Indian Law Research

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation

Decision date:

13 September 2024 · 2024 INSC 687

Whether the arrest of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal was legal and is he entitled to bail in the CBI case

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Source and extraction notes

Official source

Draft summary

AI-assisted historical explanation. Independently checked against the source by an AI reviewer. Not reviewed by a lawyer. This historical summary does not certify the current legal position.

In one sentence

Both judges granted bail in the CBI case, while differing over the arrest.

Question decided

Was Kejriwal entitled to bail, and was his CBI arrest lawful?

Key holdings

Outcome

Conditional bail was granted; the arrest challenge was dismissed by the operative joint order.

Source PDF pages: 59, 60.

Plain-English explanation

The source must be read through to the final joint order. Justice Surya Kant upheld the arrest, while Justice Ujjal Bhuyan questioned its justification. Both agreed that continued detention was not warranted and that bail should be granted. Their disagreement therefore should not be turned into a statement that the Court unanimously quashed the arrest. The joint operative order dismissed that appeal and allowed the separate bail appeal. Conditions included cooperation with trial, restrictions on public comments about the merits and incorporation of conditions from the ED proceedings. The case illustrates why headlines about judicial criticism can differ from the formal disposition. Bail also did not determine the truth of the prosecution allegations or end the criminal case.

Relevant law

Opinions

Separate opinions by Justices Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan; joint operative order at the end.

Research notes and limits

Keep the CBI case separate from the ED case and reproduce the operative result accurately; later developments require checking.

Judgment - source material

All pages of the downloaded court document follow, including separate opinions, annexures and any final joint order. This is machine-extracted original text, not an AI rewrite. Use the PDF to check exact wording.

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2024 INSC 687
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REPORTABLE 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  
 
Criminal Appeal No. 3816 / 2024 
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11023 / 2024) 
 
 
Arvind Kejriwal                   ….Appellant(s) 
versus 
Central Bureau of Investigation            ….Respondent(s) 
WITH 
Criminal Appeal No. 3817 / 2024 
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10991 / 2024) 
 
 
JUDGEMENT 
 
SURYA KANT, J. 
 
 Leave granted. 
2. These appeals are directed against the judgement s and order s dated 
05.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi ( hereinafter, ‘High 
Court’), dismissing the Appellant’s challenge to his arrest being illegal as 
well as his application for the grant of  regular bail. Consequently, the 
High Court upheld the legality of the Appellant ’s arrest and has 
summarily declined to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under Section 
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter, ‘CrPC’), 
thereby denying his prayer for regular bail.

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FACTS: 
3. At the very outset, it is essential to advert to the brief factual background 
to provide context to the manner in which the present proceedings have 
arisen. 
3.1. The Appellant is a public representative and has been elected thrice the 
Chief Minister of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi  
(hereinafter ‘GNCTD’). He also happens to be the National Convenor of 
Aam Aadmi Party, a political party in India.  
3.2. Central Bureau of Investigation ( hereinafter ‘CBI’) – the Respondent 
registered an FIR No. RC0032022A0053 (hereinafter ‘FIR’), on 
17.08.2022 under Sections 120B read with Section 477A of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1806 (hereinafter ‘IPC’) and Section 7 of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1988 ( hereinafter ‘PC Act’) against various persons. 
The FIR alleged irregularities, falsification, undue advantage, and a 
conspiracy among the persons holding positions of responsibility within 
the GNCTD, in framing and implementing the Excise Policy for the year 
2021-2022 (hereinafter ‘Excise Policy’). However, the Appellant’s name 
did not figure in the FIR.       
3.3. On 21.03.2024, the Directorate of Enforcement (hereinafter ‘ED’), 
arrested the Appellant in  the purported exercise of its power under 
Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 . 
Subsequently, this Court granted the Appellant interim bail on 
10.05.2024, until 01.06.2024 . T he Appellant surrendered thereafter

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before the jail authorities on 02.06.2024. We may hasten to add here 
that the question of law sought to be raised in the ED matter is presently 
pending consideration before a larger bench of this Court and is not 
relevant to the present controversy, and its  particulars are included 
solely to ensure lucidity in the factual matrix. 
3.4. The Special Judge vide order dated 20.06.2024 granted the Appellant 
regular bail while his bail in the ED matter was pending before this Court 
and reserved for judgement . However, the ED swiftly sought the 
cancellation of that bail order.  The High Court on 21.06.2024 stayed the 
operation of that order, as a result of which, the Appellant continued to 
remain in jail.  
3.5. CBI moved an application on 24.06.2024 before the Special Judge (PC 
Act) (hereinafter ‘Trial Court’) under Section 41A of the CrPC, seeking 
to interrogate the Appellant, which was thereupon allowed. Having 
completed interrogation and examination, the CBI filed an application on 
25.06.2024 seeking permission to arrest the Appellant and for the 
issuance of production warrants. Thereafter, the Trial Court allowed the 
CBI’s application noting that the accused was already in judicial custody 
in the ED matter . In the meantime, the High Court conclusively stay ed 
the order granting regular bail to the Appellant in the ED matter  on 
25.06.2024 itself. 
3.6. Shortly thereafter, on 26.06.2024, the Appellant was produced before the 
Trial Court, whereupon he was arrested in the instant CBI case and a

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copy of the arrest memo was handed over to the Appellant’s counsel. On 
the same day, on an appl ication moved by the CBI, the Trial Court 
remanded the Appellant to police custody for five days. Subsequently, on 
29.06.2024, the Trial Court remanded the Appellant to judicial custody 
till 12.07.2024. It may be noted that the investigation at that time was 
ongoing.  
3.7. Both the above stated orders dated 26.06.2024 and 29.06.2024 of the 
Trial Court, came to be challenged by the Appellant before the High Court 
vide a Writ Petition, inter alia seeking a declaration that his arrest was 
illegal. On 02.07.2024, when the Petition was heard , the High Court 
issued notice to the CBI and scheduled the matter to be heard on  
17.07.2024. In the interregnum, the Appellant also approached the High 
Court under Section 439 CrPC, seeking reg ular bail in connection with 
the subject FIR. On 05.07.2024, when the Bail Application came up for 
hearing, the High Court issued notice and renotified it to be heard  on 
17.07.2024, along with the Writ Petition challenging the very arrest of 
the Appellant. 
3.8. The High Court extensively heard the matter on 17.07.2024 and reserved 
judgement in the Writ Petition . The Bail Application was renotified for 
further hearing on 29.07.2024, which was also reserved. Finally, on 
05.08.2024, the High Court vide the impugned judgement and order 
upheld the arrest of the Appellant by the CBI and congruously denied 
him regular bail, with liberty to approach the Trial Court for such relief.

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3.9. As regard to the legality of the Appellant’s arrest, the High Court upheld 
the same on the following broad points: (i) The five circumstances 
delineated under Section 41(1)(b) of the CrPC apply only to arrests made 
without a warrant and does not pertain to arrests made under the aegis 
of Section 41(2) of the CrPC, which is an arrest upon the order of a court; 
(ii) The arrest was made in accordance with Section 41(2) of the CrPC; 
and (iii) The plea of non -compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC was 
totally unsubstantiated.  
3.10. As regard to the Appellant’s prayer for regular bail, the High Court has 
denied the same for the following reasons: (i) The complexity of the facts 
and material on record necessitated a more comprehensive 
determination of the Appellant’s role in the alleged conspiracy  so as to 
assess his entitlement to bail; and (ii) The Bail Application had been filed 
prior to the chargesheet being submitted, and since the chargesheet has 
now been filed before the Trial Court, the Appellant was directed to first 
approach the Court of the Sessions Judge.  
3.11. Meanwhile, this Court vide order dated 12.07.2024, passed in Criminal 
Appeal No. 2493/2024 directed the Appellant’s release on interim bail in 
the ED matter.1 However, the Appellant continues  to face incarceration 
on account of the proceedings initiated by the CBI. 
 
                                                
1 Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024.

