SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Navas alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala

Decision date:

18 March 2024 · 2024 INSC 215

Suitable term of imprisonment for murder.

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Official source

Draft summary

AI-assisted historical explanation. Independently checked against the source by an AI reviewer. Not reviewed by a lawyer. This historical summary does not certify the current legal position.

In one sentence

The conviction stood, but the minimum period without remission was reduced from thirty to twenty-five years.

Question decided

How should aggravating and mitigating factors shape the special-category life sentence?

Key holdings

Outcome

The appeal was partly allowed only to the stated extent on sentence.

Source PDF pages: 63, 64, 65.

Plain-English explanation

The judgment separates the validity of the conviction from the appropriate punishment. The Court did not find a basis to overturn the findings of guilt. It nevertheless reassessed whether the thirty-year period without remission imposed by the High Court was proportionate. Sentencing required attention to both the gravity of the offences and the offender’s circumstances and prospects, including conduct during incarceration. The revised minimum was twenty-five years, inclusive of time already undergone. This is not a general rule that murder sentences are capped at twenty-five years or that release follows automatically at that point. The special-category sentencing framework and the precise operative order must be read together. The case is useful for explaining individualised sentencing without reducing it to a mechanical list of favourable factors.

Relevant law

Opinions

Three-judge bench; Justice K.V. Viswanathan authored the judgment.

Research notes and limits

Distinguish the minimum non-remission period from an automatic release date; check later orders if discussing the individual prisoner.

Judgment - source material

All pages of the downloaded court document follow, including separate opinions, annexures and any final joint order. This is machine-extracted original text, not an AI rewrite. Use the PDF to check exact wording.

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2024 INSC 215
 
1 
 
REPORTABLE 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1215 OF 2011 
 
 
NAVAS @ MULANAVAS   …Appellant (s) 
 
Versus 
 
STATE OF KERALA                  ...Respondent(s) 
 
 
J U D G M E N T 
 
 
K.V. Viswanathan, J. 
 
 1. The present Appeal arises out of the judgment of a 
Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam 
in D.S.R. No. 4 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal No. 1620 of 
2007 dated 09.02.2010.  The Death Sentence Reference 
and the Criminal Appeal arose out of the judgment of the 
Court of the III Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast 

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Track Court No. 1, Thrissur in Sessions Case No. 491 of 
2006.   
 2. The trial Court found the appellant (the sole accused) 
guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 
449 IPC for having committed the murder of Latha (aged 39 
years), Ramachandran (aged 45 years), Chitra (aged 11 
years) and Karthiayani Amma (aged 80 years) after 
committing house -trespass.  After committing the above 
said act, the accused attempted to commit suicide for which 
he was also found guilty under Section 309 IPC.  The trial 
Court sentenced the accused to death for the offence 
punishable under Section 302  IPC.  For the offence under 
Section 449 IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo 
rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of 
Rs.1,000/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment 
for six months.  The accused was also sentenced to undergo 
simple imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of 

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Rs.500/- for the offence under Section 309 IPC, and in 
default of the payment of fine to undergo simple 
imprisonment for one month.  
 3. When the matter went for confirmation before the High 
Court, the High Court, while confirming the conviction, 
modified the sentence.  The sentence of death was modified 
and reduced to imprisonment for life with a further direction 
that the accused shall not be released from prison for a 
period of 30 (thirty) years including the period already 
undergone with set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. alone.  
Aggrieved, the appellant is before us in the present appeal 
by way of special leave. 
 Brief Facts: 
4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that in the household 
of the deceased Ramachandran, there were four people 
residing.  Apart from Ramachandran, there was his wife 
Latha, their daughter Chitra and Ramachandran’s mother 

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Karthiayani Amma.  The appellant, according to the 
prosecution, had, at an earlier point in time, illicit intimacy 
with Latha so much so that Latha even became pregnant, 
later leading to termination of pregnancy.  It is the 
prosecution case that after Latha tried to distance herself, 
the appellant was seriously aggrieved, and they advert to an 
occurrence of 03.02.2005 when the appellant is supposed to 
have trespassed into the house where Latha lived and even 
tried to harm her.  They rely on Ext. P -9 to Ext.P -11 
complaints.   
5. The macabre incident, out of which the present case 
arose, happened on the night intervening 03.11.2005 and 
04.11.2005.  It is alleged that the accused reached the house 
of the deceased late at night on 03.11.2005.  Having reached 
the house, he made a hole in the eastern side wall of the 
house and gained access into the house.  It is the  
prosecution case that, having gained access and being 
armed with 2 (two) knives and an iron rod, he caused the 

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death of Ramachandran and Chitra with the iron rod in the 
upper floor room in the northern side  of the house ; that he 
caused serious injuries to Karthiayani Amma in the northern 
room on the ground floor (resulting in her death 
subsequently) and caused the death of Latha with multiple 
stab injuries in the hall near the stairs on the ground floor.  
6. The prosecution case is that PW -1 Thankamani, the 
domestic help, who had seen the family hale and hearty the 
previous evening  i.e., 03.11.2005 , had come to sweep the 
house on the morning of 04.11.2005 at around 07:00 a.m.  
While sweeping the courtyard, she found that, unlike on 
normal days when the family would come out of the house 
in the morning, no one came out that day.  While sweeping, 
she found that a hole had been dug on the eastern side wall 
of the house and to her horror also found that blood was 
dripping from a pipe adjoining the western side wall of the 
house. She raised an alarm resulting in the neighbours 
converging on the property.   

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7. It is PW -2 (Shyama Sundaran), a neighbour, who 
called the police after witnessing the commotion outside the 
house. PW -30 (KT Kumaran) the ASI rushed to the spot 
with his police party and reached at 08:25 AM. He also 
found a hole in the wall on the eastern side of the house and 
also that telephone cable was cut. He instructed PW -6 
(Balan) & PW -23 (Rajan) to break open the door on the 
western side of the house first. PW-6 &   PW-23 broke open 
the outer door but found that th e inner door was also locked 
and it could not be opened. It was then decided to break 
open the door on the front side of the house. PW -4 
(Sandeep) removed the tile portion above the porch and 
entered the porch. He then broke open the door using a 
pestle and entered the poomukham (veranda).   PW -4 then 
broke the glass ventilator above the main door and inserted 
his hand to open the door latch.  As they entered, they found 
Latha’s dead body in the passage near the stairs. The body 
of Ramachandran and Chitra were found dead in the upper 

