Indian Law Research

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India

Decision date:

30 July 2024 · 2024 INSC 558

Whether State Bar Councils can charge a higher enrollment fees than set out in the Advocates Act.

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Official source

Draft summary

AI-assisted historical explanation. Independently checked against the source by an AI reviewer. Not reviewed by a lawyer. This historical summary does not certify the current legal position.

In one sentence

Bar Councils cannot use extra compulsory charges to exceed statutory enrolment fees.

Question decided

Can additional fees be required as a condition for enrolling an advocate?

Key holdings

Outcome

The petitions were disposed of with binding limits on enrolment preconditions.

Source PDF pages: 67, 68.

Plain-English explanation

The challenge concerned the financial barrier faced by law graduates entering the profession. State Bar Councils were collecting sums under different labels beyond the enrolment amounts fixed by Parliament. The Court looked at their practical effect: a payment required before enrolment remains a precondition even if it is called something other than an enrolment fee. Excessive barriers also raised equality and professional-freedom concerns, especially for graduates with limited resources. The judgment left room for lawful charges connected with services after enrolment, but not disguised entry charges. Its prospective operation is significant. Someone who paid a higher sum before the decision cannot rely on this judgment alone as a direction requiring reimbursement. Current amounts and any statutory amendments must be checked separately.

Relevant law

Opinions

Two-judge bench; Chief Justice Chandrachud authored the judgment.

Research notes and limits

Verify the current statute and distinguish enrolment preconditions from lawful later service fees; no retrospective refund promise.

Judgment - source material

All pages of the downloaded court document follow, including separate opinions, annexures and any final joint order. This is machine-extracted original text, not an AI rewrite. Use the PDF to check exact wording.

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2024 INSC 558
 1 
Reportable  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
 
Writ Petition (C) No. 352 of 2023 
Gaurav Kumar                         …P etitioner 
Versus 
Union of India and Ors.                        …R espondents 
 
With 
T.C.(C) No. 28 of 2023 
With 
T.C.(C) No. 29 of 2023 
With 
T.C.(C) No. 30 of 2023 
With 
T.P.(C) No. 2526 of 2023 
With 
T.P.(C) No. 1982 of 2023 
With 
T.P.(C) Nos. 2088-2089 of 2023 
With 
T.P.(C) No. 2171 of 2023 
With 
T.P.(C) No. 2123 of 2023 
And With 
T.P.(C) No. 2734 of 2023

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 2 
J U D G M E N T 
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI 
Table of Contents 
 
A. Background .......................................................................................................... 4 
B. Issues .................................................................................................................... 8 
C. Submissions ........................................................................................................ 8 
D. Legal background .............................................................................................. 13 
i. All India Bar Committee ................................................................................. 13 
ii. Advocates Act: A Complete Code ................................................................. 17 
iii. Delegated legislation ..................................................................................... 20 
iv. Power to levy fees .......................................................................................... 22 
v. Regulatory fees .............................................................................................. 25 
E. Fees charged by the SBCs................................................................................ 28 
F. SBCs cannot charge enrolment fees beyond the mandate of Section 24(1)(f)
 ............................................................................................................................. 31 
i. Legislative Scheme ........................................................................................ 31 
ii. Bar Councils cannot levy fees beyond the express stipulation of law ..... 39 
G. All fees charged at the time of enrolment are ‘enrolment fees’ .................... 46 
i. Charges other than the enrolment fee cannot be a valid pre-condition ... 48

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 3 
ii. Article 14: substantive equality and manifest arbitrariness ....................... 51 
iii. Article 19(1)(g): unreasonableness .............................................................. 60 
H. Financial implications for the SBCs and the BCI ............................................ 65 
I. Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 67

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PART A  
 4 
1. The proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution address a challenge to 
the validity of the enrolment fees charged by State Bar Councils. 1 The 
grievance is that the fees charged by the SBCs at the time of admission of 
persons on State roll s are more than  the enrolment fee prescribed under 
Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act 1961.2 
A. Background  
2. The Advocates Act was enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to 
legal practitioners and constitute a common Bar for the whole country. The 
enactment establishes the SBCs3 and the Bar Council of India.4 Section 6 of 
the Advocates Act entrusts myriad functions to the SBCs. These functions 
comprehend entry into and conduct of legal professionals, including 
admission of advocates to their rolls, preparation and maintenance of rolls, 
determination of cases of misconduct against advocates on the rolls and 
safeguarding the rights , privileges and interests of advocates . The statute 
empowers the SBCs to organize legal aid for the poor, promote and support 
law reform, conduct academic discourses , and publish journals and papers 
on matters of legal interest.  
3. The functions of the BCI have been enumerated under Section 7. These 
include laying down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for 
advocates, enunciating the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary 
committee and the disciplinary committee of the  SBCs, safeguarding the 
 
1 “SBCs” 
2 “Advocates Act” 
3 Section 3, Advocates Act  
4 “BCI”; Section 4, Advocates Act

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PART A  
 5 
rights, privileges, and interests of advocates,  and promoting law reform. BCI 
is empowered to exercise general supervision and control over the SBCs. BCI 
is also empowered to impart legal education and lay down standards for legal 
education in consultation with the universities whose degrees in law would be 
a qualification for enrolment as an advocate and, for that purpose, visit and 
inspect universities.  
4. Chapter III of the Advocates Act pertains to the admission and enrolment of 
advocates. Section 17 mandates the SBCs to prepare and maintain a roll of 
advocates. An application for admission as an advocate on a  State roll is 
made to the SBCs.
5 The SBCs are required to issue a certificate of enrolment 
to every person whose name is enrolled in the roll of advocates. 6 Section 24 
prescribes the qualifications and conditions for a person to be admitted as an 
advocate.7  
 
5 Section 25, Advocates Act  
6 Section 22, Advocates Act  
7 Section 24, Advocates Act [It reads: 
24. Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, 
and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if 
he fulfils the following conditions, namely:—  
(a) he is a citizen of India: 
Provided that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, a national of any other country 
may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if citizens of India, duly qualified, are permitted 
to practise law in that other country; 
(b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years; 
(c) he has obtained a degree in law— 
(i) before the [12th day of March, 1967], from any University in the territory of India; or 
(ii) before the 15th day of August, 1947, from any University in any area which was comprised 
before that date within India as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935; or 
 [(iii) after the 12th day of March, 1967, save as provided in sub- clause (iii-a), after undergoing 
a three-year course of study in law from any University in India which is recognised for the 
purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or 
(iii-a) after undergoing a course of study in law, the duration of which is not less than two 
academic years commencing from the academic year 1967- 68, or any earlier academic

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PART A  
 6 
5. To qualify to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, a person must: 
(a) be a citizen of India; 
(b) complete the age of twenty-one years; 
(c) obtain a degree in law; 
(d) fulfil such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made by 
the SBCs under Chapter III; and 
(e) pay an enrolment fee of Rupees six hundred payable to the SBC and 
Rupees one hundred to the BCI along with any stamp duty, if 
chargeable. In the case of a person belonging  to the Scheduled 
Castes or Scheduled Tribes, the enrolment fee of Rupees one 
hundred is payable to the SBC and Rupees twenty-five to the BCI.  
 
year from any University in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar 
Council of India; or] 
 [(iv) in any other case, from any University outside the territory of India, if the degree is 
recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or] 
 [he is a barrister and is called to the Bar on or before the 31st day of December, 1976;  [or has 
passed the articled clerk's examination or any other examination specified by the High Court at 
Bombay or Calcutta for enrolment as an attorney of that High Court;] or has obtained such other 
foreign qualification in law as is recognised by the Bar Council of India for the purpose of 
admission as an advocate under this Act]; 
(e) he fulfils such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made by the State Bar Council 
under this Chapter; 
 [(f) he has paid, in respect of the enrolment, stamp duty, if any, chargeable under the Indian Stamp 
Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), and an enrolment fee payable to the State Bar Council of [six hundred 
rupees and to the Bar Council of India, one hundred and fifty rupees by way of a bank draft 
drawn in favour of that Council]: 
Provided that where such person is a member of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes 
and produces a certificate to that effect from such authority as may be prescribed, the enrolment 
fee payable by him to the State Bar Council shall be [one hundred rupees and to the Bar Council 
of India, twenty-five rupees]. 
[Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub- section, a person shall be deemed to have obtained a degree in 
law from a University in India on the date on which the results of the examination for that degree are published 
by the University on its notice-board or otherwise declaring him to have passed that examination.]]

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PART A  
 7 
6. The SBCs charge enrolment fees stipulated under Section 24(1)(f) of the 
Advocates Act  to admit law graduates on their  State roll . At the time of 
enrolment, the SBCs also charge various “fees” and “charges” in addition to 
the enrolment fees in the form of library fund contributions, administration 
fees, identity card fees, welfare funds, training fees, processing fees, 
certificate fee s, etc. The amount of fees charged by the SBCs differ 
significantly. This results in a situation where a law graduate has to pay 
somewhere between Rupees fifteen thousand to Rupees forty-two thousand 
(depending upon the SBC) as cumulative fees at the time of enrolment. 
7. The petitioner instituted proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution 
seeking a declaration that the fees charged by the SBCs at the time of 
enrolment violate Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act. In its order dated 10 
April 2023, this Court issued notice while observing that the petitioner has 
raised a significant issue about the enrolment fees charged by the SBCs. By 
an order dated 17 July 2023, this Court  transferred to itself the petitions 
dealing with similar issues from the High Court of Kerala,
8 the High Court of 
Judicature at Madras at Madurai, 9 and the High Court of Judicature at 
Bombay.10 Given this background, we now deal with the challenge to the 
validity of enrolment fees charged by the SBCs. 
 
 
 
8 Akshai M Sivan v. Bar Council of Kerala, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3068 of 2023 
9 Manimaran v. Bar Council of India, Writ Petition (MD) No. 8756 of 2023 
10 Amey Shejwal v. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, Writ Petition No. 3795 of 2021

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PART B&C   
 8 
B. Issues 
8. The petitions give rise to the following issues: 
a. Whether the enrolment fees charged by the SBCs are in contravention of 
Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act; and 
b. Whether payment of other miscellaneous fees can be made a pre- condition 
for enrolment. 
C. Submissions 
9. Mr Gaurav Kumar, the petitioner-in-person, made the following submissions: 
a. Section 24(1)(f) expressly prescribes the enrolment fee chargeable by the 
SBCs and the BCI for persons  to be admitted as an advocate. SBCs are 
charging exorbitant enrolment fees, often under different heads, in 
derogation of Section 24(1)(f); 
b. Once there is a specific provision prescribing enrolment fees, the SBCs or 
the BCI through their delegated rule- making power cannot charge fees 
beyond the substantive provision. Therefore, the BCI and the SBCs cannot 
invoke their powers to frame rules under Section 49(1) and Section 28(1) of 
the Advocates Act respectively to prescribe enrolment fees that are at 
variance with Section 24(1)(f);  
c. The term ‘subject to the provisions of this Act’ at the beginning of Section 24 
has been misconstrued to permit charging enrolment fees beyond the 
statutory prescription. It only means that other provisions of the Act must be

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PART C   
 9 
considered while deciding the ‘eligibility’ of law graduates to be admitted as 
advocates on the state rolls;  
d. Section 6(3) of the Advocates Act prescribes how the SBCs may constitute 
‘funds’ to fulfil their functions under Section 6(2). It does not allow imposing 
additional charges under different heads along with the enrolment fees or 
charging exorbitant fees as a mandatory condition for persons  to get 
enrolled; 
e. The exorbitant enrolment fees prevent law graduates belonging to 
economically weaker sections of society from getting admitted to the rolls of 
the SBCs. Such an indirect bar on law graduates enrolling as advocates 
offends Article 19(1)(g) of the Constituti on.
 It also makes the process of 
enrolment coercive, improper, unjust and unfair, violating Article 14 of the 
Constitution; and 
f. The Advocates’ Welfare Fund Act 2001 enacted by Parliament allows for the 
collection of funds through various sources for the welfare of advocates. This 
amount does not need to be collected by levying exorbitant enrolment fees.  
10. Mr Manan Kumar Mishra, senior counsel made the following submissions on 
behalf of the BCI:   
a. Bar Councils require adequate operational funds to effectively discharge 
their functions. They require funds for day -to-day functioning including 
administrative expenses, staff salaries, infrastructure maintenance and 
technological advancements. Inadequate  funding will hinder the ability of 
SBCs to comply with their statutory obligations under the Advocates Act;