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3.12. The instant appeals are therefore restricted to the Appellant ’s 
challenges regarding the legality and propriety of his arrest by the CBI 
and his prayer for release on regular bail in connection with the 
proceedings initiated by the CBI via the subject FIR.  
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
4. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel representing the 
Appellant, argued first and foremost that the Appellant had been arrested 
illegally, in violation of the procedure enumerated in Sections 41(1) and 
41A of the CrPC. In this vein, he assailed that the Appellant was arrested 
without giving any reasons, thus violating the: (i) precondition of just and 
valid reasons for the change of a case from ‘non-arrest’ to ‘arrest’ under 
Section 41A (3) of the CrPC; and (ii) the mandatory details that have to 
be fulfilled under Section 41(1)(b)(ii), to satisfy that the arrest fell within 
the purview of any of the clauses (a) to (e). Considering that none of these 
stipulations were complied with, the Appellant ’s arrest is fraught with 
illegality.  
5. Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the  High Court having erred in 
misapplying the provision of Section 41(2) of the CrPC to justify the non-
compliances of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC and consequential arrest 
of the Appellant . He highlighted that Section 41(2) is attracted only to 
non-cognizable offences, whereas the arrest of the Appellant was made 
in a case of cognizable offence. This was fortified by contending that none 
of the applications moved by the CBI seeking remand, sought to invoke 
Section 41(2). These violations, Learned Senior Counsel contended, were

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squarely against the dictum of this Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of 
Bihar2 and a plethora of other subsequent decisions.  
6. Dr. Singhvi further argued that the Appellant deserves to be granted bail, 
as his continued incarceration is not necessitated, given that the entire 
material is in the safe custody of the CBI . He also emphasized that the 
Appellant has been granted both interim and regular bail in the ED 
matter by this Court, where the conditions are stricter, thus 
demonstrating that he would invariably meet the threshold explicated by 
the ‘triple test’ in the CBI matter as well: he has no criminal antecedents, 
is not a flight risk, and poses no threat of tampering with witnesses or 
evidence. He also assailed that the High Court ought not to have 
relegated the Appellant to the Trial Court, considering that it exercises 
concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC. This measure, he 
underscored, was akin to taking the Appellant back to square one , 
leading to a travesty of justice and unwarranted delay in the adjudication 
of his bail application.  
7. Lastly, Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the fact that the trial was not 
likely to be concluded in the near future, as the FIR was registered on 
17.08.2022, with one chargesheet and three supplementary 
chargesheets having been filed, 17 accused persons arraigned, as many 
as 224 witnesses cited and the physical and digital records running into 
lakhs of pages. Further, the fourth supplementary charge sheet was filed 
on 29.07.2024, cognizance of which was taken only recently, and which 
                                                
2 Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.

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was yet to be supplied to the Appellant. These reasons, he contended, 
irrefutably validated his apprehension of reasonable delay in the 
conclusion of trial.  
8. Per contra, Mr. S.V. Raju, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India 
argued that the arrest of the Appellant had been conducted in due 
compliance with the statutory procedure as contemplated in Section 
41(1) and 41A of the CrPC. He contended that the se provisions do not, 
in any manner , mandate a blanket ban on the arrest of an individual, 
against whom there is a reasonable suspicion of commission of a 
cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. The 
law only stipulates that the investigating authority ought to be satisfied 
with the necessity of such an arrest, which has been duly met in the 
present case. He strenuously urged  that the pre-requisites set out in 
Section 41(1)(b)(ii) had been fulfilled as the CBI deemed it imperative to 
conduct the custodial interrogation of the Appellant to unearth a larger 
conspiracy hatched amongst the accused persons and to establish the 
money trail of ill-gotten proceeds.  
9. Mr. Raju contended that the requirement of notice under Section 41A of 
the CrPC is int ended solely to compel the accused to appear before the 
investigating authority. Since the accused in the instant case was already 
in judicial custody, such notice would have been an empty formality. He 
argued that the CBI had obtained permission from the Trial Court, under 
whose custody the Appellant was. He supported his contention  by 
referencing Section 41A (4) of the CrPC, which outlines the procedure for

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situations where an accused fails to comply with a Section 41A no tice. 
Mr. Raju  maintained that, given the Appellant ’s incarceration, the 
circumstance envisaged under Section 41A (4) becomes inapplicable, and 
therefore, the requirement of notice thereunder was not necessary. In 
regard to the misgivings on the erroneous application of Section 41(2) of 
the CrPC, he explained that the High Court had inadvertently mistyped 
the provision and that it ought to be read as  Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the 
CrPC instead. 
10. While strongly opposing the Appel lant’s prayer for bail, Mr. Raju 
contended that there was a likelihood of witness intimidation, should the 
Appellant be released on bail, resulting in the trial proceedings being 
severely derailed. Mr. Raju also alluded to certain instances having 
occurred in the context of M/s. Mahadev Liquors  of Punjab , thus 
pointing to the influence exerted by the Appellant , whose political outfit 
is ruling more than one State.  
11. Mr. Raju vehemently pressed into aid his preliminary objection to 
relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court, who he stressed ought not to 
have approached the High Court directly , notwithstanding the  
concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC. He urged that the 
Appellant should not be granted any special treatment mere ly because 
of the position of power he holds or his political stature. Mr. Raju 
canvassed that the Appellant deserves to be treated like any other 
undertrial and, hence, he must firstly approach the Trial Court,

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emphasizing that the High Court's jurisdicti on is discretionary and 
should be exercised only in rare and exceptional circumstances.  
12. According to the Learned ASG, the High Court was correct in refusing to 
exercise its jurisdiction because the Appellant had failed to make out an 
exceptional case warranting such special scrutiny. Furthermore, Mr. 
Raju highlighted a significant anomaly: the Appellant ’s failure to annex 
the chargesheet while applying for bail. He argued that a crucial aspect 
of seeking bail is to demonstrate, base d on the material on record, that 
no prima facie case exists against the accused. Due to these oversights, 
Mr. Raju asserted that the Appellant should first seek relief from the Trial 
Court. 
13. Lastly, Mr. Raju submitted that since the chargesheet and some 
supplementary chargesheets have been filed after the Appellant had 
approached the High Court for his enlargement on bail, it is a significant 
change in circumstances and therefore, in light of this too the Appellant 
should be relegated to the Trial Court. Su ch relegation would aid in his 
bail claim being considered with reference to the nature of evidence 
gathered by the CBI and the complicity of the Appellant, if any, as may 
be discernible from such evidence.  
ISSUES 
14. Having considered the material on record and the extensive submissions 
made by the parties, the following questions fall for our deliberation:

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i. Whether there was any illegality in the Appellant ’s arrest?  If so, 
whether the Appellant is entitled to be release d forthwith, even in 
the absence of a formal bail application? 
ii. Whether the Appellant, regardless of his lawful arrest, is entitled to 
be enlarged on regular bail? 
iii. Whether the filing of a chargesheet is a change in circumstances of 
such a decisive nature th at an accused would be liable to be 
relegated to the Trial Court to make out a case for grant of regular 
bail?   
ANALYSIS 
15. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival contentions, along with 
the sequence of events that culminated in the Appellant’s arrest. Given 
the nature of the issues pending determination, it is essential to address 
them each independently and arrive at a definitive conclusion. 
A. Whether the procedure undertaken in arresting the Appellant was 
illegal?  
16. The primary basis for the Appellant's challenge rests on the contention 
that the procedure for arrest, as outlined under Sections 41(1)(b)(ii) and 
41A of the CrPC, was not complied with. For the purpose of analysing 
the legality of the Appellant’s arrest, there are two key aspects which we 
propose to examine separately, namely : (i) whether the issuance of a 
notice under Section 41A of the CrPC was duly complied with, in the 
context of the present factual scenario; and (ii) whether Section