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floor room on the northern side of the house. Karthiyani 
Amma was found in the northern room on the ground floor 
unconscious. PW -6 & PW -23 took Karthiyani Amma to 
hospital. It was PW -32 (Ajaya Kumar), the Investigating 
Officer of the case, who reached the spot at 09:15 AM and 
saw blood droplets starting from the northern room on the 
ground floor to the room on the south. When he opened the 
door, he found the accused lying on the floor with a cut 
injury on his left wrist. 
8. PW-30, ASI registered the suo motu FIR and PW -32, 
conducted the investigation.  The appellant was sent up for 
trial. In all, the prosecution examined 32 witnesses (PWs 1 -
32) and proved Exhibits P1 to P45 series.  Material Objects 
[M.Os.] 1 -122 were also marked by the prosecution.  The 
accused did not examine any defence witnesses; but proved 
Exhibits D1-D5.  The accused also gave a statement while 
being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  At the Section 
313 stage, he advanced a version to the effect that  there was 

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a pact between him and Latha to commit suicide; that he 
had come to the house of Latha on 03.11.2005 with the 
intention that both of them shall commit suicide; that Latha 
had kept the door open as usual and he gained entry into the 
house through such door; that after he entered the house, he 
found Latha and others were all lying dead/injured; that on 
account of grief, he had cut his left wrist in an attempt to 
commit suicide and that he was found available in the house 
in an unconscious state.  The appellant was clearly implying 
that somebody else had gained access into the house and 
caused the death of all victims. It is then that he proceeded 
to commit suicide. 
9. The case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence.  
Both the trial Court and the High Court have closely 
marshalled the circumstantial evidence in the case to arrive 
at the conclusion that the accused alone is responsible for 
the death of the four deceased.  Additionally, it also relied 
on the fact that the accused having been found present in the 

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house ha d offered no plausible and cogent explanation 
about the sequence of events that had transpired inside, 
leading to the sole and irresistible conclusion that the 
accused has perpetrated the heinous crime. 
Contentions:        
10. We have heard Mr. Renjit h B. Marar, learned counsel 
for the appellant, who advanced elaborate arguments, 
covering the entire spectrum by making available a chart 
setting out the summary of the deposition of the prosecution 
witnesses, the relevant exhibits marked and the argument of 
the defence in separate columns. He mainly contended that 
the case made out by the prosecution falls short of the proof 
needed in a case which is based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence. Learned counsel contended that with the available 
evidence it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction and 
pleaded for outright acquittal. The specific contentions of 
the learned counsel challenging certain individual 
circumstances have been dealt with hereinbelow while 

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tabulating the circumstances. Alternatively, learned counsel 
pleaded that the sentence of 30 years without remission is 
excessive and prayed that the sentence may be appropriately 
tailored to meet the ends of justice.   
11. Shri Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel, for the 
State vehemently rebutted the arguments of the counsel for 
the appellant and contended that the trial Court and the High 
Court have correctly arrived at the conclusion of guilt.  
Learned senior counsel contended that the case actually 
warranted death penalty but the High Court has modified it 
to a sentence of imprisonment for 30 years  without 
remission for the offence under Section 302.  According to 
the learned senior counsel, the sentence did not deserve any 
further modification. 
Discussion:        
12. We have carefully considered the submissions of the 
learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused 
the material on record, including the relevant original trial 

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Court records.  The circumstances that unerringly point to 
the guilt of the appellant as it emerges from the deposition 
of the witnesses and the duly proved exhibits can be 
summarized as under: 
(i) There was the incident on 03.02.2005 when the accused 
allegedly trespassed into the house and had thrown a 
koduval (curved sword)  at deceased Latha . This  highlights 
the friction between the accused and deceased  Latha.  Ex t. 
P9 - P11 complaint of 03.02.2005 has been marked by the 
prosecution. It also forms an important piece of evidence to 
establish motive.   
ii) PW-3, Raman, an auto driver, deposed that on the 
night of 03.11.2005, the accused engaged his services to go 
to Orumanayur.  The accused asked him to stop at a place 
called Muthenmavu (which is the place where the house of 
the deceased was situated) and he paid him Rs.70/ -.  We 
have seen the original deposition and it clearly records that 
it was at 10.30 PM on the night of 03.11.2005 that the 

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accused engaged the services of PW -3 at Guruvayur auto 
stand to reach the area where the house of the deceased was 
located. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, has 
challenged the evidence of PW -3 on the ground that no test 
identification parade was held and the identification was for 
the first time at the police station. This submission need not 
detain the court as nothing much turns on it.  The presence 
of the accused even otherwise, at the s cene of occurrence 
has been spoken to by PW -1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-23, 
PW-30 and PW-32, as has been discussed hereinbelow.  
iii) PW-1 Thankamani has clearly spoken about the fact 
that, on 03.11.2005, when she left the house after her work 
at 7.30 p.m. all the deceased were hale and hearty.  On the 
morning of 04.11.2005, it was she who detected the 
dripping of the blood from the pipe adjoining the western 
wall, and a hole being made in the eastern side wall of the 
house. 

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iv) The evidence of PW -1, 2, 4, 6 , 23, 30 and 32 speaks 
about the appellant lying in the southern room of the house 
and being taken to the hospital from there.  PWs 1,2,4,6,23 
& 30 also speak about the hole that has been made on the 
eastern wall of the house.  The seizure of M.O. 
29,30,31,32,33 & 34 items i.e., 2 (two) knives, 2 (two) knife 
sheaths, iron rod and bag recovered also contributes as a 
link in the chain.     
v) On 4.11.2005, M.O. 29 & 30 (Knives f ound in  the 
southern room on the ground floor where the accused was 
found) were seized and taken into custody under Ext. P -12 
(Scene Mahazar).  M.O. 33 (Iron rod) was also seized and 
taken from the northern room in the upper floor, vide the 
same Ext. P-12.  
vi) Another important circumstance is the report of the 
Finger Print Expert (Ext.P-22).  The Finger Print Expert has 
opined that the chance finger print on the water bottle found 
at the scene of the crime (marked as C -9 by the Expert) was 

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identified as the left thumb impression of the appellant in 
the slip made available with the Expert for verification 
(marked as “S” by the expert).  The Expert concluded in P -
22 that since the identical ridge characteristics are present in 
their nature and relative possessions, the finger impressions 
“C9” and “S” are identical i.e. that they are the impressions 
of the same finger of the person.  The Expert concluded 
that, in his opinion, that the chance print marked as C -9 and 
developed by him from the scene of crime on 04.11.2005 is 
made by the left thumb of the appellant.   
vii) The prosecution case is also that there were writings on 
the wall and on certain objects in the southern room of the 
ground floor where the accused was found.  The w ritings 
indicate that these were parting messages of the accused (as 
the High Court labels them) since he had decided to commit 
suicide.  The writings were in the following words “ Do not 
enter here”; “Shyaman, you are a O, you should not desire 
the ruppam of a woman, money will make people traitors, 

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you are O, you should not destroy the local area ”; The 
mirror had the writing with pen on it reading ' Latha, I love 
you' and same was underlined and below that it was written 
'Salim, I love you' and 'Yahio I lo ” and below that ' Shabna I 
lo”; The aforesaid wall had one wall clock with the label 
'Samaya Quartz' inside. On it, it was written with marker 
pen 'Latha, I love you '; On the wall, below the clock, it was 
written “My name is Nawas, reason for my death is Latha, 
so myself and Latha decided to die together.....Confirm by 
Navaz P.M.” ; “Yahayikka knows that now I shall not be 
there, wherever, no harm should happen to Yahayikka. I 
may be an idiot ”; “ For Salim to know, even if I am not 
there, you shall always be in my eyes”. Near to that it was 
written “night =12 O’clock, I am at the house of Latha” in 
two lines. Below that it was written “6 to 7= Finishing”; “I 
have no role in the looting of 6 lakhs. I was present in the 
said vehicle. This is true” and near to that it was written “for 

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police to know where I was for all these days, no child 
knows”. 
 