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PART C   
 10 
b. The enrollment fee prescribed under  Section 24(1)(f) was fixed by the 
legislature in 1993 and has not been modified since. It fails to account for 
inflation and is not adequate to meet current financial demands. Unlike other 
professional bodies that levy an annual subscription fee on members, SBCs 
rely on the one-time enrolment fee;  
c. The fees charged by SBCs at the time of enrollment include additional 
expenses incurred in the enrolment process along with the enrolment fee 
prescribed by the Act, such as online data processing fee, identity card fee 
and verification process fee. Therefore, the fees charged do not violate 
Section 24(1)(f) and are linked to the services being rendered by the SBCs;  
d. Section 6(2) lays down the functions of the SBCs and places enrolment of 
advocates exclusively within their domain. An entity on whom statutory 
powers or duties have been conferred impliedly possesses incidental 
powers necessary for its effective exercise;  
e. Section 15 of the Act provides SBCs with the power to make rules to carry 
out the purposes of Chapter II of the Act (including Section 6). This general 
power to frame Rules includes the power to levy charges for services 
rendered under the Act; 
f. Merely because a charge is levied at the time of ‘enrollment’ does not make 
it an enrollment fee. The ‘enrollment fee’ charged by most SBCs under 
Section 24(1)(f) continues to be six hundred rupees and the remaining 
amount is usually attributable to additional charges for other services. SBCs 
may be directed to comply with Section 24(1)(f) while charging an 
‘enrollment fee’. But this must be distinguished from other charges levied at

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PART C   
 11 
the time of enrolment. Such charges are permissible provided they pass the 
test of quid pro quo in terms of services rendered in return for the charges 
levied; and 
g. The BCI has the power to frame rules to charge reasonable fees under 
Section 49(1) (ah) and Section 49(h). The term ‘any matter’ used in Section 
49(h) also includes matters relating to the enrolment of an advocate. In 
exercise of this power and to ensure uniformity, the BCI has placed on 
record before this Court, the draft Uniform Rules (For Enrolment a nd Other 
Fees To Be Charged By The State Bar Councils) 2023
11 laying down a 
uniform fee to be charged by all SBCs at the time of enrollment.  
11. In view of the above submissions, the BCI has submitted that this Court 
exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to implement a uniform 
enrolment fee structure that adequately caters to the financial requirements 
of the SBCs until legislative amendments are made to the Advocates Act. 
Additionally, it has urged this Court to direct the Union Government to revise 
the enrolment fee prescribed in Section 24(1)(f).  
12. The SBCs have filed counter affidavits justifying the imposition of the fees 
charged by them at the time of enrollment. In essence, they contend that (i) 
the statutorily prescribed enrolment fee in Section 24(1)(f) fails to account for 
the current economic situation; (ii) the SBCs are charging fees in addition to 
the statutorily prescribed enrolment fee in return for services such as library 
fee and ID card fee under their rule-making powers under Section 15 and 
 
11 “BCI Draft Enrolment Rules”

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PART C   
 12 
Section 28; and (iii) the additional charges are essential to enable the SBCs 
to fulfil their statutory functions. In order to fulfil these statutory functions, the 
SBCs inter alia run various welfare programs, insurance schemes, seminars 
and training programmes, which require adequate funding. 
13. Mr Raghenth Basant, senior counsel appearing for the petitioners before the 
Kerala High Court assailed the levy of enrollment fees by the Bar Council of 
Kerala in excess of the fee prescribed in Section 24(1)(f). Mr Basant made 
the following submissions:  
a. Rules prescribed by the SBCs under general provisions such as Section 
24(1)(e) cannot be with respect to the enrolment fee which has been 
specifically dealt with in Section 24(1)(f);  
b. Rule-making powers cannot be used to frame rules contrary to the 
Advocates Act, especially in the absence of any provision stipulating that the 
BCI or the SBCs are entitled to increase the statutory enrolment fee as they 
deem fit; 
c. The 1993 amendment which increased the statutory enrolment fee to its 
present form indicates that Parliament has been conscious of the need to 
increase the enrolment fee as and when required and is the only competent 
authority to carry out such changes; and 
d. Other fees charged by the Bar Council of Kerala, such as the sums charged 
under Rule 40 of Section IVA under Chapter II of Part VI of the Bar Council 
of India Rules
12 cannot be made a condition precedent for enrolment. Rule 
 
12 “BCI Rules”

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PART D   
 13 
40 of the BCI Rules prescribes that the payment be made by an advocate 
on the rolls of the SBC and thus, it cannot be a pre-requisite for enrolment. 
D. Legal background 
i. All India Bar Committee 
14. The establishment of the High Courts by Letters Patent in the Presidencies of 
Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras brought all courts in  the territories of British 
India under a unified system. The Letters Patent also allowed the High Courts 
to enroll advocates, vakils, and a ttorneys. The Legal Practitioners Act 1879 
empowered the High Courts not established by royal charters to make rules 
for the qualifications and admission of persons  seeking to be advocates of 
the Court.13 Initially, barristers and solicitors predominated the Original Side 
practice in the High Courts.14 Gradually, both advocates and vakils (who were 
Indian non-barristers) could act and plead before all High Courts, except for 
the Calcutta High Court which excluded vakils from the Original Side. 15 This 
distinction between advocates and vakils led to the demand for the creation 
of an all-India Bar. 
15. To give effect to this demand, the colonial legislature enacted the Indian Bar 
Councils Act 192616 “to provide for the constitution and incorporation of Bar 
Councils and to confer powers and impose duties on such Bar Councils.” 
Section 3 prescribed the constitution of a Bar Council for every High Court. 
 
13 Section 41, Legal Practitioners Act 1879 
14 Report of the All-India Bar Committee (1953) 15 
15 Ibid 
16 “1926 Act”

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PART D   
 14 
Section 8 pertained to the admission and enrolment of Advocates. It 
authorized the High Courts to prepare and maintain a rol l of advocates. 
Section 9 empowered the Bar Councils to make rules regulating the 
admission of persons to be advocates of the High Court including the charging 
of fees payable to the Bar Council s in respect of enrolment. Thus, the 1926  
Act empowered the Bar Councils to prescribe fees in respect of enrolment. 
However, the 1926 Act did not substantially fulfil the demands of the Indian 
legal practitioners for an all-India Bar. In 1951, the Government set up the All-
India Bar Committee to inquire into this issue and provide a feasible legal 
solution. 
16. The Committee recommended setting up of the SBCs and an All-India Bar 
Council, uniform minimum qualification for admission to the roll of Advocates, 
a common roll of Advocates maintained by the respective SBCs , and 
permitting the enrolled advocates to practice in any court in India, including 
the Supreme Court. The Committee’s observations on the finances of the BCI 
and the SBCs are relevant: 
“It is obvious that in order to carry on its duties the 
All-India Bar Council and the State Bar Councils 
shall require funds. At present the Advocates, at the 
time of their enrolment, pay a certain amount ranging 
from Rs. 25/ - to Rs. 100/ - which goes to the Bar 
Council besides Rs. 250/- to Rs. 1,125/- which goes 
to the State. Entrants to the professions other than 
the legal profession are not required to pay any 
amount to the State as and by way of admission fee. 
Persons exercising any profession, calling or 
vocation including Advocates in several places have 
to pay a licence fee, but there is no reason why there 
should be a taxation by the State at the time of 
enrolment of Advocates only. The Committee 
suggests that an Advocate at the time of his 
admission shall pay a sum of Rs. 500/ - to the

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PART D   
 15 
State Bar Council to which he makes his 
application and nothing should be payable to the 
State. This amount may be paid in a lump sum or 
an Advocate may elect to pay annual amounts of 
Rs. 50/ - with an option to pay Rs. 500/ - at any 
time, amounts already paid not being deducted. 
Those Vakils and Pleaders who according to the 
recommendations of the Committee become eligible 
to be enrolled as Advocates may pay Rs. 500/ - in 
lump sum or an annual amount of Rs. 50/ - with the 
option mentioned above. Each State Bar Council 
shall for the first five years contribute 40% of the 
enrolment fees received by it to the All -India Bar 
Council. At the end of the first 5 years the proportion 
of the contribution may be reconsidered.”
17 
                                                      (emphasis added) 
17. The Committee was aware of the fact that the SBCs will require funds to carry 
out their functions and duties. Consequently, the Committee recommended 
that an advocate should pay an enrolment fee of Rupees five hundred to the 
SBCs “at the time of his admission”. The Committee suggested that this 
amount could either be paid as a lump sum or on  a yearly instalment basis. 
In 1958, the Law Commission of India observed that the amount of Rupees 
five hundred proposed by the All-India Bar Committee was excessive. I t 
instead suggested an enrolment fee of Rupees one hundred twenty-five.18 
18. In 1959, the Legal Practitioners Bill 1959 was introduced i n Parliament. The 
Bill was referred to a Joint Committee of Parliament  which submitted its 
 
17 All-India Bar Committee (supra) 40 
18 Law Commission of India, Fourteenth Report, Reform of Judicial Administration 1958 (Volume 1) 575. [It 
observed: “It appears to us that the amount of Rs. 500 proposed by the Committee is excessive. At present 
various State bar Councils are receiving payments which range from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 from each entrant to 
the profession and so far we have been able to ascertain, not only are the amounts received sufficient to 
finance their activities but some of these Councils have accumulated out of these and other receipts 
substantial amounts which have been invested by them. The creation of the All India Bar Council envisaged 
by the Bar Committee will no doubt involve substantial additional expenditure. Considering all aspects of the 
matter, we suggest that an enrolment fee of Rs 125 may be charged by the State Bar Council from each 
entrant out of which Rs. 25 may be paid by the State Bar Council to the All India Bar Council.”]

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PART D   
 16 
recommendations in 1960. The Joint Committee recommended renaming the 
proposed enactment as the Advocates Act because there would only be one 
class of legal practitioners in India, that is, advocates. Importantly, the Joint 
Committee recommended reducing the proposed enrolment fee from Rupees 
five hundred to Rupees two- hundred and fifty. The aim behind reducing the 
enrollment fee was “to bring in as many eligible lawyers within its  [the 
legislation’s] fold as possible.”19 
19. The recommendation of the Joint Committee was accepted by Parliament and 
incorporated under Section 24(1)(f). During the Parliamentary debates 
preceding the passage of the Advocates Act, many members suggested that 
the enrolment fee of Rupees two- hundred fifty was exorbitant. 20 It was 
suggested that the enrolment fee should be further reduced or abolished 
altogether.21 The then Minister of Law ( Mr A K Sen) justified the rationale for 
prescribing Rupees two hundred fifty as enrolment fee thus: 
“So far the Bar Council is concerned, a fee of Rs. 
250 is not very unreasonable especially having 
regard to the fact that when we are setting up an 
autonomous body, we must give it enough funds to 
make it effective and useful. If it is to discharge all 
the functions given to it under this statute, then 
it requires funds and therefore Rs. 250 per 
entrant is not too much of a fee to pay when the 
 
19 The Legal Practitioners Bill 1959, Report of the Joint Committee (28 March 1960) xiii. (Raghubir Sahai and 
Khuswant Rai, the members of the Joint Committee noted: “The Constitution of an All India Bar was demand 
of the country since long and this Bill has been brought forward to meet it. Its aim would be to bring in as 
many eligible lawyers within its fold as possible. That is why the enrolment fee has been reduced from Rs. 
500/- originally proposed in the Bill to Rs. 250/ -. It would have been much better if this could be reduced to 
Rs. 125/ - as suggested by the Law Commission and the stamp duty would have been done away with 
altogether.”) 
20 Shri Shankaraiya, Legal Practitioners Bill, Lok Sabha (27 April 1961) 14162 
21 Legal Practitioners Bill, Lok Sabha (27 April 1961) 14164

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PART D   
 17 
Bar Council is going to function in so many 
different ways.”22 
                                                     (emphasis added) 
The statement of the Law Minister indicates that the enrolment fee was meant 
to allow the SBCs to effectively discharge “all functions” under the Advocates 
Act.  
20. In 1973, the enrolment fee payable by the members of the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes was reduced to Rupees one hundred twenty -five. 
Subsequently, Section 24(1)(f) was amended in 1993 to revise the fees 
payable by general candidates from Rupees two hundred fifty to Rupees 
seven hundred fifty, without increasing the fees payable by candidates 
belonging to the SC and ST category. The enrolment fees w ere increased 
given the representations made by the Bar Councils. 23 This indicates that  
Parliament is aware and responsive to the financial problems faced by the 
Bar Councils.24 
ii. Advocates Act: A Complete Code 
21. In O N Mohindroo v. Bar Council of Delhi,25 a Constitution Bench held that 
the Advocates Act was enacted by Parliament under the legislative field of 
 