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41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC  is applicable in the facts and circumstance s of 
this case. 
i. Compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC 
17. Section 41A of the CrPC pertains to the issuance of a notice by a police 
officer to an individual when their arrest is not warranted under Section 
41(1) of the CrPC, but their  presence is still required before the 
investigating authority . Issuance of a notice under Section 41A(1) 
therefore would be imminent, when there is a complaint made , credible 
information received or there is a reasonable suspicion of the individual 
having committed a cognizable offence. Clause (2) of Section 41A 
thereafter, demands that an individual to whom such a notice has been 
issued, complies with the same. Section 41A  (3) bears out  that an 
individual who complies and continues to comply with such notice is not 
to be arrested in respect of the offence mentioned, unless the police 
officer, for reasons to be recorded, deems it necessary to arrest  them. 
Finally, Section 41A (4) stipulates that if an individual fails to comply 
with the notice or refuses to identify themself, the police may arrest such 
an individual for the offence recorded in the notice, subject to any orders 
passed by a competent court.  
18. Given the lucid nature of the language of the provision, it is crucial to 
examine the circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s arrest in order 
to gauge whether there was due compliance with the procedural 
safeguards enshrined within Section 41A. In the present context, since 
the Appellant was already in judicial custody at the relevant time in the

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ED case , the CBI filed an application on 24.06.2024 before the Trial 
Court under Section 41A of the CrPC , inter alia seeking to interrogate 
and examine him. Such examination was allegedly necessitated by new 
facts and evidence uncovered by the CBI upon further investigation. The 
CBI, vide this application, outlined the reasons prompting such 
examination, including the purported irregularities in the framing and 
implementation of the Excise Policy, and its manipulation to facilitate the 
monopolization and cartelization of wholesale and retail liquor trade in 
India.  
19. The application also alleged that, upon further investigation, statements 
from several witnesses, incriminating documents and messages 
exchanged between the accused persons named in the chargesheets, 
revealed that the Appellant was a critical component in the criminal 
conspiracy related to the Excise Policy. It was claimed that the Appellant, 
in connivance with the other accused persons, engaged in tweaking the 
policy to enhance the profit margin of wholesalers  from 5%  to 12%, 
resulting in significant windfall gains . These gains  were ultimately 
alleged to have been u tilised by the Appellant’s political party  towards 
election related expenses , during the 2021-22 Goa Assembly elections.  
The application highlighted that  the emergence of these new facts , 
pointing toward the Appellant’s complicity, required further examination, 
as there was reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission 
of the offence . Upon considering these reasons, the Trial Court, by its

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order dated 24.06.2024, allowed the CBI’s application  seeking to 
interrogate the Appellant. 
20. At this juncture, it is pertinent to first address the Appellant’s allegations 
regarding the CBI’s non-compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC , 
particularly concerning the  issuance of notice  or lack thereof . In this 
regard, it is crucial to draw reference to the language and intent of the 
provision, which aims to ensure an individual’s appearance through the 
issuance of a notice . The provision, however, does not outline any 
express procedure to be undertaken where the individual in question is 
already incarcerated. It is to be remembered that the Court is, in a way, 
the guardian of an undertrial, while he is in judicial custody. That being 
so, there could possibly be no other way to secure the Appellant ’s 
physical presence for the purpose of further investigation, except to seek 
prior permission of the Trial Court for his interrogation. 
21. In fact, given what was contended by the Appellant, it must be explicated 
that Section 41A does not envisage or mandate the issuance of a notice 
to an individual already in judicial custody. As such a person is already 
under the court ’s authority, any request to include them in an 
investigation in another case must be approved by the competent court. 
The CBI has thus followed the procedure which is contemplated in terms 
of the intent and purpose of Section 41A CrPC. 
22. Contrarily, if the Appellant’s contention is taken to its logical conclusion, 
it could lead to detrimental consequences. For instance, serving a notice

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upon an undertrial in jail through the Jail Superintendent, without 
informing the court that placed them in judicial custody, would 
effectively enable the police to arrest such individuals in a new case 
without the court ’s knowledge. This cou ld result in a misuse of police 
authority and a violation of the Constitutional and procedural rights 
afforded to undertrials.  Alternatively, when the court ’s permission is 
sought, it ensures the application of judicial scrutiny to assess whether 
custodial interrogation is necessary and, if so, for what duration. 
23. In the case in hand, the Trial Court’s approval of the CBI’s application to 
interrogate the Appellant should be viewed as satisfying the essential 
requirements of Section 41A, as the issuance of a formal notice through 
the jail authorities would have had an adverse impact on the rights of 
the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the CBI complied with 
the procedure encompassed within the framework of Section 41A of the 
CrPC. 
24. That being said, let us now address the specific contention pertaining to 
the alleged violation of Section 41A(3)  of the CrPC . The provision 
elucidates, at the risk of reiteration, that an individual who complies with 
the notice issued under Section 41A should not be arrested, unless the 
police officer for reasons recorded, opines that arrest is necessary . The 
vital takeaway from this provision is that while compliance with the 
notice generally shields an individual from arrest, the police may still 
proceed with the arrest if they conclude that it is essential and provide 
duly recorded reasons for doing so.

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25. In the present case, following the interrogation, the CBI moved another 
application to the Trial Court on 25.06.2024, seeking permission to 
arrest the Appellant. The CBI justified the arrest on the grounds that the 
Appellant had allegedly given evasive responses during questioning and 
that custodial interrogation was necessary to confront him with evidence 
and uncover a purported larger conspiracy involving the accused persons 
in the implementation of the excise policy. The Trial Court, after 
considering these reasons, allowed the CBI's application for the 
Appellant's arrest and issued production warrants on the same day. 
26. In this respect, our analysis is confined to assessing whether Section 
41A(3) was violated, thereby rendering the arrest per se illegal. First, it is 
trite law that there is no insurmountable hurdle in the conversion of 
judicial custody into police custody by an order of a Magistrate. Thus, 
there is no impediment in terms of arresting a person already in custody 
for the purposes of investigation, whether for the same offence or for an 
altogether different offence.3  The Appellant’s arrest by the CBI was thus 
entirely permissible, in light of the Trial Court’s order dated 25.06.2024.    
27. Second, Section 41A( 3) allows for arrest, provided the reasons are 
recorded, justifying the necessity of such a step, and the police officer is 
satisfied that the individual should be arrested. In this context, we have 
already noted that the CBI, in their application dated 25.06.2024, clearly 
recorded the reasons as to  why they deemed the Appellant's arrest 
necessary. These reasons were also summarized in the arrest memo 
                                                
3 Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141.

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dated 26.06.2024. It is important to clarify that our current analysis is 
limited to verifying whether the CBI followed the correct procedur e, 
including the recording of sufficient reasons. This issue would not detain 
us further, as the reasons as to why the Appellant ’s arrest was 
necessitated are discernible from the CBI ’s application dated 
25.06.2024. 
28. Third, Section 41A (1), when read with Section 41A(3)  CrPC, does not 
impose an absolute prohibition on the arrest of an individual against 
whom there exists reasonable suspicion of having committed a 
cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. This 
is evident from the language of the provision itself. Section 41A(3) 
explicitly states that an arrest is permissible if the police officer believes 
it to be necessary and duly records the reasons for such arrest. This 
provision thus essentially carves out  an exception to the general rule 
under Section 41A, which mandates that an individual whose 
appearance is required should not be arrested under Section 41(1) of the 
CrPC.   
29. Therefore, in view of these consideration s, we do not find any merit in 
the Appellant's contention that the CBI failed to comply with Section 41A 
CrPC, in its true letter and spirit. 
ii. Whether Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC is applicable? 
30. At the outset, it is imperative to clarify that our analysis will be restricted 
to the procedure outlined under Section 41(1)(b) (ii) of the CrPC. This is

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because Section 41(1), in its entirety, addresses multiple situations and 
complexities regarding the p rocedure for arrest, which may not be  
directly applicable to the intricacies of the present case.  
31. In this vein, the language of Section 41(1)(b) postulates as follows: 
 
“41. When police may arrest without warrant.— 
(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate 
and without a warrant, arrest any person—  
….. 
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or 
credible information has been received, or a reasonable 
suspicion exists that he has comm itted a cognizable offence 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less 
than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether 
with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, 
namely:—  
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such 
complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has 
committed the said offence;  
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—  
(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; 
or  
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or  
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the 
offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any 
manner; or  
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat 
or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case 
so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court 
or to the police officer; or  
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court 
whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer 
shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:  
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the 
arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this 
sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the 
arrest. 
……”