 Specimen of these writings was taken and referred to 
the handwriting expert.  The Handwriting Expert produced 
P-42 report. PW -32, the Investigating Officer spoke about 
the seizure of a mirror, a samay a quartz clock  and the 
November-December, 2005 page of Guruvayur Cooperative 
Urban Bank Calendar.  All these items had writings on them 
at the scene of the crime.  Twenty black and white 
photographs of the handwritings  were taken .  These were 
termed ‘question’ writings and marked by the Handwriting 
Expert in t he report for his reference as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, 
Q5, Q5A, Q6, Q6A to Q6P.  The Expert was also furnished 
with the ‘standard’ writings by Appellant marked by the 
Expert for his reference as S1 to S49.  In Ext. P -42, the 
Handwriting Expert concludes that, on comparison, the 
‘question’ and ‘standard’ writings are by the same person. 

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He concluded that they agree in general writing 
characteristics such as skill, speed, spacing, relative size and 
proportionate spelling errors.  The Expert opined that 
similarities found between the question and standard 
writings are significant and numerous and there did not 
exist any material differences.  Only with regard to the 
signature stamp in Q6(q), the expert concluded that it was 
not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding 
the authorship for want of sufficient data on that score.  
With regard to all others, it was concluded that the person 
who wrote the blue enclosed writings stamped and marked 
as ‘standard’ writings also wrote the red enclosed ‘question’ 
writings.  The High Court has found that this aspect of 
handwriting was not even seriously challenged by the 
accused.  Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel , contended 
that the handwriting expert had not been examined . In 
support thereof, he relies on the judgment of this Court in 
Padum Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35. 

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The submission flies in the face of Section 293 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure .  Exhibit P-42 Report is prepared by 
Dr. K.P. Jayakumar, Joint Director (Research), Forensic 
Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram. The report is 
duly marked and exhibited and proved as Exhibit P -42. The 
Joint Director who occupies a position above the Deputy 
Director and Assistant Director, is encompassed in the 
phrase “Director” used in Section 293(4)(e). This position is 
expressly settled by the judgment of this Court in Ammini 
& O thers v. State of Kerala, (1998) 2 SCC 301 . The 
relevant para of which is extracted hereinbelow: 
“11. …..The trial court was also wrong in holding that the 
report given by the Forensic Science Laboratory with 
respect to the contents of MO 44 was not admissible in 
evidence as it was signed by its Joint Director and not by 
the Director. On a true construction of Section 293(4) 
CrPC it has to be held that Joint Director is 
comprehended by the expression “Director”. The 
amendment made in clause (e) of Section 293(4) now 
indicates that clearly. If the Joint Director was not 
comprehended within the expressio n Director then the 
legislature would have certainly named him while 
amending the clause and providing that Section 293 
applies to the Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a 

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Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic 
Science Laboratory. A Joint Director is a higher officer 
than a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director and, 
therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold that a 
report signed by Joint Director is not admissible in 
evidence though a report signed by the Deputy 
Director or Assistant Director is now admissible.  In 
our opinion the High Court was right in holding that the 
report made by the Joint Director was admissible in 
evidence and that it deserved to be relied upon.” 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
 
  Hence, the report Ex. P -42 is admissible even without 
 the examination of Dr. K. P. Jayakumar. ( See also 
 Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab , (1988) 3 SCC 513  & 
State of H.P. v. Mast Ram, (2004) 8 SCC 660)    
viii) The evidence of the doctors PWs -10 & 19, who 
conducted the post -mortem of Latha & Chitra respectively, 
fixed the timing of death between 6 -18 hours prior to 6.25 
PM on 04.11.2005. Evidence of PW -25, Doctor who 
conducted post-mortem of Ramachandran stated that the 
death occurred 12 -18 hours prior to 6:25PM.   This 
synchronizes with the time that the accused made entry into 
the house.    

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ix) The hair strands found on the body of Chitra were 
found to be similar and identical to the hair of the accused.  
In Ext.P41(b), which is the report of Dr. R. Sreekumar, 
Assistant Director (Biology) in the forensic laboratory, it is 
opined that the hairs in Item 45 (hairs from the belly of 
Chitra) are human scalp hairs which are similar to the 
sample scalp hairs in Item 58 (a tuft of black hairs) which is 
the combed hair and cut hair of the appellant. Challenging 
the circumstances, Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel , 
contends that PW -27 Annamma John does not speak about 
the hair being seized and that there was no seizure memo 
spoken to in her 161 statement. This submission has no 
merit since Exhibit P -26 is the seizure mahazar of the 
objects collected by PW -27 on 04.11.2005 , the day the 
sordid incident was unravelled.  In the Inquest Report also 
PW-14 mentions about the collection of hair from the body 
of the deceased Chitra by PW-27.  

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x) It is also important to note that the 2 (two) strands of hair 
found on one of the knives, was found to be Latha’s as per 
FSL Report (Ex. P. 41(b)). 
xi) The testimonies of the Doctors PWs, 10, 19, 25 and 
26, clearly bring out that the injuries sustained by the 
deceased could be caused by means of M.O. 29, 30 and 33. 
This is an additional circumstance.   
xii) Ext.P41(c), which is the report of the Scientific 
Assistant (Chemistry), FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, clearly 
establishes that the black coloured ink in Item 66 (the 
marker pen with trade brand label as Kolor Pik permanent  
XL marker) and 67 (1 black coloured plastic cap) is similar 
to the ink used in the black coloured writings in Item 63 
(wooden frame) item 64 (wall clock) with trade label samay 
and item 65 (calendar of Guruvayur Cooperative Urban 
Bank).  Item numbers referred to here are the ones given f or 
reference by the Scientific Assistant in her report.  The 
Marker pen (part of M.O. 95) was recovered from the 

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southern room where the Appellant was found, and rightly 
an inference has been drawn that the writings on M.O. 43 
(Wall Clock) M.O. 90 (Mirror) and M.O. 94 (2005 
Calendar) are the writings of the accused by using M.O 95 
(marker pen) 
xiii) At the site where the hole was drilled, soil/powder was 
available.  It is found in the forensic report that the 
soil/powder on M.O. 34 bag (found in the room where the 
accused was found) and seized as per Ext.P -12 scene 
mahazar, was apparently similar to the soil/powder seized 
near the hole.  Equally so, in the M.O. 71 shirt belonging to 
the accused, apparently similar soil/powder was found.  
These are established by the FSL report (Exh. 41(a)). 
Further, the nail clippings of the accused taken by PW -31 
dated 14.11.2005 revealed apparently similar soil/powder to 
the soil/powder found at the site of the hole as per FSL 
report (Exh. 41(a)).  This is a circumstance relied upon by 
the prosecution to establish that the accused gained access 