22 Rajya Sabha, Advocates Bill 1961 (4 May 1961) 2125. 
23 Shri H R Bhardwaj, Minister of State in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Lok Sabha (26 
November 1992) 451. [The minister stated: “The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils represented 
that the expenses involved in the administration of the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils are 
growing every year and that it has become necessary to revise the enrolment fee upwards from Rs. 250/- to 
Rs. 750/ - without disturbing the fee payable in case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes.”] 
24 Bar Council of Maharashtra v. Union of India, 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 251 [3] 
25 1968 SCC OnLine SC 3

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PART D   
 18 
Entries 7726 and 7827 of List I. It was observed that the object of the Advocates 
Act is to constitute one common Bar for the whole of the country and to 
provide machinery for its regulated functioning. It was further observed that 
the expression “persons entitled to practice” under Entries 77 and 78 of List I 
includes within its scope the determination or prescription of qualifications and 
conditions entitling a person to practice as an advocate before the Supreme 
Court or the High Courts.
28 
22. In Bar Council of U P v. State of U P,29 the issue before a three-Judge Bench 
was whether the State legislature could impose stamp duty on the certificate 
of enrolment issued by the SBCs. It was held that the enrolment fee payable 
under Section 24(1)(f) is covered by Entry 96 in List I. Concerni ng the 
imposition of stamp duty, it was held that stamp duty payable on the certificate 
of enrolment cannot be regarded as a condition prescribed for enrolment 
because it pertains to the domain of taxation.
30 It was held that the State 
Legislature was competent to levy stamp duty under Entry 44 of List III of the 
Seventh Schedule. 
23. The Advocates Act was enacted to implement the recommendations of the 
All-India Bar Committee. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, 
the main features of the enactment are: 
 
26 Entry 77, List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. [It reads: 77. Constitution, organization, jurisdiction 
and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons 
entitled to practice before the Supreme Court”] 
27 Entry 78, List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. [It reads: 78. Constitution and organization 
(including vacations) of the High Court except provisions as to officers and servants of High Court; persons 
entitled to practice before High Courts.] 
28 O N Mohindroo (supra) [9]; Bar Council of U P v. State of U P, (1973) 1 SCC 261 [11] 
29 (1973) 1 SCC 261 
30 Bar Council of U P (supra) [14]

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(i) establishment of an All -India Bar Council and a common roll of 
advocates, and advocates on the common roll having a right to 
practice in any part of the country and any Court, including the 
Supreme Court; 
(ii) integration of the bar into a single class of legal practitioners known 
as advocates; 
(iii) prescription of a uniform qualification for the admission of persons to 
be advocates; 
(iv) division of advocates into senior advocates and other advocates 
based on merit; and 
(v) creation of autonomous Bar Councils, one for the whole of India and 
one for each State. 
24. The 1926 Act did not prescribe any qualifications to be possessed by persons 
applying for admission as advocates. Under the 1926 Act, the Bar Council s 
prescribed qualifications, but the enrollment was carried out by the High 
Courts. Under the Advocates Act, the enrolment process is completely 
undertaken by the SBCs. The SBCs are mandated to maintain and prepare a 
State roll and admit persons as advocates on the roll if they fulfil the statutory 
prescriptions, along with any other qualifications laid down by  the SBCs. 
Section 24(1) of the Advocates Act statutorily engrafts the minimum 
qualifications to be possessed by advocates seeking enrolment. The 
provision specifies the qualifications to be possessed by persons to be 
admitted as an advocate on a State roll. Additionally, the SBCs can also 
specify other conditions by rules.

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25. Section 24A provides that no person shall be admitted on a State roll if he is: 
(i) convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; (ii) convicted of an 
offence under the provisions of the Untouchability (Offences) Act 1955; and 
(iii) dismissed or remov ed from employment or office under State on any 
charge involving moral turpitude.  Section 25 provides that an application for 
admission as an advocate shall be made to the SBC within whose jurisdiction 
the applicant proposes to practice. Section 26 mandates the SBCs to refer 
every application for admission to their enrolment committee for decision. The 
SBCs are also empowered to remove the names of advocates from the State 
roll.
31 Section 28 empowers the SBCs to make rules for the admission and 
enrolment of advocates. 
26. The provisions of the Advocates Act indicate that it provides  a complete 
machinery32 to deal with the admission and enrolment of advocates. The 
SBCs are vested with sufficient powers to ensure effectual and complete 
implementation of the enactment. In Dr Haniraj L Chulani v. Bar Council of 
Maharashtra and Goa, this Court held that the Advocates Act provides a 
complete code for regulating the legal education and professional 
qualifications of an aspirant seeking entry into the legal profession.
33 
iii. Delegated legislation 
27. The basic principle underlying the concept of delegated legislation is that the 
legislature cannot directly exert its will in every detail. 34 It lays down the 
 
31 Section 26A, Advocates Act  
32 See Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1 [80] 
33 (1996) 3 SCC 342 [17] 
34 Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.) v. Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8 SCC 747 [13]

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legislative policy and delegates the subsidiary or ancillary powers to the 
delegated or subordinate authorities to carry out the legislative policy. 35 It is 
now a settled legal principle that the legislature cannot abdicate essential 
legislative functions to the delegated authority .
36 The legislature can entrust 
subsidiary or ancillary legislation to the delegate. Before such delegation, the 
legislature should enunciate the policy and the principles for the guidance of 
the delegated authority.37 As a corollary, the delegated  authority must carry 
out its rule-making functions within the framework of the law. The delegated  
legislation must be consistent with the law under which it is made and cannot 
go beyond the limits of policy and standards laid down in the law.
38 
28. Although delegated legislation enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, it 
does not enjoy the same immunity as the parent legislation. It is now well -
established39 that delegated legislation can be challenged on the following 
grounds: 
(i) lack of legislative competence to make delegated legislation; 
(ii) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution; 
(iii) violation of any provision of the Constitution; 
(iv) failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding 
the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act; 
(v) repugnance to any other enactment; and 
 
35 In re Delhi Laws Act 1912, (1951) SCC 568 [22] 
36 Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 27 [4] 
37 Harishankar Bagla v. State of MP, (1954) 1 SCC 978 [12] 
38 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 
13 [13], [71] 
39 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 [77]; State of Tamil 
Nadu v. P Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 [15]

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 22 
(vi) manifest arbitrariness. 
29.  Modern l egislation often contains provisions enabling the delegate of the 
legislature to frame subordinate legislation. The statutory  provision for 
delegation is often couched in general terms empowering the delegate the 
power to frame rules “to carry out the purposes of this Act” or a particular 
segment of the statute contained in a Chapter. The general provision is then 
followed by a provision enumerating specific matters on which the delegate 
may frame rules. A similar legislative scheme is reflected in Sections 15 and 
28 of the Advocates Act.  W here a rule-making power is conferred upon the 
delegate in general terms, a subsequent enumeration of matters on which the 
delegate may frame rules is  illustrative and does not limit the scope of the 
general power. 40 The enumerated matters in such a situation provide 
guidelines for the delegated authority while framing rules in exercise of  the 
general power.41 
iv. Power to levy fees 
30. Article 265 of the Constitution stipulates that no tax shall be levied or collected 
except by the authority of law. Article 366(28) defines taxation or tax to include 
the imposition of a tax or impost, whether general, local or special.  
31. In CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd .,42 a three- Judge Bench of this Court 
enunciated the principles for interpreting Article 265 read with Article 366(28): 
 
40 Azfal Ullah v. State of U P, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 76 [13]; Rohtak and Hissar Districts Electric Supply Co. 
Ltd v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 75 [18]. 
41 D K Trivedi and Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp SCC 20 [33] 
42 (2009) 10 SCC 755

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“21. “Tax”, “duty”, “cess” or “fee” constituting a class 
denotes various kinds of imposts by State in its 
sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the 
State. Within the expression of each specie each 
expression denotes different kinds of impost 
depending on the purpose for which they are levied. 
This power can be exercised in any of its 
manifestations only under any law authorising levy 
and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 
which uses only the expression that no “tax” shall be 
levied and collected except authorised by law. It in 
its elementary meaning conveys that to support a tax 
legislative action is essential, it cannot be levied and 
collected in the absence of any legislative sanction 
by exercise of executive power of State under Article 
73 by the Union or Article 162 by the State. 
22. Under Article 366(28) “Taxation” has been 
defined to include the imposition of any tax or impost 
whether general or local or special and tax shall be 
construed accordingly. “Impost” means compulsory 
levy. The well-known and well-settled characteristic 
of “tax” in its wider sense includes all imposts. 
Imposts in the context have following characteristics: 
(i) The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. 
(ii) “Law” in the context of Article 265 means an Act 
of legislature and cannot comprise an executive 
order or rule without express statutory authority. 
(iii) The term “tax” under Article 265 read with Article 
366(28) includes imposts of every kind viz. tax, duty, 
cess or fees. 
(iv) As an incident of sovereignty and in the nature of 
compulsory exaction, a liability founded on principle 
of contract cannot be a “tax” in its technical sense as 
an impost, general, local or special.”

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32. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution differentiates between taxing 
entries and general entries. Subjects pertaining to the levy of taxes must be 
traced to specific taxing entries enumerated in either List I or List II. 43 In 
addition, Parliament has the residuary power under Article 248 read with Entry 
97 of List I to legislate on matters not enumerated in List II or List III, including 
on matters of taxation. The power of the legislature to levy fees is dealt with 
under separate heads: (i) Entry 96 of List I empowers Parliament to levy fees 
in respect of any matters in List I; (ii) Entry 66 of List II empowers the State 
legislatures to levy fees in respect of any matters in List II; and (iii) Entry 47 
of List III empowers both Parliament and the State legislatures (subject to 
Article 254) to levy fees for any matter enumerated in List III. Parliament has 
prescribed an enrolment fee under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act 
under Entry 96 of List I. 
33. The legislature can delegate its power to levy fees.44 Since a fee is an impost 
and a compulsory exaction of money, the power of a delegate to levy fees 
must flow from the express authority of law. In Ahmedabad Urban 
Development Authority v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla 45 this 
Court observed: 
“7. […] In our view, such power of imposition of tax 
and/or fee by delegated authority must be very 
specific and there is no scope for implied authority 
for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that 
the delegated authority must act strictly within the 
parameters of the authority delegated to it under the 
Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of 
implied intent or the concept of incidental and 
 
43 M P V Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 22  
44 Kandivali Coop. Industrial Estate v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, (2015) 11 SCC 161 [25] 
45 (1992) 3 SCC 285 [7]

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PART D   
 25 
ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal 
power.” 
34. The principles that flow from the above discussion are: (i) a fee is an impost 
in terms of Article 366(28) ; (ii) the expression “tax” occurring in Article 265 
means all imposts, including fees and therefore any fee must be levied by the 
authority of a valid law; (iii)  fees being a compulsory exaction of money, the 
power to levy fees cannot be implied; (iv) delegation of the power to levy fees 
to a delegate of the legislature should be specifically provided for under the 
parent legislation; and (v) the delegate must strictly act within the parameters 
of the legislative policy laid down by the parent legislation when levying fees 
and taxes. 
v. Regulatory fees 
35. Article 110 of the Constitution, though in a different context, recognizes that   
that fees imposed under the authority of law may include (i) fees for licences; 
and (ii) fees for service.46 In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, 
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt ,47 a 
Constitution Bench explained the concept of licence fees thus: 
“47. […] In the first class of cases, the Government 
simply grants a permission or privilege to a person 
to do something, which otherwise that person would 
not be competent to do and extracts fees either 
heavy or moderate from that person in return for the 
privilege that is conferred. A most common 
 
46 Article 110(2), Constitution of India. [It reads:  
“110. Definition of “Money Bills”- 
[…] 
(2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or 
other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, 
or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any 
local authority or body for local purposes.”] 
47 (1954) 1 SCC 412

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 26 
illustration of this type of cases is furnished by the 
licence fees for motor vehicles. Here the costs 
incurred by the Government in maintaining an office 
or bureau for the granting of licences may be very 
small and the amount of imposition that is levied is 
based really not upon the costs incurred by the 
Government but upon the benefit that the individual 
receives. In such cases, according to all the writers 
on public finance, the tax element is predominant, 
and if the money paid by the licence-holders goes for 
the upkeep of roads and other matters of general 
public utility, the licence fee cannot but be regarded 
as a tax” 
In Shirur Mutt  (supra), it was held that  a fee is money taken by the 
Government “as the return for the work done or services rendered.” 48 
Therefore, a fee was characterised by an element of quid pro quo between 
the payer and the public authority.  
36. In a  series of subsequent decisions, this Court held that a l evy can be 
regarded as a fee if it has a “reasonable relationship” with services rendered 
by the public authority.49 The traditional view that there must be an actual quid 
pro quo for a fee has not been applied in the strict sense in subsequent 
decisions of this Court. It has been held that the relationship between the levy 
of a fee and services rendered is one of general character and not of 
mathematical exactitude.50  
 
48 Shirur Mutt (supra) [48] 
49 H H Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, 1963 
Supp (2) SCR 302 [18]. [It was observed: “18. […] A levy in the nature of a fee does no cease to be of that 
character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, not is it a postulate 
of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual 
who obtains the benefit of service. If with a view to provide a specific service, levy is imposed by law and 
expenses for maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there being a reasonable relation 
between the levy and the expenses incurred for rendering the service, the levy would be in the nature of a 
fee and not in the nature of a tax.”]; Indian Mica Micanite Industries v. State of Bihar, (1971) 2 SCC 236 [15]. 
50 Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416 [23]; Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A P, 
(1983) 4 SCC 353 [31].