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32. Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC clearly stipulates that an arrest under this 
provision can be made based on a complaint or credible information that 
an individual has committed a cognizable offence punishable with 
imprisonment up to seven years, with or without a fine. However, such 
an arrest must be conducted subject to the satisfaction of specific 
conditions outlined in sub sections (a) to ( e). The rigors of Section 
41(1)(b)(ii) have been extensively examined by this Court in  Arnesh 
Kumar (supra), where it was observed that: 
“7.1. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is 
evident that a person accused of offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years 
or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, 
cannot be arrested by the police officer only on its satisfaction 
that such person had committed the offence punishable as 
aforesaid. Police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be 
further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such 
person from committing any  further offence; or for proper 
investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from 
causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering 
with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person 
from making any inducement, threat or promi se to a witness 
so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court 
or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, 
his presence in the court whenever required cannot be 
ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach 
based on facts.  
7.2. The law mandates the police officer to state the facts and 
record the reasons in writing which led him to come to a 
conclusion covered by any of the provisions aforesaid, while 
making such arrest. Law further requires the police officers to 
record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.  
7.3. In pith and core, the police office before arrest must put a 
question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What 
purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only 
after these questions are addressed and one or the other

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conditions as enumerated above is satisfied, the power of 
arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first the 
police officers should have reason to believe on the basis of 
information and material that the accused has committed the 
offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied 
further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more 
purposes envisaged by sub -clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of 
Section 41 of Cr.PC.” 
 
33. Given this annotation, while there exists no doubt that the submissions 
made by the Appellant in regard to the precepts of Section 41(1)(b) are 
sound, the provision is inapplicable to the vicissitudes of the present 
factual matrix. Here is a case where the court upon application of judicial 
mind accorded its approval to the Appellant’s arrest for which necessary 
warrant was issued. There was thus no occasion for the arresting police 
officer to form an opinion regarding the existence of valid reasons of 
arrest. The competent court having undertaken such a task, the police 
officer cannot be expected to sit over the order of the court.  
34. Still further, Section 41(1) opens with the expression that ‘any police 
officer may arrest without an order from a Magistra te or without a 
warrant’. It necessarily means that where a Magistrate has issued an 
order, the police officer stands absolved form his statutory obligation of 
forming an opinion. Consequently, it  becomes apparent that the 
variables and conditions ensconced in Section 41(1)(b) (ii) of the CrPC 
would cease to apply in the present context, given the order granted by 
the Trial Court prior.

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35. Lastly, we are inclined to agree with the explanation given by the Learned 
ASG that the reference to Section 41(2) of the CrPC in the High Court's 
judgment appears to have been included inadvertently and is a 
typographical error. Both parties, during their submissions, have rightly 
clarified that Section 41(2 ) which pertains to the procedure of arrest in 
non-cognizable offences, does not apply to the facts and circumstances 
here. 
36. Having considered the CBI's compliance with Section 41A  of the CrPC  
and the inapplicability of Section 41(1) (b)(ii) of the CrPC, we are thus of 
the view that the Appellant ’s arrest does not suffer with any procedural 
infirmity. Consequently, the plea regarding non -compliance of these 
provisions, merits rejection. Ordered accordingly.     
B. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the relief of regular bail? 
37. Adverting to  the question of grant ing bail to the Appellant,  it may be 
noticed that the High Court has viewed that due to the complexity and 
web of facts and the material on record, it was crucial to comprehensively 
determine the role of the Appellant in the alleged conspiracy and then 
only decide his entitlement to bail. The High Court further observed that 
considering the charge sheet had been filed before the Trial Court, the 
Appellant should first seek relief from that court.  
38. The evolution of bail jurisprudence in India underscores that the ‘issue 
of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public 
treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is

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integral to a socially sensitised judicial process ’.4 The principle has 
further been expanded  to establish that the prolonged incarceration of 
an accused person, pending trial, amounts to an unjust deprivation of 
personal liberty . This Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb has 
expanded this principle even in a case under the provisions of the 
Unlawful Activities ( Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter ‘UAPA’) 
notwithstanding the statutory embargo contained in Section  43-D(5) of 
that Act, laying down that the legislative policy against the grant of bail 
will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within 
a reasonable time .5 The courts would invariably bend towards ‘liberty’ 
with a flexible approach towards an undertrial, save and except when the 
release of such person is likely to shatter societal aspirations, derail the 
trial or deface the very criminal justice system which is integral to rule 
of law. 
39. It was submitted during these proceedings that the FIR was registered 
on 17.08.2022, and since then, the chargesheet along with four 
supplementary chargesheets have been filed. The fourth supplementary 
chargesheet was filed as recently as 29.07.2024 and we are informed that 
the Trial Court has taken cognizance of the same. Additionally, seventeen 
accused persons have been named, 224 individuals have been identified 
as witnesses, an d extensive documentation, both physical and digital, 
                                                
4 Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240. 
5 Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, AIR 2021 SC 712.

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has been submitted. These factors suggest that the completion of the 
trial is unlikely to occur in the immediate future.   
40. In our considered view, although the procedure for the Appellant’s arrest 
meets the requisite criteria for legality and compliance, continued 
incarceration for an extended period pending trial would infringe upon 
established legal principles and the Appellant’s right to liberty, traceable 
to Article 21 of our Constitution. The Appellant has been granted interim 
bail by this Court in the ED matter on 10.05.2024 and 12.07.2024, 
arising from the same set of facts. Additionally, s everal co-accused in 
both the CBI and ED matters have also been granted bail by the Trial 
Court, the High Court, and this Court in separate proceedings. 
41. So far as the apprehension of the Appellant influencing the outcome of 
the trial is concerned, it seems that all evidence and material relevant to 
the CBI’s disposition is already in their possession, negating the 
likelihood of tampering by the Appellant. Similarly, given the Appellant’s 
position and his roots in the society, the re seems to be no valid reason 
to entertain the apprehension of his fleeing the country. In any case, in 
order to assuage the apprehensions of the CBI, we may impose stricter 
bail conditions . As regard to  Appellant indulging in  influencing 
witnesses, it needs no emphasis that in the event of any such instance, 
it will amount to misuse of the concession of bail and necessary 
consequences will follow.

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42. Therefore, in the light of these extenuating circumstances and 
considering the foregoing analysis, it could be resolved that the Appellant 
satisfies the requisite triple conditions for the grant of bail. We order 
accordingly. 
C. Whether the filing of a chargesheet is a change in circumstances 
warranting relegation to the trial court for grant of regular bail?   
43. It is true that generally the Trial Court should consider the prayer 
seeking bail once the chargesheet is filed, since the material that an 
Investigating Authority  may have  been able to procure w ould 
undoubtedly facilitate that court to form a prima facie  opinion with 
regard to (i) the gravity of offence; (ii) the degree of involvement of the 
applicant; (iii) the background and vulnerability of the witnesses; (iv) the 
approximate timeline for conclusion of the trial based on the number of 
witnesses; and (v)  the societal impact of granting or denying  bail. 
However, there can be no straitjacket formula which enumerates that 
every case concerning the consideration of bail should depend upon the 
filing of a chargesheet. In fact, each case ought to be assessed on its own 
merits, recognizing that no one-size fits all formula exists for determining 
bail.  
44. An undertrial thus should, ordinarily, first approach the Trial Court for 
bail, as this process not only provides the accused an opportunity for 
initial relief but also allows the High Court to serve as a secondary 
avenue if the Trial Court denies bail  for inadequate reasons. This  
approach is beneficial for both the accused and the prosecution; if bail

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is granted without proper consideration, the prosecution too can seek 
corrective measures from the High Court. 
45. However, superior courts should adhere to this procedural recourse from 
the outset. If an accused approaches the High Court directly without first 
seeking relief from the Trial Court, it is generally appropriate for the High 
Court to redirect them to the Trial Court at the threshold. Nevertheless, 
if there are significant delays following notice, it may not be prudent to 
relegate the matter to the Trial Court at a later stage. Bail being closely 
tied to personal liberty, such claims should be adjudicated pr omptly on 
their merits, rather than oscillating between courts on mere procedural 
technicalities. 
46. This issue is however, more or less academic in the instant case as the 
High Court did not relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court at the 
preliminary stage.  Since notice was issued and the parties were 
apparently heard on merits by the High Court, we do not deem it 
necessary at this stage to relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court even 
though filing of a chargesheet is a change in the circumstances.  
CONCLUSION:  
47. We, thus, deem it appropriate to pass the following order: 
i. The Criminal Appeal challenging the legality of arrest (arising out of 
SLP (Crl.) No. 10991/2024) is, hereby, dismissed.