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through the hole that he dug.  The argument of the accused 
that the nail clippings were taken on 14.11.2005 and no 
importance could be attached has rightly been rejected by 
the High Court saying that it is not even the case of the 
accused that the soil/powder detected from the hole at the 
scene of occurrence was planted on his nail. Mr. Renjith B. 
Marar, learned counsel for the appellant contended that 
Exhibit P -41(a) report was not put in the Section 313 
questioning in the context of the soil particles o n the wall 
tallying with the soil particles in the nail clippings and on 
the shirt and the bag found in the room where the accused 
was present. We have called for the original record and 
examined the Section 313 statement and had the Malayalam 
version read over to us. We have also seen the translated 
version of Section 313. Exhibit P -41(a) was put in question 
no. 52 but it was in the context of item 68 cable and as to 
how it could be cut with the knives (item 22 and 23). To 
that extent, Mr. Renjith B. Marar i s right that the report was 

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not put in this context. The report was put to the accused 
albeit in the context of the cable and knives. However, 
viewed in the conspectus of the other circumstances even if 
this circumstance is eschewed, it will not make any 
difference to the ultimate conclusion. The further argument 
that there was no seizure memo for the nail clippings is 
clearly incorrect. PW -31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar has clearly 
deposed that he had collected the nail clippings and hair 
samples and the blood of the accused -appellant and after 
sealing and labeling them handed it over to the police 
constable-4628.  Exhibit P -45(i) marked by PW -32 Ajay 
Kumar, Investigating Officer as part of the property list, 
mentions about the collection of nail clippings, hair sample 
and sodium fluoride tube. Hence, the contention that the 
chain of custody is not established cannot be countenanced. 
There is no reason to disbelieve PW -31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar 
and the documents in support of the same. 

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xiv) The evidence of the prosecution witnesses and even 
the version  of the accused establishes his presence at the 
scene of occurrence.  His explanation that deceased Latha 
would always leave the door open for him to enter and that 
when he entered, he found them already dead and lying on 
the floor wounded has been found to be  false. If the 
appellant’s own case is that he entered the house that night, 
no cogent explanation has been given as to who opened the 
door. However, we have not gone by his version. His 
presence at the scene of crime is established by the evidence 
of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-23, PW-30 and PW-32.  
xv) The appellant  was the only other person inside the 
house, with the other three being dead and one Karthiayani 
Amma, who was injured and unconscious and who later 
died in that state itself.  There is no cogent and plausible 
explanation forthcoming from the accused as to what 
transpired at the scene of occurrence on the night 
intervening 03.11.2005 and 04.11.2005.  This coupled with 

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the fact that his relationship with the deceased Latha was 
strained clearly point to his guilt.  Section 106 of the Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872 states that when any fact is especially 
within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving 
that fact is upon him.  We are conscious of the warning 
administered by Justice Vivian Bose, rightly, in Shambhu 
Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer , 1956 SCR 199 to the 
effect that Section 106 is not intended to relieve the 
prosecution of its duty.  However, Shambhu Nath Mehra  
(supra) itself recognizes that in exceptional cases where it 
could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately 
difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are 
especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden 
will be on the accused since he could prove as to what 
transpired in such scenario, without difficulty or 
inconvenience.  In this case, when an offence like m ultiple 
murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the initial 
burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. Once the 

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prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon it, 
the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other 
person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent 
and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be 
committed. The appellant has miserably failed on that score.  
This can be considered as a very important circumstance, 
constituting a vital link in the chain. 
13. Though the trial Court and the High Court have 
adverted to few other circumstances, we are satisfied that 
the circumstances set out hereinabove are by themselves 
consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the 
accused alone is the perpetrator of these murders which 
were most foul.   
14. It is also to be noted that the law on the appreciation 
of circumstantial evidence is well settled and it will be an 
idle parade of familiar learning to deal with all the cases.  
We do no more than set out the holding in Sharad 
Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 

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116, which dealt with the panchsheel or the five principles 
essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in 
a case based on circumstantial evidence: 
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that 
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case 
against an accused can be said to be fully established: 
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of 
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. 
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the  
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may 
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a   
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be 
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in  Shivaji 
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the 
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) 
p. 1047] 
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused 
must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can 
convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and 
‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure 
conclusions.” 
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only 
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to 
say, they should not be explainable on any other          
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, 
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature 
and tendency, 
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis    
except the one to be proved, and 
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as 
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion 

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consistent with the innocence of the accused and must 
show that in all human probability the act must have been 
done by the accused. 
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, 
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on 
circumstantial evidence.” 
 
15. We are convinced that the circumstances presented in 
evidence in this case more than meets the ingredients that 
are required to be established.  We find no reason to 
interfere with the concurrent conviction recorded by the trial 
Court and the High Court against the appellant for the 
offences under Section 302 (murder), 449 (house -trespass) 
and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) and we maintain the 
conviction. 
Discussion on Sentence:  
16. Coming to the sentencing, while the trial Court 
imposed the sentence of death, the High Court has modified 
it to that of imprisonment for 30 years with no remission.  
Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, made an 
impassioned plea as part of his alternative submission that 

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imprisonment for 30 years without remission is excessive 
and disproportionate.  Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior 
counsel, left no stone unturned in contending that the 
appellant has got away lightly and that he is fortunate to 
have escaped the gallows.   
17. The question before us is what should be the 
appropriate sentence and whether the High Court was 
justified in adopting the Swamy Shraddananda  v. State of 
Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767  line of cases and even it 
was justified whether the fixing of the quantum at 30 years 
without remission was the appropriate sentence, in the facts 
and circumstances of the case? 
18.  The trial court imposed the sentence of death as far as 
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC was 
concerned. The trial court recorded that the appellant had 
committed the murder of four persons; that the appellant 
was blood -thirsty; that he had illicit  love affair with 
deceased Latha, the wife of deceased Ramachandran; that 

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she even became pregnant because of him and then fell out 
with the appellant ; that there was an attempt to cause 
bodily injury earlier to Latha by throwing a koduval 
(curved sword)  on 03.02.2005; that the nature of the 
injuries inflicted upon the deceased persons indicate that 
the murder s were committed in an extremely brutal and 
dastardly manner; that they were premeditated and cold 
blooded murders; that the entire family was eliminated 
including an innocent child aged eleven years and a hapless 
80 years old lady and that the collective conscience of the 
community was shocked.  The trial court also noted that the 
accused attempted to commit suicide by cutting the vein in 
his left forearm but however discarded that circumstance 
and passed a sentence of death. 
19. The High Court first recorded that there was no 
question of interfering with the sentence under Sections 
449 and 309 IPC and the question was only whether the 
sentence of death ought to be confirmed or not. Thereafter, 