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37. In Corporation of Calcutta  v. Liberty Cinema, 51 a Constitution Bench 
observed that licence fees are not necessarily charged in return for services 
rendered. This Court referred to a Privy Council decision 52 which inter alia 
held that licence fees could be charged to defray the costs of administering 
the local regulations. In Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners’ 
Association v. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation ,53 this Court observed 
that licence fees could broadly be classified as either regulatory or 
compensatory. It was observed that licence fees are regulatory when the 
activities for which a licence is given are required to be regulated or controlled. 
It was further held that the fees charged for regulation of activities could be 
validly classified as fees although no service is rendered. A regulatory fee 
such as a licence fee enables authorities to supervise, regulate, and monitor 
the activity related to which the licence has been issued and to secure proper 
enforcement of the legal provisions.
54 
38. The principle which follows from the above discussion is that the State grants 
a licence to regulate a  particular trade, business, or profession. 55 These 
regulatory activities entail a duty on behalf of the State or its instrumentalities 
to supervise, regulate, and monitor that particular trade, business, or 
profession. Because such activities require the State to expend public 
resources, the State can charge licence fees to defray the administrative 
 
51 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65 [8] 
52 George Walkem Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, 1938 AC 708. 
53 (1999) 2 SCC 274 [9] 
54 Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd v. State of U P, (1997) 2 SCC 715 [18]; A P Paper Mills Ltd. v. Government of 
A P, (2000) 8 SCC 167 [24]. 
55 Indian Mica Micanite Industries v. State of Bihar, (1971) 2 SCC 236 [14]

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 28 
costs. The enrolment fee stipulated by Section 24(1)(f)  of Advocates Act  
meets the characteristic of a regulatory fee. 
39. Having encapsulated the broad gist of the historical and legal context, we now 
deal with the issues arising in these petitions.  
E. Fees charged by the SBCs 
40. Presently, the SBCs charge different  fees from advocates at the time of 
enrolment. Most SBCs charge an enrolment fee in addition to other 
miscellaneous fees. For instance, the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa is 
charging library fees, certificate fees, administration fees, identity card fees, 
training fees, and welfare fund contributions. Resultantly, t he enrolment fee 
and the other fees charged by the SBC amounts to Rupees fifteen thousand 
for general candidates and Rupees fourteen thousand five hundred for 
candidates from SC and ST category. 
41. The Bar Council of Odisha is charging Rupees forty -two thousand one 
hundred from advocates at the time of enrolment. In their counter  affidavit, 
the SBC concedes the fact that Section 24(1)(f) only mandates the SBCs to 
charge Rupees seven hundred fifty in total at the time of enrolment. However, 
the SBC sought to justify charging the enhanced enrolment fee and other fees 
from the advocates “having regard to the functions of the Odisha Bar Council” 
under the Advocates Act. The SBC further claims that in line with its functions 
under Section 6, it has created various welfare funds for the benefit of 
advocates on its roll and utilizes the contributions received from the fees 
towards this end. Resultantly, the SBC is charging Rupees twenty -six

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 29 
thousand nine hundred as a one-time deposit to enable an advocate to avail 
of a lifetime benefit of various welfare schemes. This amount is in addition to 
the enrolment fee of Rupees six thousand, processing/ development fees of 
Rupees seven thousand, and other miscellaneous charges. The SBC justified 
charging Rupees six thousand as the  enrolment fee on the basis of a BCI 
resolution dated 26 June 2013. The BCI resolution reads thus: 
“The council is of the unanimous view that the 
enrolment fee fixed earlier is too less amount and it 
has never been revised after the year of 1961. The 
council resolves that the enrolment fee per 
candidate will be Rs 6000 and for SC/ST 
Candidates, it should be Rs 3000. This provision is 
applicable throughout the country and out of this as 
per the provisions of the Act, 20% amount is to be 
sent to the Bar Council of India by all the State Bar 
Councils. These rules will come into effect the day it 
is published in the Gazette of India. Soon after the 
publication the office is directed to communicate this 
resolution to all the State Bar Councils and all the 
Bar Associations of the country. It is made clear that 
this resolution is confined to the enrolment fee on ly 
and the other charges fixed or prescribed by the 
different State Bar Councils would be applicable as 
of their own suitability.”
56 
In view of the above resolution, the BCI directed all the SBCs to charge the 
revised enrolment fee.57 
42. All the SBCs justify charging the miscellaneous fees for the following reasons: 
(i) the miscellaneous fees are one-time fees paid by the advocates to the Bar 
Councils; (ii) the fees are charged as a one-time lump sum because 
advocates do not pay the fees periodically after their enrolment;  (iii) the SBCs 
 
56 Resolution No. 32 of 2013, Gazette Notification dated 28 June 2013. 
57 BCI. D 7114/2016(C1) dated 22 December 2016

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 30 
do not get any financial assistance from the Government and have to sustain 
their operations, including payment of salaries to their employees, from the  
amount collected by way of enrolment fee and miscellaneous fees ; and (iv) 
the lump sum fees are intended to defray the expenditure incurred by each 
SBC while discharging myriad statutory functions including continuing legal 
education and welfare schemes for advocates.  
43. The Bar Council of Manipur has stated that it meets all its expenses including 
the staff salary and office maintenance from the enrolment fees. The SBC 
charges Rupees sixteen thousand six hundred fifty as enrolment fees from 
general candidates. Out of this, nine thousand five hundred is allowed to be 
used for office expenses while the balance is deposited into other accounts 
and used for specified purposes. According to the SBC, the average annual 
enrolment in Manipur is of a hundred advocates. Therefore, the total 
enrolment fee collected by the SBC is Rupees nine lakh fifty thousand against 
the overall annual expense of Rupees nine lakh. 
44. The legal profession is a serious occupation and requires advocates to 
maintain exemplary conduct both inside and outside the court.
58 The SBCs 
and the BCI perform the important function of regulating and maintaining the 
standards of conduct required from advocates. The Bar Councils conduct 
activities related to providing advocates knowledge about the substantive and 
procedural aspects of law. Many SBCs have published books and manuals 
and assisted members of the legal profession in acquiring the practical skills 
 
58 In Re Sanjiv Dutta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, (1995) 3 SCC 619 [20]; 
Ajitsinh Arjunsinh Gohil v. Bar Council of Gujarat, (2017) 5 SCC 465 [39]

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 31 
required for the successful pursuit of a career as an advocate. The Bar 
Councils conduct welfare schemes for advocates. During the period of the 
Covid pandemic and even at other times, the Bar Councils have stepped in 
to provide relief to advocates and their families. In doing so many Bar 
Councils have provided significant aid to advocates. The enrolment fee and 
other miscellaneous fees are the only source of income available to the SBCs 
to perform their functions under the Advocates Act and implement welfare 
schemes for advocates. However, the imposition of the enrolment fee and 
other miscellaneous fees by the SBCs must be consistent with the 
Constitution and the scheme of the Advocates Act.  
F. SBCs cannot charge enrolment fees  beyond the mandate of Section 
24(1)(f)  
i. Legislative Scheme 
45. Parliament has enacted the Advocates Act under Article 246 read with Entries 
77 and 78 of List I to deal with legal practitioners and their qualifications, 
enrolment, right to practice, and discipline. The Advocates Act establishes the 
SBCs and the BCI to create a common all-India bar. The SBCs have been 
entrusted with the function of admitting persons as advocates on the State 
roll. Persons who are admitted on the roll are entitled to the right to practice 
in all courts, tribunals, or authority throughout the territory of India.
59 
46. Sections 15 and 28 o f the Advocates Act vests a rule-making power in the 
SBCs. The rule-making power under Section 15 is available to both the SBCs 
 
59 Section 30, Advocates Act

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and the BCI. Section 15(1) specifies that a Bar Council “may make rules to 
carry out the purposes of this Chapter.” A Bar Council can make rules 
providing for the election of members, Chairman and Vice-Chairman, filing of 
casual vacancies, constitution of one or more funds to give  financial 
assistance or legal aid or advice, organization of legal aid, etc. Section 15(3) 
provides that no rule made by the SBCs shall have effect unless it is approved 
by the BCI. Thus, the scope of the rule- making powers of the SBCs and the 
BCI under Section 15 pertains to the subjects in Chapter II. Other than Section 
15, Chapter II comprises of Sections 3 to 14:  
(a) Section 3 provides for establishment of the SBCs; 
(b) Section 4 establishes the BCI; 
(c) Section 5 provides that every Bar Council should be a body 
corporate; 
(d) Section 6 lays down the functions of the SBCs; 
(e) Section 7 lays down the functions of the BCI; 
(f) Section 7A pertains to membership in international bodies; 
(g) Section 8 specifies terms of office of the members of the SBCs; 
(h) Section 8A talks about constitution of a special committee in the 
absence of an election; 
(i) Section 9 deals with disciplinary committees;  
(j) Section 9A talks about constitution of legal aid committees;

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(k) Section 10 provides for constitution of committees other than 
disciplinary committees; 
(l) Section 10A pertains to transaction of business by Bar Councils 
and committees; 
(m)  Section 11 allows Bar Councils to appoint staff; 
(n) Section 12 mandates Bar Council s to maintain books of account 
for audit; 
(o) Section 13 provides that vacancies in Bar Councils cannot be a 
ground to challenge the validity of acts done by a Bar Council; and 
(p) Section 14 pertains to challenges to elections to Bar Councils.  
47. Chapter II establishes Bar Councils and delineates their functions and 
responsibilities. The provisions of the Chapter II also empower Bar Councils 
to constitute disciplinary and other committees and appoint qualified staff. The 
rule-making powers granted to Bar Councils under Section 15 are regulatory 
powers and must be construed widely
60 because they support the objective 
of regulation of the legal profession. 
48. In Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of MP,61 a two-Judge Bench 
of this Court observed that the power of Bar Councils to frame rules must be 
interpreted broadly: 
“51. The power to frame rules has to be given wider 
scope, rather than a restrictive approach so as to 
render the legislative object achievable. The 
functions to be performed by the Bar Councils and 
 
60 Gupta Modern Breweries v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2007) 6 SCC 317 [20] 
61 (2011) 9 SCC 573

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the manner in which these functions are to be 
performed suggest that democratic standards both 
in the election process and in performance of all its 
functions and standards of professional  conduct 
need to be adhered to. In other words, the 
interpretation furthering the object and purposes of 
the Act has to be preferred in comparison to an 
interpretation which would frustrate the same and 
endanger the democratic principles guiding the 
governance and conduct of the State Bar Councils.” 
49. The SBCs have broad powers under Section 15 to give effect to the provisions 
of Chapter II. Although the rule-making power under Section 15 is broad, it is 
confined to the subject  matters of Chapter II. In Bar Council of Delhi  v. 
Surjeet Singh,62 the issue before a three-Judge Bench was whether the Bar 
Council of Delhi  could frame election rules prescribing qualifications and 
conditions entitling an advocate to vote at Bar Council elections. It was held 
that the SBCs cannot use the rule-making power under Section 15 to override 
the specific provisions of the Advocates Act. This Court observed that 
Sections 3(4) and 49(1)(a) empowered the BCI to prescribe qualifications or 
conditions subject to which an advocate may be entitled to vote at an election 
to the SBCs. Resultantly, it was held that Section 15(1) cannot be interpreted 
to confer rule- making powers on the SBCs which are expressly provided to 
the BCI.63 
50.  In Surjeet Singh  (supra), it was argued that the election rules of the Bar 
Council of Delhi were valid because they were approved by the BCI according 
to Section 15(3). It was further argued that the approval provided by the BCI 
 