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ii. The Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11023/2024)  is 
allowed and the impug ned judgement of the High Court dated 
05.08.2024, to that extent is set aside. Consequently, 
a. the Appellant is directed to be released on bail in connection 
with FIR No. RC0032022A0053/2022 registered by the CBI at 
PS CBI, ACB, upon furnishing bail bonds for a sum of Rs. 
10,00,000 /- with two sureties of such like amount , to the 
satisfaction of the Trial Court; 
b. the Appellant shall not make any public comments on the 
merits of the CBI case, it being sub judice before the Trial Court. 
This condition is necessitated to dissuade a recent tendency of 
building a self-serving narrative on public platforms; 
c. however, this shall not preclude the Appellant from raising all 
his contentions before the Trial Court; 
d. the terms and conditions imposed by a coordinate bench of this 
Court vide orders dated 10.05.2024 and 12.07.2024 passed in 
Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024, titled Arvind Kejriwal v. 
Directorate of Enforcement , are imposed mutatis mutandis 
in the present case; 
e. the Appellant shall remain present before the Trial Court on 
each and every date of hearing, unless granted exemption; and

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f. the Appellant shall fully cooperate with the Trial Court for 
expeditious conclusion of the trial proceedings. 
48. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.  
49. Ordered accordingly. 
 
 
………..………………… J. 
(SURYA KANT) 
 
 
 
NEW DELHI 
DATED: 13.09.2024

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3816 OF 2024
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 11023 OF 2024
ARVIND KEJRIWAL     APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION          RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3817 OF 2024
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 10991 OF 2024
J U D G M E N T
UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
I   have   gone   through   the   draft   judgment   of   my
esteemed senior colleague Justice Surya Kant. I am in complete
agreement with the conclusion and direction of his Lordship that
the   appellant   should   be   released   on   bail.   However,   on   the
necessity and timing of the arrest, I have a definite point of view.

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Therefore, I deem it appropriate to render a separate opinion on
the point of necessity and timing  of the arrest of the appellant
while concurring with the opinion of Justice Surya Kant that the
appellant should be released on bail. 
2. Leave granted. 
3. At the outset, a brief recital of the relevant dates and
the attending facts as borne out from the record may be noted.
3.1. A case was registered by the CBI on 17.08.2022 being
RC   No.   0032022A0053   under   Section   120B   read   with   Section
477A of IPC and Section 7 of the PC Act. The aforesaid case was
registered on the basis of source information as well as on the
basis of a written complaint received from Shri Praveen Kumar
Rai,   Director,   Ministry   of   Home   Affairs,   Government   of   India
dated   22.07.2022.   This   letter   also   conveyed   complaint   dated
20.07.2022 of Shri Vinay Kumar Saxena, Lieutenant Governor of
the   Government   of   National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi.   The
complaint   sought   for   enquiry   into   the   irregularities   and
manipulation   in   the   framing   and   implementation   of   the   excise
policy   of   the   Government   of   National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi
(GNCTD) for the year 2021­22. The precise allegation is that the

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3
accused persons had deliberately tweaked and manipulated the
excise policy of 2021­22 which resulted in enhanced profit of the
liquor manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers in   lieu  of illegal
gratification received by the accused persons from what is called
the   “south   group”   to   meet   the   election   related   expenses   of   the
Aam Admi Party at Goa.
3.2. On   14.04.2023,   appellant   received   summons   under
Section   160   Cr.P.C.   from   the   CBI   to   appear   before   it   on
16.04.2023. In compliance thereto, appellant appeared before the
CBI   on   16.04.2023.   According   to   the   appellant,   he   was
questioned by the CBI for about 9 to 10 hours. 
3.3. CBI   filed   a   total   of   four   chargesheets   wherein   17
persons   were   named   as   accused.   Manish   Sisodia   and   Kavitha
Kalvakuntala were named as accused amongst others. Appellant
Shri Arvind Kejriwal was not named as an accused in the said
chargesheets.   The   gist   of   the   chargesheets   is   that   the   excise
policy in question was a result of criminal conspiracy which was
hatched   by   a   cartel   of   liquor   manufacturers,   wholesalers   and
retailers   ensuring   undue   gain   to   them   in   lieu  of   pecuniary

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4
benefits   to   the   accused   persons.   Such   criminal   conspiracy
resulted in huge loss to the government exchequer.
3.4. Fifth and final chargesheet has been filed by the CBI
on 29.07.2024 wherein appellant has been named as an accused.
4. Directorate  of   Enforcement   or   ED  recorded  ECIR   No.
HIU­II/14/2022   on   22.08.2022   under   the   Prevention   of   Money
Laundering Act, 2005 (PMLA) on the basis of the offences under
which the CBI case was registered. Thus, the offences under the
CBI case became the predicate offence leading to investigation by
the ED under PMLA. ED filed the first prosecution complaint on
26.11.2022 in respect of which the Special Court took cognizance
on   20.12.2022.   ED   has   since   then   filed   seven   supplementary
prosecution   complaints.   In   the   last   supplementary   prosecution
complaint filed on 17.05.2024, appellant has been named as an
accused.
4.1. According to ED, several notices under Section 50 of
PMLA   were   issued   to   the   appellant   for   his   examination   and
recording   of   statement   but   he   failed   to   appear   and   join   the
investigation.   However,   according   to   the   appellant,   the   notices
issued under Section 50 were illegal, bad in law and invalid.

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5. Be that as it may, appellant was arrested by the ED on
21.03.2024.   Appellant   challenged   his   arrest   before   the   High
Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India   read   with   Section   482   Cr.P.C.   However,   the   same   was
dismissed by the High Court on 09.04.2024.
6. It   is   stated   that   the   competent   authority   accorded
permission   under   Section   17A   of   the   PC   Act   on   23.04.2024
whereafter CBI proceeded to investigate the role of the appellant
in the CBI case. However, it is not mentioned as to when such
permission was sought for.
7. In so far arrest of the appellant in the PMLA case is
concerned, appellant carried his challenge from the High Court to
this Court. On 10.05.2024, this Court granted interim bail to the
appellant till 02.06.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 2493 of 2024 in
view of  the  ongoing  Lok  Sabha  elections. On  completion  of  the
period of interim bail, appellant surrendered and was taken back
into custody.
8. On 20.06.2024, appellant was granted regular bail by
the   learned  Special  Judge  in   the   ED  case.   This  bail  order   was
challenged by the ED before the High Court which stayed the bail

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order   on   21.06.2024   on   an   oral   mentioning.   A   detailed   order
staying the bail of the appellant in the ED case was pronounced
by the High Court only on 25.06.2024.
9. CBI   sought   for   custody   of   the   appellant   so   as   to
interrogate him. Application filed by the CBI in this regard under
Section 41A Cr.P.C. was allowed by the learned Special Judge on
24.06.2024.
10. It is stated that CBI interrogated the appellant in Tihar
Jail on 25.06.2024 for 3 hours but according to the CBI, he did
not   furnish   satisfactory   reply   to   the   questions   put   to   him.   His
reply was found to be evasive.
11. At   around   the   same   time   the   High   Court   stayed   the
bail of the appellant in the PMLA case, on 25.06.2024 CBI sought
for permission of the learned Special Judge to formally arrest the
appellant in the CBI case. On production of the appellant before
the learned Special Judge on 26.06.2024, appellant was formally
arrested   and   remanded   to   CBI   custody   till   29.06.2024   by   the
learned Special Judge.  In the arrest memo dated 26.06.2024, CBI
mentioned   in   column   7   that   it   had   explained   the   grounds   of