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the High Court delved into the balance sheet of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. The High Court , while 
recording the argument of the prosecution , noticed that 
there was prior planning; that four lives were snuffed out 
and the entire family was wiped out including a child and 
an aged woman; that the deceased were unarmed and 
defenceless and no provocation or resistance was offered 
by them; that the offence was committed after 
mischievously planning the operation and after gaining 
access to the closed house in the night by making a hole on 
the wall; that the incident reflected a dare devil attitude; 
that the nature of weapons used by the accused , namely, 
the knife and the iron bar is also taken as an aggravating 
circumstance; that the nature and number of injuries 
inflicted on deceased Latha (43 of which 38 were stab 
injuries) was also an aggravating circumstance and that 
there were prior instances of involvement by the accused in 
attempting to assault Latha.  

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20. Dealing with the mitigating circumstance, the High 
Court noticed the contention of the defence, to the effect 
that there was no semblance of any element of gain, profit 
or advantage for the accused; that rightly or wrongly the 
accused was labouring under an impression of deprivation 
in love; that the accused was in an extremely agitated and 
excited state of mind; that there was indication to show 
that at some point of time deceased Latha had herself 
suggested commission of suicide together; that the 
accused had no motive whatsoever against 
Ramachandran, Chitra and Karthiayani  Amma; that he 
had great affection for Chitra and referred to 
Ramachandran in endearing terms; that he had not used 
any weapon against Karthiayani Amma; that he did not 
make any attempt to flee from justice and in fact 
attempted to commit suicide; that he was a young man of 
twenty eight years; that he was still young and not lost to 

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civilization and humanity and the final contention of the 
defence that he was not a menace to the society.  
21. Thereafter, the High Court dealt with the precedents  
laid down by this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of 
Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 , Machhi Singh v. State of 
Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470  to examine whether the litmus 
test, namely, that the alternative option being 
unquestionably foreclosed was fulfilled or not. Thereafter, 
the High Court noticed the judgment of this Court in 
Swamy Shraddananda (supra) and the holding thereon 
that to avoid a sentence of death , it is possible for the 
courts to device a graver form of sentence of 
imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years which would 
ensure that the society is insulated from the criminal for 
such period as the court may specify, including if the facts 
warranted, the entire rest of his life. 

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22. Thereafter applying Swamy Shraddananda (supra) , 
the High Court observed as follows:  
"54. A question still remains  whether the instant case is 
one in which the graver alternatives of a life sentence are 
also unquestionably foreclosed. We have rendered our 
anxious consideration to all that all the relevant inputs. 
We are unable to agree that all the options now available 
can be said to be unquestionably foreclosed in the given 
circumstances. In every case of death sentence, the court 
must consider the purpose of the sentence. The theory of 
reformation will have no place whatsoever in a case of 
imposition of death sentence. In a case like the instant 
one, the consideration of compensation/restoration cannot 
also have any place, as all the members of the family 
have been liquidated by the conduct of the accused. The 
purpose of a death sentence - of eliminating the menace 
to the society in the form of a hardened criminal and to 
save society from the activities of such criminal may not 
also have much role, given the alternative option of a life 
sentence which will ensure that the accused does not 
come into contact with the society thereafter. 
59. Let it not be assumed that this court does not perceive 
the instant one to be a serious and dastardly crime. We, to 
say the least, are convinced that the offence committed 
calls for societal abhorrence and disapproval. But, the 
totality of circumstances instill in us the satisfaction that 
this is not a case where the range of further options 
available to the court after Swamy Shraddananda  
(supra) are unquestionably foreclosed. Placing fetter on 
the powers of the Executive under Section 432 and 433 
Cr.P.C. for a prescribed period (and with due caution 
administered that the powers under Article 72 and Article 

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161 should not be lightly invoked to get over the 
prescription of such period fixed by this Court) a sentence 
of imprisonment for life which shall ensure that the 
offender does not get exposed to society for a period of 
30 years can be imposed. We are not prescribing the 
'entire rest of the life' as the period, as fixed by their 
Lordships in Swamy Shraddananda (supra), considering 
the totality of circumstances and because of the optimistic 
faith in the infinite capacity of the human soul to repent 
and reform." 
Holding so, the High Court modified the sentence of death 
to that of imprisonment for life with the further direction 
that the accused shall not be released from prison for a 
period of 30 (thirty) years including the period already 
undergone with set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. alone. 
23. The State is not in appeal, having accepted the verdict 
of the High Court. It is only the appellant who is in appeal. 
It is his submission that the imposition of 30 (thirty) years 
sentence without remission is excessive and the counsel 
urges that a suitable lesser sentence be imposed under the 
Swamy Shraddananda principle. This is the alternative 
submission advanced.  

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24. Swamy Shraddananda (supra) , since affirmed 
subsequently in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias 
Murugan and Others, (2016) 7 SCC 1 , resolved a judge’s 
dilemma. Often it happens that a case that falls short of the 
rarest of the rare category may also be one where a mere 
sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life 
imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and 
inadequate. The Court may find that while death penalty 
may not be warranted keeping in mind the overall 
circumstances, a proportionate penalty would be to fix the 
period between 14 years and for the imprisonment till rest 
of the life without remission. Addressing this issue 
felicitously in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) Justice Aftab 
Alam speaking for the court, held as follows: 
“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different 
angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A 
sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be 
highly disproportionately inadequate . When an appellant 
comes to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by 
the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this 

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Court may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just 
falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel 
somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But 
at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime, 
the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life 
imprisonment subject to remission normally works out to 
a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and 
inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the Court's 
option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence 
of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more 
than 14 years and the other death, the Court may feel 
tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death 
penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far 
more just, reasonable and proper course would be to 
expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of 
fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus 
between 14 years' imprisonment and death. It needs to be 
emphasised that the Court would take recourse to the 
expanded option primarily because in the facts of the 
case, the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment would 
amount to no punishment at all.” 
25. In V. Sriharan ( supra), a Constitution Bench of this 
Court affirmed the principle laid down in Swamy 
Shraddananda (supra) . It first affirmed the principle that 
imprisonment for life meant imprisonment for rest of the 
life, subject however, to the right to claim remission , as 
provided in the Constitution and the statutes. It was further 
held that the judgment in Swamy Shraddananda (supra)  