62 (1980) 4 SCC 211 
63 Reiterated in Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Manubhai Paragji Vashi, (2012) 1 SCC 314 [16]

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had the effect of making it a rule made by the BCI itself. Speaking for the 
three-Judge Bench, Justice N L Untwalia held that there is a difference 
between making a rule and granting approval to a rule:  
“8. […] Any rule made by the State Bar Council 
cannot have effect unless it is approved by the Bar 
Council of India. But the approval of the Bar Council 
of India can make the rule made by the State Bar 
Council valid and effective only if the rule made is 
within the competence of the State Bar Council, 
otherwise not. Mere approval by the Bar Council of 
India to a rule ultra vires the State Bar Council 
cannot make the rule valid. Nor has it the effect of a 
rule made by the Bar Council of India. Making a rule 
by the Bar Council of India and giving approval to a 
rule made by the State Bar Council are two distinct 
and different things. One cannot take the place of the 
other.” 
51. We can derive the following principles concerning the rule-making power of 
the SBCs under Section 15: (i) the SBCs can exercise rule- making powers 
only for the subject matters specified under Chapter II; (ii) although the SBCs 
have a broad rule-making power, it must be exercised to further the object  
and purpose of the Advocates Act; (iii) the SBCs cannot use their rule-making 
power under Section 15 with respect to subject matters on which the BCI has 
been granted exclusive power to make rules under the Advocates Act ; and 
(iv) approval by the BCI to an invalid rule made by the SBCs cannot be 
deemed to validate the invalid rule. 
52. The scope of the rule- making power of Bar Councils under Section 15 
pertains to carrying “out the purposes of” Chapter II. As mentioned above, the 
purposes of Chapter II can be determined from Sections 3 to 14.  Therefore,

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the scope of the rule-making power of Bar Councils under Section 15 extends 
to give effect to the provisions of Chapter II, namely, Sections 3 to 14. 
53. Chapter III pertains to the admission and enrolment of advocates. As 
discussed in the earlier segment of this judgment, the Advocates Act is a 
complete code for  admission of advocates on the State roll. Section 28 
empowers the SBCs to make rules to carry out the purposes of Chapter III. 
According to Section 28(2), the SBCs can make rules providing for the: 
(a) time within which and form in which an advocate shall express an 
intention for the entry of their name in the State roll under Section 20;  
(b) form in which an application shall be made to the SBCs  for admission 
as an advocate and how such application shall be disposed of by the 
enrolment committee of the SBCs; 
(c) conditions subject to which a person may be admitted as an advocate;  
and 
(d) instalments in which the enrolment fee may be paid.  
54. The admission of persons as advocates on the State roll is within the 
exclusive domain of the SBCs.64 The Advocates Act vests rule-making power 
under Section 28 with the SBCs, who are the chosen representatives of legal 
practitioners, to regulate and control the admission of people to the legal 
profession. In Dr. Haniraj L Chulani (supra), the issue before a three-Judge 
Bench was whether an SBC can refuse admission as an advocate to a 
medical practitioner who does not want to give up their medical practice. This 
 
64 Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India, (1995) 1 SCC 732 [11]

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Court held that the rule- making power conferred on the SBCs to lay down 
further conditions for controlling the entry to the legal profession is not 
unfettered.65 It was held that the rule- making power of the SBCs draw s 
sustenance from the guidelines laid down by the Advocates Act. It was further 
observed that the “[r]ule-making power conferred on the SBCs is inherently 
hedged in with the obligation to frame only such rules regarding enrolment 
which would fructify the purpose of having efficient members of the Bar who 
can stand up to the expectation of the noble and learned profession to which 
they are to be given entry.” Given the above reasoning, it was held that the 
rule enacted by the SBC barring a medical practitioner from simultaneously 
practicing law was valid. 
55. Section 24 lays down the eligibility qualifications for a person who seeks 
admission as an advocate on the State roll. Section 24(1)(e) provides that 
such a person must also fulfil “such other conditions as may be specified in 
the rules made by the State Bar Council under this Chapter.” The use of the 
expression “other conditions” indicates that the SBCs can prescribe 
conditions and qualifications in addition to what has already been prescribed 
statutorily under Section 24(1). Section 24(1) lays down requirements such 
as citizenship, age, and educational efficiency that  make a person eligible to 
be admitted on a State roll. These minimum qualifications enable a person to 
effectively perform their responsibilities as legal professionals. In addition, the 
BCI can also prescribe “such other conditions” in addition to the qualifications 
already prescribed under Section 24(1).  Generally, a condition is a 
 
65 Dr. Haniraj L Chulani (supra) [18]

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qualification, restriction, or limitation. 66 However, the “conditions” to be 
imposed by the SBCs should be consistent with the qualifications already 
prescribed by the statute. The BCI cannot prescribe any conditions or 
qualifications that: (i) seek to modify what has already been prescribed by the 
statute; (ii) are contrary to the stipulated qualifications ; and (iii) are 
inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Advocates Act. 
56. Section 24(1)(e) has to be read conjointly with Section 28(1)(d) which 
empowers the SBCs to make rules prescribing “the conditions subject to 
which a person may be admitted as an advocate on any such roll.” Since 
Section 24(1) already prescribes the basic substantive qualifications, the 
SBCs are empowered under Section 24(1)(e) read with Section 28(1)(d) to 
make rules concerning other conditions not already prescribed under Section 
24(1). 
57. Section 49 pertains to the general power of the BCI to make rules. It provides 
that the BCI may make rules for discharging its functions under the Advocates 
Act. The BCI may prescribe rules providing for the conditions subject to which 
an advocate may be entitled to vote at Bar Council elections , qualifications 
for membership of Bar Council s and disqualification for such membership, 
minimum qualifications required for admission to a course for a degree in law 
in any recognised university, etc. Importantly, Section 49(1)(h) empowers the 
BCI to make rules prescribing the fees which may be levied in respect of any 
matter under the Advocates Act. Pursuant to this, the BCI has prescribed fees 
under Part VIII of the B CI Rules. It mandates the SBCs to levy fees not 
 
66 Union of India v. Rajdhani Grains & Jaggery Exchange Ltd, (1975) 1 SCC 676 [13]

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exceeding the limits prescribed under Part VIII. The BCI has prescribed fees 
for varied purposes including petitions challenging the election of one or more 
members of the SBCs, complaints of professional misconduct under Section 
35, certificates as to the date of enrolment and the continuance of the name 
of the advocate on the roll. The above legislative scheme suggests that the 
SBCs and the BCI act as  the delegates of Parliament  under the Advocates 
Act. 
ii. Bar Councils cannot levy fees beyond the express stipulation of law 
58. While acting as a delegate of Parliament, the SBCs and the BCI can frame 
rules under the Advocates Act. However, any rule enacted by the SBCs  is 
only ancillary and cannot be so exercised to bring into existence substantive 
rights, obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the 
parent enactment.
67 Further, the rules must align with the object and purpose 
of the Advocates Act, namely, the creation of a common bar and regulation of 
legal practitioners and their qualifications, enrolment, right to practice, and 
discipline. 
59. A legislation can confer the power to make subordinate legislation upon a 
delegate. In conferring such powers, the legislation has to specifically law 
down the policy, principles, and standards that will guide the subordinate 
authority.
68 The legislative policy can be determined from the preamble and 
the provisions of an enactment.69 The delegate derives its legislative powers 
 
67 Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H P, (2000) 3 SCC 40 [14] 
68 Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. CST, (1974) 4 SCC 98 [12] 
69 Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1954) 1 SCC 978 [12]

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from the parent statute. Unlike the legislature, which has sovereign legislative 
powers derived from the Constitution, the delegated authority  is conferred 
powers by the parent enactment. Therefore, delegated authority must strictly 
conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed.70 A delegate 
cannot alter or change the legislative policy.71 A delegate cannot override the 
provisions of the parent enactment either by exceeding the legislative policy 
or making provisions inconsistent with the enactment.72  
60. In Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd.,73 the 
Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act 1966 
allowed the market committee to levy market fees on all transactions of 
purchase and sale provided the transactions took place within the notified 
market area. Section 12 created a legal fiction by providing that if any notified 
agricultural produce, livestock, or products of livestock  is taken out of a 
notified market area, it shall be presumed to have been purchased or sold 
within such area. The market committee framed bylaws providing that the 
notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock shall be 
deemed to have been purchased or sold after the notified commodity has 
been weighed,  measured, counted or when it is taken out of the notified 
market area. Thus, the bylaws introduced additional circumstances to the 
legal fiction contemplated under Section 12.  
 
70 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 [75]; General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief v. Subhash Chandra Yadav, (1988) 2 SCC 352 [14].  
71 Rajnarain Singh v. Patna Administration Committee, (1954) 2 SCC 82 [32] 
72 Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 1 SCC 137 [18]; J K Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2007) 13 
SCC 673 [133] 
73 (1997) 5 SCC 516

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61. A two-Judge Bench of this Court identified the following relevant principles in 
matters of delegated legislation: 
“26. […] the delegate which has been authorized to 
make subsidiary rules and regulations has to work 
within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or 
constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down 
thereunder. It cannot, in the garb of making rules, 
legislate on the field covered by the Act and has to 
restrict itself to the mode of implementation of the 
policy and purpose of the Act.” 
Given the above principle, it was observed that Section 12 is a fiscal provision 
and had to be construed strictly. It was further observed that any 
circumstance, situation, factor, or condition which was not contemplated by 
the Act could not  be taken into consideration to raise the presumption 
regarding sale or purchase of the notified agricultural produce. It was held 
that the bylaw introduced additional factors such as ‘weighed’, ‘measured’, 
and ‘counted’ which were not contemplated under Section 12. Therefore, the 
bylaws were held to be ultra vires for widening the scope of the presumption 
under Section 12. 
62. In Assam Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam,74 the State Government framed a rule 
empowering the State authorities to reexamine the computation of agricultural 
income made by the Central officers.  It was contended that this rule was 
beyond the power delegated under the Assam Agricultural Income Tax Act. A 
three-Judge Bench of this Court observed: 
“10. […] It is an established principle that the power 
to make rules under an Act is derived from the 
enabling provision found in such Act. Therefore, it is 
 
74 (2001) 4 SCC 202

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fundamental that a delegate on whom such power is 
conferred has to act within the limits of the authority 
conferred by the Act and it cannot enlarge the scope 
of the Act. A delegate cannot override the Act either 
by exceeding the authority or by making a provision 
that is inconsistent with the Act. Any rule made in 
exercise of such delegated power has to be in 
consonance with the provisions of the Act, and if the 
rule goes beyond what the Act contemplates, the 
rule becomes in excess of the power delegated 
under the Act, and if it does any of the above, the 
rule becomes ultra vires the Act.” 
63. In Assam Co. Ltd. (supra), it was observed that enactment empowered the 
State Government to make such rules as were necessary for carrying out the 
purposes of the enactment. It was further observed that the object and the 
scheme of the enactment did not empower the State authorities to recompute 
agricultural income contrary to the computation made by the Central officers. 
It was held that the rule framed by the State government w as ultra vires  
because it enlarged the scope of the enactment. 
64. In Consumer Online Foundation and Others v. Union of India,75 this Court 
was dealing with the validity of the levy of development fees on embarking 
passengers by the lessees of the Airports Authority of India 76 at the 
international airports in New Delhi and Mumbai. The unamended Section 22A 
of the Airports Authority of India Act 1994 77 empowered the AAI, after the 
previous approval of the Central Government, to levy development fees on 
embarking passengers “at the rate as may be prescribed.” A two-Judge Bench 
of this Court held that the development fee was in the nature of a cess or tax 
 
75 (2011) 5 SCC 360  
76 “AAI” 
77 “AAI Act”