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arrest to the appellant. The grounds of arrest were mentioned as
under:
He is not co­operating with the investigation and
concealing   the   true   facts   even   after   being
confronted   with   evidences   gathered   during   the
investigation so far and also the facts which are
exclusively in his knowledge and relevant for the
purpose of the investigation to reach to the just
conclusion of the case. He is trying to purposely
derail   the   investigation.   He   may  influence   the
witnesses.
11.1. In   the   remand   application,   CBI   mentioned   in
paragraph 17 that appellant was examined/interrogated in Tihar
Jail on 25.06.2024. During his interrogation he remained evasive
and   non­cooperative,   failing   to   give   satisfactory   replies   to   the
questions put to him regarding his role in the conspiracy. CBI
mentioned as under:
That   Arvind   Kejriwal   was
examined/interrogated   in   Tihar   Jail   on
25.06.2024.   During   his   interrogation,   he
remained   evasive   and   non­cooperative,   failing
to   give   satisfactory   replies   to   the   questions
raised to him regarding his role in the matter of
demand   of   upfront   money   of   Rs.   100   Crores

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from   co­accused   persons   of   South   Group,   the
acceptance   and   delivery   of   the   same   to   Aam
Aadmi   Party   through   his   close   associate   Vijay
Nair   as   well   as   utilization   of   the   ill­gotten
money so received in the Assembly Elections of
Goa   during   the   year   2021­22   to   meet   the
election   related   expenditures   of   Aam   Aadmi
Party. He further gave evasive replies regarding
his   role   and   the   role   of   other   co­accused   in
respect   of   criminal   conspiracy   hatched.   His
replies   are   contrary   to   the   oral   and
documentary evidence gathered by CBI during
the investigation. He is not disclosing the facts
truthfully,   despite   being   confronted   with   the
incriminating evidence and also concealing the
vital   facts,   which   are   exclusively   in   his
knowledge.   These   facts   are   relevant   for   the
purpose of the investigation to reach to the just
conclusion of the case. 
11.2. On   29.06.2024,   learned   Special   Judge   remanded   the
appellant to judicial custody till 12.07.2024.
12. Criminal Appeal No. 2493 of 2024 was heard by this
Court in the meanwhile. On 12.07.2024, a detailed judgment was
passed. A bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court framed the

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following   three   questions   of   law   for   consideration   by   a   larger
bench:
(a) Whether   the   “need   and   necessity   to   arrest”   is   a
separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed
in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act?
(b) Whether   the   “need   and   necessity   to   arrest”   refers   to
the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take
a person into custody, or  it relates to other  personal
grounds   and   reasons   regarding   necessity   to   arrest   a
person   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   said
case?
(c) If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative,
what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken
into   consideration   by   the   court   while   examining   the
question of “need and necessity to arrest”?
12.1. While   making   the   reference   as   above,   the   bench
observed that right to life and liberty is sacrosanct. Appellant had
suffered   incarceration   of   over   90   days.   The   above   questions
referred to a larger bench would require in depth consideration.
Therefore, appellant was directed to be released on interim bail in
connection with ECIR No. HIU­II/14/2022 dated 22.08.2022 on
the   same   terms   which   were   imposed   earlier   while   granting
temporary bail on 10.05.2024.

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13. CBI filed its final chargesheet naming the appellant for
the first time as an accused on 29.07.2024.
14. Appellant filed Bail Application No. 2285/2024 before
the High Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. seeking regular bail
in   the   CBI   case.   On   05.07.2024,   a   learned   Judge   of   the   High
Court issued notice. Thereafter, arguments were heard on interim
bail on 17.07.2024. However, the case was directed to be listed
again   on   29.07.2024   at   03:00   PM.   On   29.07.2024,   arguments
were heard and the judgment was reserved.
14.1. Seven days thereafter  the judgment was delivered on
05.08.2024. Without deciding the bail application on merit, the
High Court disposed of the same giving liberty to the appellant to
approach the Court of Special Judge for regular bail saying that
such a course of action would be more beneficial to the appellant.
15. From the narration of facts as noted above, it is seen
that   CBI   had   registered   its   case   RC   No.   0032022A0053   on
17.08.2022. A total of four chargesheets were filed by CBI in the
case  naming   17   persons   as  accused.  Appellant   Arvind   Kejriwal
was not named as an accused in those chargesheets. 

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16. In   the   meanwhile,   ED   recorded   ECIR   No.   HIU­
II/14/2022   under   PMLA   on   22.08.2022.   ED   filed   seven
complaints   under   PMLA.   In   none   of   the   above   complaints,
appellant   was   named   as   an   accused.   However,   appellant   was
arrested by the ED in the PMLA case on 21.03.2024.
17. On 20.06.2024, appellant was granted regular bail by
the learned Special Judge in the ED case. On oral mentioning,
this bail order was stayed by the High Court on 21.06.2024.
18. It   was   thereafter   that   CBI   sought   for   custody   of   the
appellant   in   the   CBI   case   which   was   allowed   by   the   learned
Special Judge on 24.06.2024.
19. Finally,   this   Court   granted   interim   bail   to   the
appellant in the PMLA case on 12.07.2024.
20. CBI filed the fifth and final chargesheet in the CBI case
on   29.07.2024   wherein   appellant   has   been   named   as   an
accused.
21. Since appellant’s arrest by the ED, bail granted by the
learned Special Judge and stay of bail by the High Court in the
PMLA   case   are   subject   matter   of   parallel   proceedings   where
appellant has been granted interim bail by this Court, I would

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refrain   from   commenting   thereon.   Therefore,   I   will   confine   this
opinion   only   to   two   aspects:   arrest   of   the   appellant   and   the
judgment of the High Court. 
Arrest of the appellant by the CBI: necessity and timing
22. In   so   far   arrest   of   the   appellant   by   the   CBI   is
concerned, it raises more questions than it seeks to answer. As
already noted above, CBI case was registered on 17.08.2022. Till
the arrest of the appellant by the ED on 21.03.2024, CBI did not
feel   the   necessity   to   arrest   the   appellant   though   it   had
interrogated   him   about   a   year   back   on   16.04.2023.   It   appears
that only after the learned Special Judge granted regular bail to
the appellant in the ED case on 20.06.2024 (which was stayed by
the   High   Court   on   21.06.2024   on   oral   mentioning)   that   CBI
became active and sought for custody of the appellant which was
granted by the learned Special Judge on 26.06.2024. Even on the
date of his arrest by the CBI on 26.06.2024, appellant was not
named as an accused by the CBI. Only in the last chargesheet
filed by the CBI on 29.07.2024, appellant has been named as an
accused.

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23. Thus, it is evident that CBI did not feel the need and
necessity to arrest the appellant from 17.08.2022 till 26.06.2024
i.e.   for   over   22   months.   It   was   only   after   the   learned   Special
Judge granted regular bail to the appellant in the ED case that
the   CBI   activated   its   machinery   and   took   the   appellant   into
custody.   Such   action   on   the   part   of   the   CBI   raises   a   serious
question mark on the timing of the arrest; rather on the arrest
itself. For 22 months, CBI does not arrest the appellant but after
the learned Special Judge grants regular bail to the appellant in
the ED case, CBI seeks his custody. In the circumstances, a view
may be taken that such an arrest by the CBI was perhaps only to
frustrate the bail granted to the appellant in the ED case.
24. In so far the grounds of arrest are concerned,  I am of
the   view   that   those   would   not   satisfy   the   test   of   necessity   to
justify   arrest   of   the   appellant   and   now   that   the   appellant   is
seeking bail post incarceration, those cannot also be the grounds
to deny him bail. The respondent is definitely wrong when it says
that because the appellant was evasive in his reply, because he
was   not   cooperating   with   the   investigation,   therefore,   he   was
rightly   arrested   and   now   should   be   continued   in   detention.   It

