR and the 
grounds set out in the remand application are taken to be true on 
the face of the record, apparently, the same convey just a fictional 
web spun around conjectures and surmises.  It was contended 
that though a reference is made in the FIR that the appellant and 
one Neville Roy Singham,  a foreign national were found to be 
discussing how to create a map of India without Kashmir and to 
show Arunachal Pradesh as a disputed area  but the fact remains 

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37 
 
that no such map  was prepared or published or was found in 
possession of the appellant or on his devices  till the date of his 
arrest.   
43. Shri Sibal had also argued that the appellant was arrested 
without any indication as to how he was connected with the alleged 
incorrect map of India.  He also urged that the  FIR refers to 
farmers’ agitation without justifying as to how the appellant was 
connected with those incidents .  He contended that not a single 
incident is mentioned in the FIR or the remand application which 
can give rise to the offences alleged and that the FIR was registered 
without any plausible reason or basis just to victimise the 
appellant. 
44. We do not feel persuaded to examine these aspects at this 
stage because the same would require entering into the merits of 
the case.  This would be within the domain of the Court examining 
the matter after the filing of the charge sheet.   The core issue in 
this appeal is regarding the illegality of the process whereby the 
appellant was arrested and remanded to police custody which does 
not require examining the merits of the case.   
45. It was the fervent contention of learned ASG that in the case 
of Ram Kishor Arora (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court 

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38 
 
interpreted the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra) to 
be having a prospective effect  and thus the ratio of Pankaj 
Bansal(supra) cannot come to the appellant’s aid.   Indisputably, 
the appellant herein was remanded  to police custody on 4 th 
October, 2023 whereas the judgment in the case of Pankaj 
Bansal(supra) was delivered on 3 rd October, 2023.  Merely on a 
conjectural submission regarding  the late uploading of the 
judgment, learned ASG cannot be permitted to argue that the ratio 
of Pankaj Bansal (supra) would not apply to the present case.   
Hence, the plea of Shri Raju, learned ASG that the judgment in 
Pankaj Bansal(supra) would not apply to the proceedings of 
remand made on 4th October, 2023 is misconceived. 
46. We are of the firm opinion that once this Court has 
interpreted the provisions of the statute in context to the 
constitutional scheme and has laid down that the grounds of 
arrest have to be conveyed to the accused in writing expeditiously, 
the said ratio becomes the law of the land binding on all the Courts 
in the country by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 
47. Now, coming to the aspect as to whether the grounds of arrest 
were actually conveyed to the appellant in writing before he was 
remanded to the custody of the Investigating Officer. 

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39 
 
48. We have carefully perused the arrest memo( Annexure P-7) 
and find that the same nowhere conveys the grounds on which the 
accused was being arrested.  The arrest memo is simply a proforma 
indicating the formal ‘reasons’ for which the accused was being 
arrested. 
49. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a 
significant difference in the phrase ‘ reasons for arrest ’ and 
‘grounds of arrest ’.  The ‘reasons for arrest’ as indicated in the 
arrest memo are purely formal parameters, viz., to prevent the 
accused person from committing any further offence; for proper 
investigation of the offence ; to prevent the accused person from 
causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with 
such evidence in any manner; t o prevent the arrested person for 
making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted  
with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing 
such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer.  These 
reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge 
of a crime whereas the ‘grounds of arrest ’ would be required to 
contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which 
necessitated the arrest of the accused.  Simultaneously, the 
grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested 

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accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to 
provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial 
remand and to seek bail.  Thus, the ‘grounds of arrest’ would 
invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with 
the ‘reasons of arrest’ which are general in nature. 
50. From the detailed analysis made above, there is no hesitation 
in the mind of the Court to reach to a conclusion that the copy of 
the remand application in the purported exercise of 
communication of the grounds of arrest in writing was not 
provided to the accused appellant or his counsel before passing of 
the order of remand dated 4 th October, 2023 which vitiates the 
arrest and subsequent remand of the appellant. 
51. As a result, the appellant is entitled to a direction for release 
from custody by applying the ratio of the judgment rendered by 
this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra). 
52. Accordingly, the arrest of the appellant followed by remand 
order dated 4 th October, 2023 and so also the impugned order 
passed by the High Court of Delhi dated 13 th October, 2023 are 
hereby declared to be invalid in the eyes of law and are quashed 
and set aside.  

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53. Though we would have been persuaded to direct the release 
of the appellant without requiring him to furnish bonds or security 
but since the charge sheet has been filed, we feel it appropriate to 
direct that the appellant shall be released from custody on 
furnishing bail and bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court. 
54. We make it abundantly clear that none of the observations 
made above shall be treated as a comment on the merits of the 
case. 
55. The appeal is allowed in these terms. 
56. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 
 
       …………………………..J. 
       (B.R. GAVAI) 
 
 
       .…….……………………J. 
       (SANDEEP MEHTA) 
New Delhi; 
May 15, 2024 
  

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