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did not violate any statutory prescription. The Court went 
on to observe that all that Swamy Shraddananda (supra)  
sought to declare was that within the prescribed limit of the 
punishment of life imprisonment , having regard to the 
nature of offence committed  by imposing life 
imprisonment for a specified period would be proportionate 
to the crime as well as the interest of the victim. Thereafter, 
in the same judgment Ibrahim Kalifulla, J., in a passage 
which repays study held as under: 
“98. While that be so, it cannot also be lost sight of that it 
will be next to impossible for even the lawmakers to think 
of or prescribe in exactitude all kinds of such criminal 
conduct to fit into any appropriate pigeonhole for 
structured punishments to run in between the minimum 
and maximum period of imprisonment. Therefore, the 
lawmakers thought it fit to prescribe the minimum and 
the maximum sentence to be imposed for such diabolic 
nature of crimes and leave it for the adjudication 
authorities, namely, the Institution of Judiciary which is 
fully and appropriately equipped with the necessary 
knowledge of law, experience, talent and infrastructure to 
study the detailed parts of each such case based on the 
legally acceptable material evidence, apply the legal 
principles and the law on the subject, apart from the 
guidance it gets from the jurists and judicial 

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pronouncements revealed earlier, to determine from the 
nature of such grave offences found proved and 
depending upon the facts noted, what kind of punishment 
within the prescribed limits under the relevant provision 
would appropriately fit in. In other words, while the 
maximum extent of punishment of either death or life 
imprisonment is provided for under the relevant 
provisions noted above, it will be for the courts to decide 
if in its conclusion, the imposition of death may not be 
warranted, what should be the number of years of 
imprisonment that would be judiciously and judicially 
more appropriate to keep the person under 
incarceration, by taking into account, apart from the 
crime itself, from the angle of the commission of such 
crime or crimes, the interest of the society at large or 
all other relevant factors which cannot be put in any 
straitjacket formulae.”  
(Emphasis Supplied) 
It will be clear from the paragraph above that the question 
of fixing the number of years within the maximum, in the 
case of life imprisonment , was to be left to the courts. It 
was mandated that the courts would with its experience, 
knowledge of law, the talent and infrastructure after 
studying the detailed parts of each case, with the guidance 
from the jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed 
earlier would decide judiciously about the period of 

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incarceration which the case warranted. It was also 
indicated that for this, apart from the crime itself; the angle 
of the commission of such crime or crimes; the interest of 
society at large and all other relevant facts which cannot be 
put in a ny straitjacket formulae would be taken into 
account.  
26. Once the court decides that the death penalty is not to 
be imposed and also that the convict cannot be released on 
the expiry of 14 years, the guidelines set out in Swamy 
Shraddananda (supra), V. Sriharan (supra) and the line 
of cases which have applied these judgments will have to 
be considered and principles , if any, set out therein have to 
be applied.  
27. How much is too much and how much is  too little? 
This is the difficult area we have tried to address here. As 
rightly observed , there can be no straitjacket formulae. 
Pegging the point up to which remission powers cannot be 

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invoked is an exercise that has to be carefully undertaken 
and the discretion should be exercised on reasonable 
grounds. The spectrum is very large. The principle in 
Swamy Shraddananda (supra) as affirmed in V. Sriharan 
(supra) was evolved as the normally accepted norm of 14 
years was found to be grossly disproportionate on the lower 
side. At the same time, since it is a matter concerning the 
liberty of the individual, courts should also guard against 
any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher side too. 
A delicate balance has to be struck. While undue leniency , 
which will affect the public confidence and the efficacy of 
the legal system, should not be shown, at the same time, 
since a good part of the convict’s life with freedom is being 
sliced away  (except in cases where the Court decides to 
impose imprisonment till rest of the full life), in view of his 
incarceration, care should be taken that the period fixed is 
also not harsh and excessive. While by the very nature of 
the task mathematical exactitu de is an impossibility, that 

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will not deter the Court from imposing a period of sentence 
which will constitute “a just dessert” for the convict. 
Precedents can be good pointers as advised in V. Sriharan 
(supra).  A survey of the previously decided cases applying 
the Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle would be a 
safe and legitimate guide. It is in pursuance of that mandate 
that we have made a survey of  some of the  cases to see 
how Swamy Shraddananda (supra)  had come to be 
applied in the course of the last decade and a half.  
28. In Swamy Shraddananda (supra) itself, on facts, after 
finding that it was a murder of the wife in a systematic 
preplanned manner coupled with the fact that it was a 
murder for gain, th is Court directed that the appellant 
therein be not released from prison for the rest of his life. 
29. In Haru Ghosh v. State of W est Bengal, (2009) 15 
SCC 551 which involved the murder of two individuals and 
the attempt to murder the third by the accused who was out 

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on bail in another case, after convict ion, this Court while 
commuting the death penalty after taking into account the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances imposed a 
sentence of 35 (thirty five)  years of actual jail sentence 
without remission. It was noted that commission of the 
offence was not premeditated since he did not come armed 
and that the accused was the only bread earner for his 
family which included two minor children. 
30. In Mulla & Another  v. State of U.P. , (2010) 3 SCC 
508 the accused/appellant, along with other co -accused, 
was found guilty of murdering five persons, including one 
woman. This Court confirmed the conviction but modified 
the sentence. This Court stressed on the fact that socio -
economic factors also constitute a mitigating factor and 
must be taken into consideration as in the case the 
appellants belonged to extremely poor background which 
prompted them to commit the act. The sentence was 

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reduced from death to life imprisonment for full life , 
subject to any remission by the Government for good 
reasons. 
31. In Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2010) 1 SCC 573 
which involved the murder of his wife , this Court imposed 
a sentence of 20 (twenty) years including remissions. 
32. In Ramnaresh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh., 
(2012) 4 SCC 257  the convicts were sentenced to death by 
the lower court, with the High Court confirming the 
sentence, on finding them guilty of raping and murdering 
an innocent woman while she was alone in her house. This 
Court confirmed the conviction but found the case did not 
fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category for awarding death 
sentence. Ultimately, after setting out the well-established 
principles and on consideration of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, th is Court, while commuting the 

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sentence from death imposed a sentence of life 
imprisonment of 21 (twenty one) years.   
33. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC  766 
was a case where the accused committed murder of his 
own four -year old daughter. This Court , after considering 
the nature of offence, age, relationship and gravity of 
injuries caused, awarded the accused 30 (thirty) years  in 
jail without remissions. 
34. In Sandeep v. State of U ttar Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 
107 which involved the murder of paramour and the 
unborn child (f oetus), this Court, while considering the 
facts and circumstances awarded a period of 30 (thirty) 
years in jail without remission. 
35. In Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs State of Maharashtra, 
(2013) 5 SCC 546,  the accused was convicted for raping 
and murdering a minor girl aged eleven years and was 
sentenced to death for conviction under S. 302 of IPC, life 