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cannot   be  the   proposition   that   only   when   an   accused  answers
the   questions   put   to   him   by   the   investigation   agency   in   the
manner in which the investigating agency would like the accused
to answer, would mean that the accused is cooperating with the
investigation. Further, the respondent cannot justify arrest and
continued detention citing evasive reply.
25. We   should   not   forget   the   cardinal   principle   under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India that no person accused
of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
This   Court   has   held   that   such   a   protection   is   available   to   a
person   accused   of   an   offence   not   merely   with   respect   to   the
evidence that may be given in the court in the course of the trial,
but   is   also   available   to   the   accused   at   a   previous   stage   if   an
accusation   has   been   made   against   him   which   might   in   the
normal course result in his prosecution. Thus, the protection is
available to a person against whom a formal accusation has been
made, though the actual trial may not have commenced and if
such   an   accusation   relates   to   the   commission   of   an   offence
which   in   the   normal   course   may   result   in   prosecution.   An
accused has the right to remain silent; he cannot be compelled to
make   inculpatory   statements   against   himself.   No   adverse

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inference can be drawn from the silence of the accused. If this is
the   position,   then   the   very   grounds   given   for   arrest   of   the
appellant would be wholly untenable. On such grounds, it would
be a travesty of justice to keep the appellant in further detention
in the CBI case, more so, when he has already been granted bail
on   the   same   set   of   allegations   under   the   more   stringent
provisions of PMLA.
26. That   apart,   the   apprehension   of   tampering   with   the
evidence or influencing witnesses has already been answered by
this Court in the case of  Manish Sisodia  in the following manner:
57.    Insofar   as   the   apprehension   given   by   the
learned ASG regarding the possibility of tampering
the evidence is concerned, it is to be noted that the
case   largely   depends   on   documentary   evidence
which   is   already   seized   by   the   prosecution.   As
such, there is no possibility of tampering with the
evidence.   Insofar   as   the   concern   with   regard   to
influencing   the   witnesses   is   concerned,   the   said
concern   can   be   addressed   by   imposing   stringent
conditions upon the appellant.  
27. Power to arrest is one thing but the need to arrest is
altogether a different thing. Just because an investigating agency
has   the   power   to   arrest,   it   does   not   necessarily   mean   that   it

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should arrest such a person.  In  Joginder Kumar Vs. State of U.P. 1,
a   three­Judge   bench   of   this   Court   examined   the   interplay   of
investigation   and   arrest.   Referring   to   the   third   report   of   the
National Police Commission, this Court declared that no arrest
can be made just because it is lawful for police officers to do so.
The existence of the power of arrest is one thing but justification
for the exercise of it is quite another. It was held as under:
20.  …….No   arrest   can   be   made   because   it   is
lawful   for   the   police   officer   to   do   so.   The
existence   of   the   power   to   arrest   is   one   thing.
The   justification   for   the   exercise   of   it   is   quite
another.   The   police   officer   must   be   able   to
justify the arrest apart from his power to do so.
Arrest   and   detention   in   police   lock­up   of   a
person   can   cause   incalculable   harm   to   the
reputation   and   self­esteem   of   a   person.   No
arrest can be made in a routine manner on a
mere   allegation   of   commission   of   an   offence
made against a person. It would be prudent for
a   police   officer   in   the   interest   of   protection   of
the   constitutional   rights   of   a   citizen   and
perhaps   in   his   own   interest   that   no   arrest
should   be   made   without   a   reasonable
satisfaction reached after some investigation as
1 (1994) 4 SCC 260

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to   the   genuineness   and   bona   fides   of   a
complaint   and   a   reasonable   belief   both   as   to
the   person's   complicity   and   even   so   as   to   the
need   to   effect   arrest.   Denying   a   person   of   his
liberty   is   a   serious   matter.   The
recommendations   of   the   Police   Commission
merely   reflect   the   constitutional   concomitants
of the fundamental right to personal liberty and
freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely
on   the   suspicion   of   complicity   in   an   offence.
There must be some reasonable justification in
the   opinion   of   the   officer   effecting   the   arrest
that   such   arrest   is   necessary   and   justified.
Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be
avoided if a police officer issues notice to person
to attend the Station House and not to leave the
Station without permission would do.
28. In the case of   Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma
Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 2,  this Court emphasized that investigation
must be fair and effective. Investigation should be conducted in a
manner   so   as   to   draw   a   just   balance   between   a   citizen’s   right
under   Articles   19   and   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India   and   the
expansive power of the police to make investigation. Concept of
fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of
2 (2010) 6 SCC 1

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the   fundamental   right   of   the   accused   under   Article   21   of   the
Constitution of India.
29. This Court in the case of   Arnesh Kumar Vs. State  of
Bihar3,  while  examining  the  provisions  of  Sections   41  and  41A
Cr.P.C. observed that arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom
and cast scars forever. This Court, while emphasizing the need to
sensitize   the   police   against   high­handed   arrest,   deprecated   the
attitude to arrest first and then to proceed with the rest. While
emphasizing   that   police   officers   should   not   arrest   the   accused
unnecessarily   and   that   the   Magistrate   should   not   authorize
detention   casually   and   mechanically,   this   Court   observed   as
follows:
5.          Arrest   brings   humiliation,   curtails
freedom   and   casts   scars   forever.   Lawmakers
know   it   so   also   the   police.   There   is   a   battle
between the lawmakers and the police and it
seems that the police has not learnt its lesson:
the   lesson   implicit   and   embodied   in   CrPC.   It
has not come out of its colonial image despite
six   decades   of   Independence,   it   is   largely
considered as a tool of harassment, oppression
and   surely   not   considered   a   friend   of   public.
The need for caution in exercising the drastic
3 (2014) 8 SCC 273

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power of arrest has been emphasized time and
again by the courts but has not yielded desired
result.   Power   to   arrest   greatly   contributes   to
its   arrogance   so   also   the   failure   of   the
Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power
of   arrest   is   one   of   the   lucrative   sources   of
police   corruption.   The   attitude   to   arrest   first
and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It
has become a handy tool to the police officers
who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.
30. Again   in   the   case   of   Mohd.   Zubair   Vs.   State   (NCT   of
Delhi)4, a three­Judge Bench of this Court once again emphasized
that the existence of the power of arrest must be distinguished
from the exercise of the power of arrest. The exercise of the power
of   arrest  must  be  pursued  sparingly.  This   Court   reiterated  the
role of the courts in protecting personal liberty and ensuring that
investigations are not used as a tool of harassment. Referring to
its earlier decision in  Arnab Ranjan Goswami Vs. Union of India 5,
this Court observed that the courts should be alive to both ends
of   the   spectrum:   the   need   to   ensure   proper   enforcement   of
criminal law on the one hand and the need to ensure that the
law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment on the other
4 (2022) SCC Online SC 897
5 (2020) 14 SCC 12

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hand. Courts must ensure that they continue to remain the first
line of defence against the deprivation of liberty of the citizens.
Deprivation of liberty even for a single day is one day too many.
31. When the CBI did not feel the necessity to arrest the
appellant for 22 long months, I fail to understand the great hurry
and urgency on the part of the CBI to arrest the appellant when
he was on the cusp of release in the ED case. The substantive
charge   against   the   appellant   is   under   Section  477A   IPC   which
deals   with   falsification   of   accounts   and   if   convicted   carries   a
punishment   of   imprisonment   for   a   term   which   may   extend   to
seven   years   or   with   fine   or   with   both.   The   appellant   has   also
been   charged   under   Section   7   of   the   PC   Act   which   deals   with
offence   relating   to   a   public   servant   being   bribed.   Here   the
punishment, if convicted, is imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years
and   shall   also   be   liable   to   fine.   Without   entering   into   the
semantics of applicability of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) and Section 41A
Cr.P.C.   as   explained   by   this   Court   in   Arnesh   Kumar   (supra),
timing of the arrest of the appellant by the CBI is quite suspect. 