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for generating revenue for the specified purposes mentioned in Section 22A.78 
Further, it was held that the power to levy a development fee under Section 
22 could not be exercised without the rules prescribing the rate at which the 
development fee was to be levied. Since no rules were framed prescribing 
the rate of development fee, it was held that the levy was without authority of 
law. 
65. In Consumer Online Foundation  (supra), the Central Government 
determined the rate of development fee in two letters communicated to the 
lessees. This Court held that under Section 22A the Central Government only 
had the power to grant its approval to the levy and collection of development 
fees but had no power to fix the rate at which the development fee would  be 
levied and collected from embarking passengers. The rates determined by 
the Central Government were held to be ultra vires the AAI Act.  
66. From the above discussion, we can cull out the following principles: (i)  a 
delegate cannot act contrary to the express provisions and object of the 
parent legislation; (ii) a delegate cannot widen or constrict the scope of the 
parent legislation or the legislative policy prescribed under it; and (iii) a fiscal 
provision has to be construed strictly and a delegate cannot consider any 
circumstance, factors or condition not contemplated by the parent legislation. 
67. The legislative policy of enrolment and admission of advocates is contained 
in Chapter III of the Advocates Act. Section 24(1) lays down the qualifications 
subject to which an advocate may be admitted on a State roll. Section 24(1)(f) 
 
78 Section 22A, AAI Act.

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provides that the enrolment fee payable by general candidates is Rupees 
seven hundred fifty and by SC and ST candidates, Rupees one hundred and 
twenty-five. Section 24(1)(f) reflects the legislative policy of the Advocates Act 
that subject to the fulfilment of other conditions of Section 24(1), the payment 
of the stipulated monetary amount will make a person eligible to be admitted 
as an advocate. 
68. Presently, the SBCs charge enrolment fees in the following manner: (i) they 
charge an enrolment fee according to the legal stipulation under Section 
24(1)(f), but charge miscellaneous fees, and (ii) they charge an enrolment fee 
beyond the legal stipulation in addition to charging miscellaneous fees. 
Section 24(1)(f) expressly stipulates that the total enrolment fees shall be 
Rupees seven hundred fifty for advocates belonging to the general category 
and Rupees one hundred twenty-five for advocates belonging to the SC and 
ST category. The SBCs cannot charge “enrolment fees” beyond the express 
legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f)  as it currently stands . Therefore, 
prescribing enrolment fees beyond Rupees seven hundred for general 
candidates and Rupees one hundred twenty -five for SC and ST candidates 
is contrary to Section 24(1)(f). The subject matter of enrolment fee is covered 
by the Advocates Act. Therefore, the SBCs, being delegated authorities, do 
not have any legislative powers to prescribe enrolment fee s contrary to the 
statutory stipulation. 
69. As discussed in the above segments of this judgment, the legislature 
prescribed the enrolment fee under Section 24(1)(f) to cover “all functions” 
carried out by the SBCs and the BCI under the Advocates Act. The legislative

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history suggests that the legislature was averse to imposing any charges 
other than enrolment fees at the time of enrolment. This was in furtherance of 
the legislative object  to foster an inclusive Bar. However, the SBCs are 
imposing miscellaneous fees and charges in the guise of an enrolment fee, 
which cumulatively exceed the statutory stipulation under Section 24(1)(f). 
The decision of the SBCs to charge an enrolment fee beyond the stipulated 
amount is contrary to the legislative object of the Advocates Act. 
70. Section 24(1)(f) is a fiscal regulatory provision and has to be construed strictly. 
Parliament has prescribed the enrolment fees in the exercise of its sovereign 
legislative powers. The SBCs and the BCI, being delegates  of Parliament, 
cannot alter or modify the fiscal policy laid down by Parliament. The delegate 
can create substantive rights and obligations only to the extent to which the 
parent enactment empowers the delegate.
79 By prescribing additional fees at 
the time of enrolment, the SBCs have created new substantive obligations 
not contemplated by the provisions of the Advocates Act. The basis for the 
fees imposed by the SBCs has to be traceable to the provisions of the statute. 
There is no express provision in the Advocates Act empowering the SBCs to 
levy fees, except for the enrolment fee and stamp duty, if any, under Section 
24(1)(f), at the time of admission of advocates on the State roll. The decision 
of the SBCs to charge miscellaneous fees is contrary to the legislative 
prescription of the Advocates Act. 
 
 
79 See Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2009) 15 SCC 570 [25]

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71. On 26 June 2013, the BCI passed a resolution directing the SBCs to charge 
Rupees six thousand as enrolment fees for general candidates and Rupees 
three thousand for SC and ST candidates. Importantly, the resolution state d 
that the SBCs could charge other fees according to “their own suitability.” On 
22 December 2016, the BCI addressd a letter to all the SBCs directing them 
to charge the revised enrolment fees. The BCI resolution dated 26 June 2013 
prompted many SBCs such as the Odisha Bar Council to enhance their 
enrolment fees. Section 24(1)(f) stipulates the enrolment fee to be charged 
by the SBCs. In the face of  the express stipulation of law, the BCI had no 
authority to pass a resolution revising the enrolment fees charged by the 
SBCs. The fact that the enrolment fee stipulated under Section 24(1)(f) has 
not been revised by the legislature does not clothe the BCI with any authority 
to direct the SBCs to charge revised enrolment fees. Since the BCI exercises 
general supervision and control over all the SBCs, it is  incumbent upon it to 
ensure that the SBCs  strictly follow the mandate of the Advocates Act. The 
resolution dated 26 June 2013 is devoid o f legal authority  and contrary to 
Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act. 
G. All fees charged at the time of enrolment are ‘enrolment fees’ 
72. In this batch of matters, we have transferred to this Court similar petitions 
pending before the Kerala High Court. In T Koshy v. Bar Council of Kerala,
80 
the SBC was charging special fees for enrolment from candidates who had 
retired from government service. A Single Judge of the Kerala High Court 
 
80 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41055

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observed that the special fees were charged in addition to the enrolment fees 
and other miscellaneous charges such as application form fee, registration 
fee, enrolment certificate fee, and verification fee. The vires of the 
miscellaneous fees was not challenged before the High Court. The High Court 
construed the special fee charged by the SBC as an enrolment fee and held 
that the amount charged by the SBC was over and above the enrolment fee 
stipulated by Section 24(1)(f). In appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court 
upheld the judgment of the Single Judge by holding that Section 28(2)(d) did 
not empower the SBC “to prescribe any fee for enrolment, either in the form 
of enrolment fee or special fee.”81 The Special Leave Petition filed by the SBC 
was dismissed by this Court on 4 June 2019.82 
73. In adjudicating upon WP (C) No. 3068 of 2023,83 another Single Judge of the 
Kerala High Court relied on T Koshy (supra) to observe that the SBC is only 
entitled to collect the enrolment fee stipulated under Section 24(1)(f) of the 
Advocates Act. Subsequently, the writ petition was heard by a Division Bench 
of the Kerala High Court which passed an interim order directing the SBC to 
admit the petitioners on the State roll by accepting Rupees seven hundred 
fifty as enrolment fees.  
74. Given the above background, two issues arise for consideration: (i)  whether 
the miscellaneous fees which are charged in addition to the enrolment fee at 
the time of enrolment  can be considered as enrolment fee; and (ii)  whether 
 
81 Bar Council of Kerala v. T Koshy, W A No. 2170 of 2017.  
82 Bar Council of Kerala v. N S Gopakumar, SLP(C) No. 44268 of 2018. 
83 Akshai M Sivan v. Bar Council of Kerala, WP(C) No. 3068 of 2023 (order dt. 12 June 2023)

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the SBCs or the BCI can charge miscellaneous fees as a pre- condition for 
enrolment. 
i. Charges other than the enrolment fee cannot be a valid pre-condition 
75. Section 24(1) of the Advocates Act lays down the conditions subject to which 
an advocate may be admitted on a State roll. Section 24(1)(f) provides that 
the enrolment fee is paid by the advocate “in respect of the enrolment.” The 
use of the phrase “in respect of the enrolment” conveys that the fee is paid 
for the entire enrolment process.  Under the Advocates Act, the process of 
enrolment commences when an applicant makes an application to the SBC 
within whose jurisdiction the applicant proposes to practice. Thereafter, the 
enrolment committee of the SBC scrutinizes the application on the basis of 
the eligibility qualifications laid down under Section 24(1). The name of an 
applicant who is  found eligible is entered on the roll of advocates and a 
certificate of enrolment is issued to the applicant by the SBC. The enrolment 
fee prescribed under Section 24(1)(f) comprehends the whole enrolment 
process.  
76. On 27 December 2016, 84 the BCI passed a resolution fixing the verification 
fees charged by the SBCs at the time of submission of enrolment forms. The 
resolution was in the following terms 
“The State Bar Councils/ Enrolment Committees of 
the State Bar Councils shall require the Xerox as well 
as the original certificates of the candidates applying 
for enrolment. Following certificates shall be 
 
84 Communication dated 28 January 2017 by the BCI to the secretaries of the SBCs, BCI:D 
529/2017(Council) dated 28 January 2017.

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required to be submitted alongwith the enrolment 
forms:- 
(a) Certificate of concerned Board for 
Secondary/10
th examination. 
(b) Certificate of concerned Board for Senior 
Secondary or intermediate examination. 
(c) Certificate of graduation, if any or/and the LLB 
degree or the provisional certificates of these 
Degrees granted by the University as well as the 
mark-sheets of all the three or five year of LL.B. 
examinations. 
The office of State Bar Councils shall charge a sum 
of Rs. 2500/ - for verification of the said certificates 
from the candidates at the time of submission of the 
enrolment forms only.” 
77. In view of the BCI resolution, many SBCs increased the verification fees 
charged by them. Currently, the SBCs charge various fees such as verification 
fees, application fees, registration fees, and identity card fees at the time of 
enrolment. The SBCs charge these fees as concomitant to the process of 
enrolment. For instance, a verification fee is charged for the verification of 
academic qualification certificates of the candidates. The verification fee is  
collected from the candidates “at the time of submission of enrolment forms.” 
These additional fees are in furtherance of the process of enrolment of 
advocates and are encompassed within the meaning of the phrase “in respect 
of the enrolment” appearing in Section 24(1)(f).   
78. Additionally, the SBCs also collect charges such as building fund and 
benevolent fund from advocates at the time of enrolment. These charges are

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per se not related to the process of enrolment, but in most cases the 
candidates have no choice but to pay the levies. The SBCs admit that they 
charge the fees at the time of enrolment as a one-time payment for all the 
services offered by them. The SBCs contend that they charge these fees at 
the time of enrolment because the advocates do not pay periodic fees after 
enrolment.  
79. Admission on the roll of advocates is a pre-requisite for any person intending 
to practice law in India. At the time of enrolment, candidates have little agency 
but to pay the miscellaneous fees imposed by the SBCs to get enrolled. Non-
payment of the fees means that a candidate cannot get enrolled on the State 
roll. Thus, all the miscellaneous fees collected from a candidate at the time of 
enrolment essentially serve as a pre- condition to the process of enrolment. 
Section 24(1) specifically lays down the pre- conditions subject to which an 
advocate can be enrolled on State rolls. Since Section 24(1)(f) specifies the 
amount that can be charged by the SBCs as an enrolment fee, the SBCs and 
the BCI cannot demand payment of fees other than the stipulated enrolment 
fee as a pre-condition to enrolment. 
80. Rule 40 under Section IVA of Chapter II of Part VI under the BCI Rules 
mandates every advocate borne on the rolls to pay the SBC a sum of Rupees 
three hundred every third year.
85 The sum under Rule 40 can only be collected 
 
85 Rule 40, Section IVA, Chapter II, Part VI, BCI Rules. [It reads: 
“40. Every Advocate borne on the rolls of the State Bar Council shall pay to the State Bar Council a sum of 
Rs. 300 every third year commencing from 1st August, 2001 along with a statement of particulars as given 
in the form set out at the end of these Rules, the first payment to be made on or before 1st August, 2001 or 
such extended time as notified by the Bar Council of India or the concerned State Bar Council. 
 