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imprisonment under S. 376, seven years RI under S. 366 -A 
and five years RI under S. 363 r/w S. 34. This Court 
confirmed the conviction but modified the death sentence 
to life imprisonment for natural life and all the sentences to 
run consecutively.  
36. Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 9 SCC 
778, concerned killing of five persons including three 
children.  This Court, taking note of the fact that the guilt 
was established by way of circumstantial evidence and the 
fact that the High Court had already imposed a sentence of 
20 (twenty) years  without remission, did not interfere with 
the judgment of the High Court. 
37. In Gurvail Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2 
SCC 713 which involved the murder of four persons, this 
Court weighed the mitigating factors i.e., age of the 
accused and the probability of reformation and 
rehabilitation, and aggravating factors i.e., the number of 

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deceased, the nature of injuries and the totality of facts and 
circumstances directed that the imprisonment would be for 
a period of 30 (thirty) years without remission. 
38. In Alber Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, (2014) 12 SCC 
306 which involved the murder by the accused of his live -
in partner and the two children of the partner , this Court , 
even though it found the murder to be brutal, grotesque, 
diabolical and revolting , applied the proportionality 
principle and imposed a sentence of 30 (thirty) years  over 
and above the period already undergone. It was ordered 
that there would be no remission for a period of 30 (thirty) 
years.  
39. In Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 
SCC 353, which involved the rape and murder of helpless 
and defenceless minor girl, this Court commuting the death 
penalty imposed a sentence of 35 (thirty five) years  in jail 
without remission.   

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40. In Selvam v. State, (2014) 12 SCC 274 , the accused 
was found guilty of rape and murder of nine year old girl. 
This Court imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a 
period of 30 (thirty) years  without any remission, 
considering the diabolic manner in which the offence has 
been committed against the child. 
41. In Birju v. State of M adhya Pradesh, (2014) 3 SCC 
421, the accused was involved in the murder of a one -year-
old child. This Court noted that various criminal cases were 
pending against the accused but stated that it cannot be 
used as an aggravating factor as the accused wasn’t 
convicted in those cases. While commuting the death 
penalty, this Court imposed a sentence of rigorous 
imprisonment for a period of 20 (twenty) years  over and 
above the period undergone without remission , s ince he 
would be a menace to the society i f given any lenient 
sentence. 

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42. In Tattu Lodhi v. State of M adhya Pradesh, (2016) 9 
SCC 675 this Court was dealing with an appeal preferred 
by the accused who was sentenced to death after he was 
found guilty of committing murder of a minor girl and for 
kidnapping and attempt to rape  after destruction of 
evidence.  This Court reduced the sentence from death to 
life imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years  as 
it noted that there exists a possibility of the accused 
committing similar offence if freed after fourteen years. 
This Court also opined that the special category sentence 
developed in Swamy Shradhanand (supra)  serves a 
laudable purpose which takes care of genuine concerns of 
the society and helps the accused get rid of death penalty. 
43. Vijay Kumar v. State of J ammu & Kashmir, (2019) 
12 SCC 791 was a case where the accused was found guilty 
of murder of three minor children of the sister-in-law of the 
accused. This Court, taking note of the fact that the accused 

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was not a previous convict or a professional killer and the 
motive for which the offence was committed , namely, the 
grievance that the sister -in-law’s family was not doing 
enough to solve the matrimonial problem of the accused, 
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment till natural death 
of the accused without remission. 
44. In Parsuram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 8 
SCC 382 , the accused had raped and murdered his own 
student. T he T rial Court sentenced the accused to death 
which was affirmed by the High Court. This Court took 
into consideration the mitigating factors i.e., that the 
accused was twenty two year s old when he committed the 
act and the fact that there exists a possibility of reformation 
and the aggravating factors i.e., that the accused abused the 
trust of the family of the victim. After complete 
consideration and reference to some precedents , this Court 
imposed a sentence of thirty years without any remission. 

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45. In Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 
16 SCC 278 , the accused was sentenced to death by the 
Trial Court and the High Court for committing rape and 
murder of minor girl aged about eight years old. This Court 
noted the mitigating factors i.e., age of the accused at the 
time of committing the act [50 years] and possibility of 
reformation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a 
period of 25 (twenty five) years without remission. 
46. Swapan Kumar Jha v.  State of Jharkhand  and 
Another, (2019) 13 SCC 579  was a case relating to 
abduction of deceased for ransom and thereafter murder by 
the accused. This Court took into consideration the 
mitigating factors i.e., young age of the accused, possibility 
of reformation and the convict not being a menace to 
society. On the other side of the weighing scale, was the 
fact that the accused had betrayed the trust of the deceased 
who was his first cousin and the fact that the act was 

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premeditated. This Court modified the death sentence to 
one of imprisonment for a period of 25 (twenty five) years  
with remissions. 
47. Raju Jagdish Paswan v.  State of 
Maharashtra, (2019) 16 SCC 380  was a case where the 
accused was convicted for the rape and murder of minor 
girl aged about nine years and sentenced to death by the 
trial court which was affirmed by the High Court. This 
Court noted the mitigating factors i.e., murder was not pre -
planned, young age of the accused, no evidence to show 
that the accused is a continuing threat to society and the 
aggravating factors i.e., the nature of the crime and the 
interest of society , if petitioner is let out after fourteen 
years, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for 30 
(thirty years) without remission. 
48. In X v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1 the 
accused was sentenced to death by this Court on his 

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conviction for committing rape and murder of two minor 
girls who lived near his house. However, in review, the 
question placed before the Court was whether post -
conviction mental illness be a mitigating factor. This Court 
answered it in the affirmative but cautioned that in only 
extreme cases of mental illness can this factor be taken into 
consideration. The Court reduced the sentence from death 
to life imprisonment for the remainder of his life as he still 
poses as a threat to society. 
49. In Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of  
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801 , this Court affirmed 
conviction of the accused, inter alia, under S. 302 and 376 
but modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment 
for minimum 30 (thirty years) . This Court stated that 
mitigating factors such as young age of the accused, no 
criminal antecedents, act not being pre -planned, socio -
economic background of the accused and the fact that 

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conduct of the accused inside jail was ‘satisfactory’ 
concluded that sufficient mitigating circumstances exists to 
commute the death sentence. 
50. In Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 
817, this Court opined that the facts of the case shocked the 
conscience of the Court. The accused was found guilty of 
rape and murder of a twenty eight year old married woman 
who was returning from her workplace. Despite noting that 
the case did not fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category, the 
Court stated that while considering the possibility of 
reformation of the accused, Courts held that showing undue 
leniency in such a brutal case will adversely affect the 
public confidence in the efficacy of the legal system. It 
concluded that a fixed term of 30 (thirty years)  should be 
imposed. 
51. In Manoj and Others v. State of M adhya Pradesh, 
(2023) 2 SCC 353 , the three accused were sentenced to 

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death by the lower court and confirmed by the High Court 
on their conviction under Section 302 for committing 
murder, during the course of robbery, of three women. This 
Court, while modifying the sentence from death to life 
imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five)  years, took 
into consideration the non -exhaustive list of mitigating and 
aggravating factors discussed in Bachan Singh (supra)  to 
establish a method of principled sentencing. This Court 
also imposed an obligation on the State to provide material 
disclosing psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the 
accused which would help the courts understand the 
progress of the accused towards reformation. 
52. In Madan vs State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 
1473, this Court was dealing with a case wherein the 
accused was sentenced to death, along with other co -
accused, for murdering six persons of his village. This 
Court called for the jail conduct report and psychological 

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report of the accused which were satisfactory and depicted 
nothing out of the ordinary. Th is Court also took into 
consideration the old age of the accused and period 
undergone [18 yrs .] as mitigating factors. This Court 
concluded that the case did not fall under the rarest of rare 
category and commuted the death sentence to life 
imprisonment for minimum 20 (twenty years)  including 
sentence undergone. 
53. In Sundar vs State by Inspector of Police - 2023 SCC 
OnLine SC 310 , this Court, while sitting in review, 
commuted death sentence awarded to accused therein to 
life imprisonment of minimum 20 (twenty years). The 
accused had committed rape and murder of a 7 -year-old 
girl. Factors that influenced this Court to reach such a 
decision were the fact that no court had looked at the 
mitigating factors. It called for jail conduct and education 
report from the jail authorities and found that the conduct 

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was satisfactory and that accused had earned a diploma in 
food catering while he was incarcerated. Apart from the 
above, the Court noted the young age of the accused, no 
prior antecedents to reach a conclusion warranting 
modification in the sentence awarded. 
54. In Ravinder Singh vs State Govt. of NCT of Delhi - 
(2024) 2 SCC 323 , the accused was convicted under 
Sections 376, 377 & 506 of the IPC for raping his own 9 -
year-old daughter by the Sessions court and conviction was 
confirmed by the High Court. The Sessions Court , while 
imposing life imprisonment , also stated that the accused  
would not be given any clemency by the State before 20 
years. This Court clarified that, as discussed in V. Sriharan 
(supra), the power to impose a special category sentence 
i.e., a sentence more than 14 years but short of death 
sentence can only be im posed by the High Court or if in 
appeal, by th is Court.  Considering the nature of the 

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offence committed by the accused and the fact that if the 
accused is set free early, he can be a threat to his own 
daughter, this Court imposed a minimum 20 (twenty years) 
life imprisonment without remissions. 
55. A survey  of the 27 cases discussed above indicates 
that while in five cases, the maximum of imprisonment till 
the rest of the life is given; in nine cases, the period of 
imprisonment without remission was 30 years; in six cases, 
the period was 20 years  (In Ramraj (supra), this Court had 
imposed a sentence of 20 years including remission) ; in 
four cases, it was 25 years; in another set of two cases, it 
was 35 years and in one case, it was 21 years. 
56. What is clear is that courts , while applying Swamy 
Shraddananda (supra), have predominantly in cases 
arising out of a wide array of facts, keeping the relevant 
circumstances applicable to the respective cases fixed the 
range between 20 years and 35 years and in few cases have 

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imposed imprisonment for the rest of the life. So much for 
statistics. Let us examine how the  judgments guide  us in 
terms of discerning any principle. 
57. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove shows 
that the fundamental underpinning is the principle of 
proportionality. The aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances which the Court considers while deciding 
commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, 
have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of 
compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. As a 
judicially trained mind pores and ponders over the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and in cases 
where they decide to commut e the death penalty they 
would by then have a reasonable idea as to what would be 
the appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the 
Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle too. Matters are 
not cut and dried and nicely weighed here to formulate a 

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uniform principle. That is where the experience of the 
judicially trained mind comes in as pointed out in V. 
Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the process of arriving at 
the number of years as the most appropriate for the case at 
hand, which the convict will have to undergo before which 
the remission powers could be invoked, some of the 
relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the 
number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their 
age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including  sexual 
assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was 
committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when 
the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the 
premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship 
between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust 
if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the 
convict, if released , would be a menace to the society . 
Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the 
convict; (2)  the probability of reformation of convict; (3) 

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the convict not being a professional killer; ( 4) the socio-
economic condition of the accused ; (5) the composition of 
the family of the accused  and ( 6) conduct expressing 
remorse.  
 These were some of the relevant factors that were kept 
in mind in the cases noticed above while w eighing the pros 
and cons of the matter.  The Court would be additionally 
justified in considering the conduct of the convict in jail; 
and the period already undergone to arrive at the number of 
years which the Court feels the convict should, serve as 
part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before which 
he cannot apply for remission. These are not meant to be 
exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on 
the facts and circumstances therein.  
58. How do these factors apply to the case at hand?  The 
act committed by the accused was pre -
planned/premeditated; the accused brutally murdered 4 

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(four) persons who were unarmed and were defenseless, 
one of whom was a child and the other an aged lady. It is 
also to be noted that by the act of the accused, three 
generations of single family have lost their lives for no 
fault of theirs; Nature of injuries inflicted on Latha, 
Ramachandran and Chitra highlights the brutality and cold -
bloodedness of the act.  
59. On the mitigating side, the accused was quite young 
when he committed the act i.e., 2 8 years old; The act 
committed by the accused was not for any gain or profit; 
accused did not try to flee and in fact tried to commit 
suicide as he was overcome with emotions after the 
dastardly act he committed ; accused has been in jail for a 
period of 18 years and 4 months and the case is based on 
circumstantial evidence.  We called for a conduct report of 
the appellant from the Jail Authorities.  The report dated 
05.03.2024 of the Superintendent , Central Prison and 

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Correctional Home, Viyyur, Thrissur has been made 
available to us.  The report indicates that ever since his 
admission to jail, he had been entrusted with prison labour  
work such as duty of barber, day watchman and night 
watchman.  Presently, he has been assigned the job as 
convict supervisor for the last one and a half years.  The 
report clearly indicates that no disciplinary action s were 
initiated against him in the prison and that the conduct and 
behavior of the appellant in prison has been satisfactory so 
far. 
Conclusion: 
60.  For the reasons stated above, we uphold the 
judgment of the High Cout insofar as the conviction of the 
appellant under Sections 302, 449 and 309 IPC  is 
concerned.  We also do not interfere with the sentence 
imposed on the accused for the offence under Section 449 
and Section 309 of IPC.  We hold that the High Court was 
justified on the facts of the case in following Swamy 

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Shraddananda (supra) principle while imposing sentence 
for the offence under Section 302 IPC. However, in view 
of the discussion made above, we are inclined to modify 
the sentence under Section 302 imposed by the High 
Court from a period of 30 years imprisonment without 
remission to that of a period of 25 years imprisonment 
without remission , including the period already 
undergone.  In our view, this  would serve the ends of 
justice.   
 For the reasons stated above, the Appeal is partly 
allowed in the above terms.       
  …....…………………J. 
               (B. R. Gavai) 
 
 
…....…………………J. 
             (K.V. Viswanathan) 
 
        
               …..…………………J. 
                   (Sandeep Mehta) 
New Delhi; 
March 18, 2024.