Provided further however that an advocate shall be at liberty to pay in lieu of the payment of Rs. 60043 every 
three years a consolidated amount of Rs. 1000. This will be a life time payment to be kept in the fixed deposit

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from advocates already admitted on the State rolls.  Therefore, this sum 
cannot be collected from persons at the time of enrolment. It must be collected 
from advocates after they are admitted on the State roll.   
ii. Article 14: substantive equality and manifest arbitrariness 
81. Article 14 has a substantive content that mirrors the quest for ensuring fair 
treatment of an individual in every aspect of human endeavou r and  
existence.86 In Joseph Shine  v. Union of India ,87 one of us (D Y 
Chandrachud, J) observed that substantive equality is directed at eliminating 
individual, institutional, and systemic discrimination against disadvantaged 
groups which effectively undermines their full and equal participation in 
society at the social, economic, political, and cultural  levels. It was further 
observed: 
“172. The primary enquiry to be undertaken by the 
Court towards the realisation of substantive equality 
is to determine whether the provision contributes to 
the subordination of a disadvantaged group of 
individuals. The disadvantage must be addressed 
not by treating a woman as “weak” but by construing 
her entitlement to an equal citizenship. The former 
legitimises patronising attitudes towards women. 
The latter links true equality to the realisation of 
dignity. The focus of such an approach is not simply 
 
by the concerned State Bar Council. Out of life time payment, 80% of the amount will be retained by the State 
Bar Council in a fixed deposit and remaining 20% has to be transferred to the Bar Council of India. The Bar 
Council of India and State Bar Council have to keep the same in a fixed deposit and the interest on the said 
deposits shall alone be utilized for the Welfare of the Advocates”44. 
 
Explanation 1. —Statement of particulars as required by Rule 40 in the form set out shall require to be 
submitted only once in three years. 
Explanation 2. —The Advocates who are in actual practise and are not drawing salary or not in full time 
service and not drawing salary from their respective employers are only required to pay the amount referred 
to in this rule. 
 
Explanation 3.—This rule will be effective from 1- 10-2006 and for period prior to this, advocates will continue 
to be covered by old rule.”] 
86 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1 [409] 
87 (2019) 3 SCC 39 [171]

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on equal treatment under the law, but rather on the 
real impact of the legislation. Thus, Section 497 has 
to be examined in the light of existing social 
structures which enforce the position of a woman as 
an unequal participant in a marriage.” 
82. In Navtej Singh Johar  v. Union of India ,88 a Constitution Bench  held that 
Section 377 undermined substantive equality because it created barriers, 
systemic and deliberate, for the effective participation of the members of the 
LGBTIQ+ community in the workforce. 
83. In Bonnie Foi Law College  (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court 
recognized the effect of the exorbitant enrolment fees charged by the SBCs: 
“54. We also have one caveat arising from the plea 
that different State Bar Councils are charging 
different fees for enrolment. This is something which 
needs the attention of the Bar Council of India, which 
is not devoid of the powers to see that a uniform 
pattern is observed and the fee does not become 
oppressive at the threshold of young students joining 
the Bar.” 
84. The burden of payment of enrolment fees and other miscellaneous fees 
imposed by the SBCs falls  equally on all persons seeking enrolment. While 
the burden is facially neutral, it perpetuates  structural discrimination against 
persons from marginalized and economically weaker sections of the society. 
In more than one way, the process of enrolment perpetuates a culture89 of 
systemic exclusion and discrimination that impacts the entry of law graduates 
into the legal profession and even beyond. A law graduate in India undergoes 
legal education which typically entails a study of a three- year LLB course or 
 
88 (2018) 10 SCC 1 [453] 
89 See Nitisha v. Union of India, (2021) 15 SCC 125 [77]

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an integrated five-year course. The model of legal education in India is largely 
centred around a standardized admissions test. Candidates desirous of 
taking the admission test have to pay a hefty fee for taking the examination 
and in many cases engage tutors or coaching classes to prepare for these 
tests. Although the engagement of tutors or purchase of preparation material 
is a choice a candidate can choose not to make, it puts them against a cohort 
of competitors who have engaged such help. Once admitted to a recognized 
institute for legal education, a student has to afford the fees of the college 
either by paying on their own or by availing of a student loan. Students are 
also expected and sometimes mandated to partake in internships, research 
work, and co-curricular and extra- curricular activities among others.
90 
Partaking in these activities entails additional expenses.  
85. Young law graduates seeking to enter litigation start from a position of 
disadvantage. In S Seshachalam v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu,91 Justice R 
Banumathi summed up the struggle of young advocates in apt words:  
“26. The profession of Law is a noble calling. The 
legal fraternity toils day and night to be successful in 
the profession. Although it is true that slowly 
working one's way up is the norm in any 
profession, including Law, but initially young 
advocates have to remain in the queue for a 
prolonged period of time and struggle through 
greater hardships. Despite being extremely 
talented, a number of young lawyers hardly get 
proper opportunity or exposure in their 
profession. New entrants to the profession in the 
initial stages of the profession suffer with the 
meagre stipend which young lawyers may 
receive during their initial years,  coupled with 
 
90 Rule 25, Part IV of the Rules of Legal Education 2008, BCI mandates law students to complete an 
internship under an advocate for a minimum of 12 weeks for the three year law course and twenty weeks for 
the five year law course. 
91 (2014) 16 SCC 72

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the absence of a legislation concerning this, they 
struggle to manage their food, lodging, 
transportation and other needs. Despite their 
valiant efforts, they are unable to march ahead in 
their profession. It is only after years of 
hardwork and slogging that some of the 
fortunate lawyers are able to make a name for 
themselves and achieve success in the 
profession. For the majority of the legal fraternity, 
everyday is a challenge. Despite the difficult times, 
the lawyer who sets up practice straight after 
enrolment, struggles to settle down … in the 
profession. Some of the lawyers remain struggling 
throughout their lives yet choose to remain in the 
profession. It is something like “riding a bicycle uphill 
with the wind against one”. 
                                                      (emphasis added) 
86. Young law graduates who start litigating right after graduation earn anywhere 
between Rupees ten thousand to Rupees fifty thousand per month, 
depending upon the location of their practice and the chambers they join. The 
structure of the Indian legal setup is such that the struggle for getting 
acceptance in chambers and law firms is greater for those who belong to the 
marginalized sections, first-generation advocates, or law graduates without a 
degree from a National Law University.  A recent report suggests that many 
law students from the Dalit community face English language barriers , 
reducing their opportunities of practicing before the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court where the court proceedings are in English. 92 In a legal 
system that is predisposed against the marginalized, the pre- condition of 
 
92 Challenges for Dalits in South Asia’s Legal Community, Chapter III –  Dalit Justice Defenders in India, 
American Bar Association (2021) 16

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paying exorbitant fees in the name of enrolment  fee creates a further barrier 
for many.  
87. In Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India,93 a two-Judge Bench of this Court, 
explained the redundancy of the concept of merit and the struggles of a first -
generation learner: 
“33. The crux of the above discussion is that the 
binary of merit and reservation has now become 
superfluous once this Court has recognised the 
principle of substantive equality as the mandate of 
Article 14 and as a facet of Articles 15(1) and 16(1). 
An open c ompetitive exam may ensure formal 
equality where everyone has an equal opportunity to 
participate. However, widespread inequalities in the 
availability of and access to educational facilities will 
result in the deprivation of certain classes of people 
who would be unable to effectively compete in such 
a system. Special provisions (like reservation) 
enable such disadvantaged classes to overcome the 
barriers they face in effectively competing with 
forward classes and thus ensuring substantive 
equality. The privileges that accrue to forward 
classes are not limited to having access to 
quality schooling and access to tutorials and 
coaching centres to prepare for a competitive 
examination but also include their social 
networks and cultural capital (communica tion 
skills, accent, books or academic 
accomplishments) that they inherit from their 
family. The cultural capital ensures that a child is 
trained unconsciously by the familial 
environment to take up higher education or high 
posts commensurate with their famil y's 
standing. This works to the disadvantage of 
individuals who are first-generation learners and 
come from communities whose traditional 
occupations do not result in the transmission of 
necessary skills required to perform well in open 
examination. They h ave to put in surplus effort 
to compete with their peers from the forward 
communities. On the other hand, social 
networks (based on community linkages) 
become useful when individuals seek guidance 
 
93 (2022) 4 SCC 1

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and advice on how to prepare for examination 
and advance in their career even if their 
immediate family does not have the necessary 
exposure. Thus, a combination of family habitus, 
community linkages and inherited skills work to 
the advantage of individuals belonging to certain 
classes, which is then classified as “merit” 
reproducing and reaffirming social hierarchies.” 
                                                     (emphasis added) 
88. Social capital and networks play an important role in the Indian legal setup in 
advancing legal career s. Most litigation chambers hire advocates through 
networks and community linkages. The structure of the Indian legal system is 
such that social capital and network s also play an important role in getting 
clients. The lack of social capital and network is acutely felt by advocates from 
marginalized communit ies.94 The marginalized sections of our society face 
insurmountable obstacles in navigating the Indian legal system. 95 This is 
further compounded by their lack of representation in the legal profession. 
Greater representation of the marginalized communit ies in the legal 
profession will increase the diversity within the profession, enable the 
marginalized sections to trust the legal system and facilitate the delivery of 
legal aid and services to unrepresented communities.  
89. Section 24(1)(f) prescribes an enrolment fee of Rupees seven hundred fifty 
from general candidates and Rupees one hundred twenty -five from SC and 
ST candidates. Therefore, the enrolment fee prescribed for candidates from 
the SC and ST communities is far less than the fees paid by a candidate from 
 
94 Challenges for Dalits in South Asia’s Legal Community, Chapter III –  Dalit Justice Defenders in India, 
American Bar Association (2021) 17 
95 Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayan, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1010 [12]

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the general category. In 1993, Parliament increased the enrolment fee for 
general candidates from Rupees two-hundred fifty to Rupees seven-hundred 
fifty, without disturbing the fees paid by candidates from the SC and ST 
community. This shows that Parliament is conscious of the socio- economic 
marginalization of the SC and ST community. However, the present enrolment 
fee structure reinforces the socio-economic marginalization of the SCs and 
STs. For instance, the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa charges a 
cumulative fee of Rupees fifteen thousand from the general candidates and 
Rupees fourteen thousand five hundred from SC and ST candidates. 
Similarly, in Manipur, the general category candidates pay Rupees six teen 
thousand six hundred fifty as an enrolment fee while a candidate from the SC 
and ST categor y pays Rupees six teen thousand fifty. Thus, the candidates 
from the SC and ST category practically pay as much as the candidates from 
the general category. This is evidently against the legislative policy of t he 
Advocates Act. 
90. Dignity is crucial to substantive equality. The dignity of an individual 
encompasses the right of the individual to develop their potential to the 
fullest.96 The right to pursue a profession of one’s choice and earn livelihood 
is integral to the dignity of an individual. Charging exorbitant enrolment fees  
and miscellaneous fees as a pre-condition for enrolment creates a barrier to 
entry into the legal profession. The levy of exorbitant fees as a pre- condition 
to enrolment serves to denigrate the dignity  of those who face social and 
 
96 K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 [525]

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economic barriers in the advancement of their legal careers.97 This effectively 
perpetuates systemic discrimination against persons from marginalized and 
economically weaker sections by undermining their equal participation in the 
legal profession. Therefore, the current enrolment fee structure charged by 
the SBCs is contrary to the principle of substantive equality.  
91. In Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal  v. Union of India ,98 a three-Judge Bench of 
this Court held that substantive equality is aimed at producing equality of 
outcomes through different modes of affirmative action. The purpose of the 
Advocates Act of creating an inclusive Bar cannot be defeated by having 
exclusionary conditions which seek to create social and economic barriers. 
The Bar Councils have a responsibility in the public interest to ensure greater 
representation of persons from marginalized communities in the legal 
profession.  
92. The decision of the SBCs to charge exorbitant fees also suffers from the vice 
of manifest arbitrariness. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. State of Karnataka,
99 
this Court laid down the following principles for challenging delegated 
legislation: (i) the test of arbitrary action which appl ies to executive actions 
does not necessarily apply to delegated legislation; (ii) a delegated legislation 
can be struck down only if it is manifestly arbitrary;  and (iii) a delegated 
legislation is manifestly arbitrary if it is not in conformity with the statute or 
offends Article 14. In Clariant International Ltd . v. SEBI,100 a three-Judge 
 
97 See Neil Aurelio Nunes (supra) [35] 
98 (2023) 2 SCC 209 [37] 
99 (1996) 10 SCC 304 [13] 
100 (2004) 8 SCC 524 [63]

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Bench of this Court held that when any criterion is fixed by a statute or by a 
policy, the subordinate authority must follow the policy formulation broadly 
and substantially. Non- conformity with the legislative policy will render 
delegated legislation arbitrary.101 
93. In Shayara Bano  v. Union of India ,102 a Constitution Bench held that 
manifest arbitrariness must be something done by the legislature capriciously, 
irrationally, and/or without adequate determining principles. It was further held 
that legislation which is excessive and disproportionate would also be 
manifestly arbitrary. In Joseph Shine (supra), one of us (D Y Chandrachud, 
J) held that an “adequate determining principle” is a principle that aligns with 
constitutional values. With respect to a piece of delegated legislation, an 
adequate determining principle is a principle that  aligns with the legislative 
policy of the parent enactment as well as constitutional values.  Delegated 
legislation that is forbiddingly excessive or disproportionate will also be 
manifestly arbitrary.
103 
94. As held in the preceding segments of this judgment, the  SBCs at the time of 
enrolment charge fees in contravention of Section 24(1)(f) and the legislative 
policy of the Advocates Act. Therefore, the excess enrolment fees charged by 
the SBCs are manifestly arbitrary. Further, the effect of charging exorbitant 
enrolment fees as a pre-condition for enrolment  has created entry barriers, 
especially for people from marginalized and economically weaker sections, to 
 
101 Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers, Government of India v. Cipla Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 1 [9] 
102 (2017) 9 SCC 1 [101] 
103 Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P) Ltd. v. Amruta Garg, (2021) 9 SCC 606 [79]

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enter into the legal profession. Thus, the current enrolment fee structure is 
manifestly arbitrary because it denies substantive equality.   
iii. Article 19(1)(g): unreasonableness  
95. Section 30 of the Advocates Act inheres in every advocate whose name is 
entered in the State roll the right to practice in all courts throughout  the 
territory of India. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution provides that all citizens 
of India shall have the right to practice any profession or to carry on any 
occupation, trade, or business. Article 19(6) subjects the right under Article 
19(1)(g) to reasonable restrictions. Further, the provision allows the State to 
make any law relating to the professional or technical qualifications necessary 
for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. 
Thus, the right to practice law is not only a statutory right but also a 
fundamental right protected under Article 19(1)(g). 104 However, the right of 
citizens to practice law  can be regulated and is not absolute. 105 Under the 
Advocates Act, only those advocates who are admitted on the State roll have 
a right to practice throughout the territory of India.106 
96. In Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh ,107 a Constitution Bench 
explained the purpose of the expression “reasonable restrictions” thus: 
“8. The phrase “reasonable restriction” connotes 
that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment 
of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive 
nature, beyond what is required in the interests of 
the public. The word “reasonable” implies intelligent 
care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course 
 
104 N K Bajpai v. Union of India, (2012) 4 SCC 653 [25] 
105 Jamshed Ansari v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, (2016) 10 SCC 554 [17] 
106 N K Bajpai (supra) [25] 
107 1950 SCC 695

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which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or 
excessively invades the right cannot be said to 
contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it 
strikes a proper balance between the freedom 
guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social control 
permitted by clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held 
to be wanting in that quality.” 
97. In Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana,108 a Constitution Bench of 
was called upon to decide the validity of by e-laws framed by the Municipal 
Board. Bye-law 2 provided that no person could establish any new market or 
place for wholesale transactions without the previous permission of the 
Municipal Board. Justice S R Das (as the learned Chief Justice then was), 
speaking for the Constitution Bench, held: 
“11. The Constitution by Article 19(1) guarantees to 
the Indian citizen the right to carry on trade or 
business subject to such reasonable restrictions as 
are mentioned in clause (6) of that article. The 
position, however, under Bye- law 2 is that while it 
provided that no person shall establish a market for 
wholesale transactions in vegetables except with the 
permission of the Board, there is no bye- law 
authorising the respondent Board to issue the 
licence. The net result is that the prohibition of this 
bye-law, in the absence of any provision for issuing 
licence, becomes absolute.” 
98. In Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad,109 a Constitution 
Bench of this Court was called upon to determine the validity of the bye-laws 
framed by the Town Area Committee imposing licence fees on any person 
intending to sell in wholesale at any place in the town area. The issue before 
this Court was whether the Committee had legal authority to impose the fees. 
 
108 1950 SCC 221 
109 (1952) 1 SCC 205

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Justice S R Das (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that a 
“licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee 
but also operates as a restriction on his right to carry on his business, for 
without the payment of such fee the business cannot be carried on at all.” It 
was held that the restriction on the fundament right under Article 19(1)(g) can 
be imposed by the State according to Article 19(6). It was held that an illegal 
impost is an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on occupation, trade 
or business under Article 19(1)(g): 
“12. […] If, therefore, the licence fee cannot be 
justified on the basis of any valid law no question of 
its reasonableness can arise, for an illegal impost 
must at all times be an unreasonable restriction and 
will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to 
carry on his occupation, trade or business under 
Article 19(1)(g) and such infringement can properly 
be made the subject -matter of a challenge under 
Article 32 of the Constitution.” 
99. In Mohammad Yasin (supra), the United Provinces Town Areas Act 1914 
empowered the Town Area Committee to charge fees for the use or 
occupation of any immoveable property vested in or entrusted to the 
management of the Town Area Committee, including any public street or 
place. It was held that this power did not include the power to levy licence 
fees on a person intending to sell in wholesale at any place in the town area. 
Therefore, it was held that the licence fee imposed by the Town Area 
Committee was ultra vires the 1914 Act: 
 
“20. In our opinion, the bye- laws which impose a 
charge on the wholesale dealer in the shape of the 
prescribed fee, irrespective of any use or occupation

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by him of immovable property vested in or entrusted 
to the management of the Town Area Committee 
including any public street, are obviously ultra vires 
the powers of the respondent Committee and, 
therefore, the bye-laws cannot be said to constitute 
a valid law which alone may, under Article 19(6) of 
the Constitution, impose a restriction on the right 
conferred by Article 19(1)(g). In the absence of any 
valid law authorising it, such illegal imposition must 
undoubtedly operate as an illegal restraint and must 
infringe the unfettered right of the wholesale dealer 
to carry on his occupation, trade or business which 
is guaranteed to him by Article 19(1)( g) of our 
Constitution.” 
 
100. In Cooverjee B Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner,110 another Constitution 
Bench held that a licence fee levied without the authority of law was not 
protected under Article 19(6). In R M Seshadri v. District Magistrate,111 the 
District Collector imposed a condition compelling the licencee to exhibit at 
each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such 
length of time as directed by the Government. The condition was challenged 
for violation of Article 19(1)(g). A Constitution Bench of this Court observed 
that the condition was couched in wide language and did not lay down any 
guideline to the licencing authority. It was held that a “condition couched in 
such wide language is bound to operate harshly upon the cinema business 
and cannot be regarded as a reasonable restriction.” 
 
 
 
110 (1954) 1 SCC 18 [9] 
111 (1954) 2 SCC 320

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101. We can cull out the following principles from the above discussion: (i) the 
power of the authority to impose restrictions on the right under Article 19(1)(g) 
is not absolute and must be exercised in a reasonable manner; (ii) any fees 
or licences levied by the authorities must be valid and levied on the basis of  
the authority of law; and (iii) delegated legislation which is contrary to or 
beyond the scope of the legislative policy laid down by the parent legislation 
places an unreasonable restriction in violation of Article 19(1)(g).
112  
102. According to the current enrolment fee structure of the SBCs, an advocate 
has to pay anywhere between Rupees fifteen thousand to Rupees forty -two 
thousand as a pre-condition to enrolment. As held in the above segments of 
this judgment, the SBCs charge enrolment fees in excess of the stipulated 
fee prescribed under Section 24(1)(f). The excess enrolment fee imposed by 
the SBCs is without authority of law. Compounded with this  there are no 
reasonable criteria behind the decision of the SBCs to charge such exorbitant 
amounts as enrolment fees. The SBCs cannot have unbridled powers to 
charge any fees given the express legislative policy  under Section 24(1)(f). 
Imposing excessive financial burdens on young law graduates at the time of 
enrolment causes economic hardships, especially for those belonging to the 
marginalized and economically weaker sections of the society. Therefore, the 
current enrolment fee structure charged by the SBCs is unreasonable and 
infringes Article 19(1)(g).  
 
 
112 Minerva Talkies v. State of Karnataka, 1988 Supp SCC 176 [15]

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H. Financial implications for the SBCs and the BCI 
103. As discussed in the above segments of this judgment, we are cognizant of 
the fact that the SBCs and the BCI depend entirely on the amount collected 
from candidates at the time of enrolment for performing their functions under 
the Advocates Act, including payment of salaries to their staff. According to 
the legislative scheme of the Advocates Act, the Bar Councils must only 
charge the amount stipulated under Section 24(1)(f) as an enrolment fee. 
Instead of devising ways and means to charge fees from enrolled advocates 
for rendering services, the SBCs and the BCI have been forcing young law 
graduates to cough up exorbitant amounts of money as a pre- condition for 
enrolment. 
104. Once the advocates are enrolled on the State rolls, the Bar Councils can 
charge fees for the services provided to the advocates in accordance with the 
provisions of the Advocates Act. It is for the SBCs and the BCI to devise an 
appropriate method of charging fees that  is fair and just not only for the law 
graduates intending to enroll, but also for the advocates already enrolled on 
the State rolls.  There are several reasonable ways by which the SBCs and 
BCI can and already do collect funds at later stages of an advocate’s career. 
For instance, under the Advocates Welfare Fund Act  2001, advocates must 
affix mandatory welfare stamps on vakalatnamas  which are used to collect 
funds for advocate welfare. Unlike an enrollment fee charged before a 
graduate is given a fair chance to earn a living, such sources of income are 
directly correlated to the advocates’ practice.

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105. It is clarified that the only charges permissible at the stage of enrolment  are 
those stipulated under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act. All other 
miscellaneous fees, including but not limited to, application form fees, 
processing fees, postal charges, police verification charges, ID card charges, 
administrative fees, photograph fees etc. charged from the candidates at the 
time of admission are to be construed as part of the enrollment fee. The fees 
charged under these or any similar heads cannot cumul atively exceed the 
enrolment fee prescribed in Section 24(1)(f). 
106. The Advocates Welfare Fund Act 2001 113 is enacted to provide for the 
constitution of a welfare fund for the benefit of advocates. Section 3 provides 
that the appropriate government shall constitute an Advocates Welfare Fund. 
Section 15 mandates the SBCs to pay annually to the welfare fund an amount 
equal to twenty per cent of the enrolment fee received by it under Section 
24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act.114 This decision will not have any effect on the 
obligation of the SBCs under Section 15 because they will continue to charge 
the enrolment fee as stipulated under Section 24(1)(f). 
107. The SBCs and the BCI  are directed to ensure that the fees charged at the 
time of enrollment compl y with Section 24(1)(f) and the provision is not 
defeated either directly or indirectly under the garb of different nomenclatures. 
The SBCs cannot charge an enrolment fee or miscellaneous fees above the 
amount prescribed in Section 24(1)(f). No case is made out for this Court to 
 
113 “2001 Act” 
114 Section 15, Advocates Welfare Fund Act 2001. [It reads: 
15. Payment of certain monies to Fund by State Bar Council –  The State Bar Council shall pay to the Fund 
annually an amount equal to twenty per cent of the enrolment fee received by it under clause (f) of Section 
24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961).]

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exercise its power under Article 142 to implement the BCI Draft Enrolment 
Rules in their current form. 
108. The result of this decision would have entitled  advocates who have paid the 
excess enrolment fee to a refund from the SBCs. 115 The SBCs have been 
levying the enrolment fees for a considerable duration and utilizing the 
collected amounts to carry out their day -to-day functioning.  Therefore, we 
declare that this judgment will have prospective effect. Resultantly, the SBCs 
are not required to refund the excess enrolment fees collected before the date 
of this judgment.  
I. Conclusions 
109. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that: 
a. The SBCs cannot charge “enrolment fees” beyond the express legal 
stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) as it currently stands;  
b. Section 24(1)(f) specifically lays down the fiscal pre- conditions subject to 
which an advocate can be enrolled on State rolls. The SBCs and the BCI 
cannot demand payment of fees other than the stipulated enrolment fee and 
stamp duty, if any, as a pre-condition to enrolment;  
c. The decision of the SBCs to charge fees and charges at the time of 
enrolment in excess of the legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) violates 
Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; and  
 
115 See Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd v. State of U P, (2001) 5 SCC 519 [46]

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d. This decision will have prospective effect. The SBCs are not required to 
refund the excess enrolment fees collected before the date of this judgment. 
110. In view of the above, the writ petition, transferred cases and transfer petitions 
are disposed of. 
111. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 
 
 
 
…..…..…....…........……………….…........CJI. 
                               [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] 
 
 
 
 
.…....…..…....…........……………….…........J. 
                                [J B Pardiwala]  
     
 
New Delhi;  
July 30, 2024