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32. CBI is a premier investigating agency of the country. It
is in public interest that CBI must not only be above board but
must also be seem to be so. Rule of law, which is a basic feature
of our constitutional republic, mandates that investigation must
be fair, transparent and judicious. This Court has time and again
emphasized that fair investigation is a fundamental right of an
accused person under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. Investigation must not only be fair but must be seem to be
so.   Every   effort   must   be   made   to   remove   any   perception   that
investigation was not carried out fairly and that the arrest was
made in a high­handed and biased manner. 
33. In a functional democracy governed by the rule of law,
perception   matters.   Like   Caesar’s   wife,   an   investigating   agency
must be above board. Not so long ago, this Court had castigated
the CBI comparing it to a caged parrot. It is imperative that CBI
dispel   the   notion   of   it   being   a   caged   parrot.   Rather,   the
perception should be that of an uncaged parrot.
Impugned order
34. Let   me   now   deal   with   the   impugned   judgment   and
order   of   the   High   Court   whereby   the   bail   application   of   the

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appellant   was   disposed   of.   Appellant   had   filed   Bail   Application
No.   2285   of   2024   before   the   High   Court   under   Section   439
Cr.P.C.   in   the   CBI   case   where   he   was   taken   into   custody   on
26.06.2024. On 05.07.2024, a learned Judge of the High Court
issued notice, fixing 17.07.2024 for arguments. On 17.07.2024,
arguments were heard on interim bail; thereafter, the case was
directed to be listed on 29.07.2024 at 03:00 PM. On 29.07.2024,
arguments were heard and the judgment was reserved. Finally,
the   judgment   was   pronounced   on   05.08.2024,   the   relevant
portion of which reads as under: 
5. Though   there   is   no   quarrel   about   the
proposition   that   the   District   Courts   and   this
Court have concurrent jurisdiction, as has been
held   in   the   Judgments   relied   on   behalf   of   the
appellant, but at the same time it has been held
time and again by the Apex Court that the Party
must first approach the Court of first instance.
6. In the present case, it is more in the benefit
of the appellant, considering the complexity and
the web of the facts and the material on record,
to   comprehensively   determine   the   role   of   the
appellant in this alleged conspiracy to determine
if he is entitled to bail. It may also be noted that
when   the   Bail   Application   was   filed   before   this

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Court,   the   chargesheet   had   not   been   filed.
However,   in   the   changed   circumstances,   when
the  chargesheet  has  already  got  filed before the
learned Special Judge, it would be in the benefit
of   the   appellant,   to   first   approach   the   Court   of
Sessions Judge.
7. In   these   circumstances,   this   Bail
Application is hereby disposed of with the liberty
to the appellant to approach the learned Special
Judge for regular bail.
34.1. After observing that it would be more to the benefit of
the   appellant   if   the   appellant   approaches   the   learned   Special
Judge first for bail more so when the chargesheet has been filed,
the   High   Court   relegated   the   appellant   to   the   forum   of   the
learned   Special   Judge   though   both   the   Court   of   the   Special
Judge   and   the   High   Court   have   concurrent   jurisdiction   in   the
matter.
35. If   indeed   the   High   Court   thought   of   remanding   the
appellant   to   the   forum   of   the   Court   of   Special   Judge,   it   could
have  done   so   at   the   threshold   itself.   After   issuing   notice,   after
hearing the parties at length and after reserving the judgment for
about  a  week,  the  above  order  was  passed  by  the  High  Court.

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Though couched in a language which appears to be in favour of
the   appellant,   in   practical   terms   it   has   only   resulted   in
prolonging the incarceration of the appellant for a far more longer
period impacting his personal liberty. 
36. In   somewhat   similar   circumstances,   this   Court   in
Kanumuri   Raghurama   Krishnam   Raju   Vs.   State   of   A.P. 6,   after
observing that jurisdiction of the trial court as well as of the High
Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is concurrent, held that merely
because the High Court was approached by the appellant without
approaching the trial court would not mean that the High Court
could not have considered the bail application of the appellant.
In the facts of that case, this Court opined that the High Court
ought to have considered the bail application of the appellant on
merit and decided the same. However, having regard to the fact
that much time had lapsed since passing of the order of the High
Court   and   there   were   subsequent   medical   reports   of   the
appellant, this Court did not relegate the appellant back to the
High Court but considered the bail application of the appellant
on merit herein itself. This Court held thus:
6  (2021) 13 SCC 822

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14.  The jurisdiction of the trial court as well as
the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 is concurrent and merely
because   the   High   Court   was   approached   by   the
appellant   without   approaching   the   trial   court
would   not   mean   that   the   High   Court   could   not
have   considered   the   bail   application   of   the
appellant.   As   such,   in   our   view,   the   High   Court
ought to have considered the bail application of the
appellant   on   merits   and   decided   the   same.
However, since the High Court has not considered
the   matter   on   merits   and   much   water   has   flown
since the passing of the order of the High Court, as
now there are two medical reports of the appellant,
one by the government hospital on the direction of
the High Court and the other by Army Hospital on
the   directions   of   this   Court,   we   deem   it   fit   and
proper   to   consider   the   bail   application   of   the
appellant on merits.
37. Mr. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India,
while supporting the order of the High Court vehemently argued
that the appellant has to first approach the trial court for  bail
though under Section 439 Cr.P.C. both the Special Court and the
High   Court   have   concurrent   jurisdiction.   No   special   privilege
should be shown or granted to the appellant. I am afraid such a

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submission cannot be accepted. In this regard, I am in respectful
agreement   with   the   view   taken   by   this   Court   in   Kanumuri
Raghurama Krishnam Raju . That apart, when the appellant has
been granted bail under the more stringent provisions of PMLA,
further   detention   of  the  appellant  by  the  CBI  in   respect  of  the
same   predicate   offence   has   become   wholly   untenable.   In   such
circumstances, asking the appellant or relegating the appellant
to approach the trial court, then to the High Court and then to
this Court for a fresh round of bail proceedings in the CBI case
after he had already traversed the same route in the PMLA case
would be nothing but a case of procedure triumphing the cause
of   justice.   In   this   connection,   it   would   be   apt   to   refer   to   the
observations of this Court in the case of  Manish Sisodia Vs. CBI,
Criminal Appeal No. 3296 of 2024, decided on 09.08.2024:
32.  It could thus be seen that this Court had granted
liberty to the appellant to revive his prayer after filing of
the chargesheet. Now, relegating the appellant to again
approach the trial court and thereafter the High Court
and   only   thereafter   this   Court,   in   our   view,   would   be
making   him   play   a   game   of   “Snake   and   Ladder”.   The
trial court and the High Court have already taken a view
and   in   our   view   relegating   the   appellant   again   to   the
trial   court   and   the   High   Court   would   be   an   empty

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formality. In a matter pertaining to the life and liberty of
a   citizen   which   is   one   of   the   most   sacrosanct   rights
guaranteed   by   the   Constitution,   a   citizen   cannot   be
made to run from pillar to post.
37.1. Manish Sisodia is a co­accused in the same CBI case
and the ED case. His second bail application was rejected by the
trial court on 30.04.2024 after taking about three months’ time
to decide the same. When Sisodia moved the High Court for bail,
the   same   also   came   to   be   rejected   on   21.05.2024.   It   was
thereafter   that   Manish   Sisodia   approached   this   Court   in   the
second round. In the hearing which took place on 04.06.2024,
the learned Solicitor General for India made a statement before
the   Court   that   investigation   would   be   concluded   and   final
complaint as well as chargesheet would be filed in both the ED
and CBI cases on or before 03.07.2024. On the basis of the above
statement of the learned Solicitor General, this Court disposed of
the two criminal appeals of Shri Manish Sisodia with liberty to
him to revive his prayer afresh after filing of final complaint and
chargesheet. When  Shri Sisodia approached this Court for  bail
after   the   complaint   and   the   chargesheet   were   filed,   Mr.   Raju
learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the ED

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as   well   as   the   CBI   contended   that   Shri   Sisodia   should   again
approach  the  trial  court  for  regular  bail as in  the   interregnum,
the complaint and the chargesheet were filed. Such submission
of Mr. Raju was rejected by this Court. Adverting to the earlier
order   of   this   Court   dated   04.05.2024,   this   Court   in   Manish
Sisodia observed as under:
33.   ……..It   will   be   a   travesty   of   justice   to
construe   that   the   carefully   couched   order
preserving   the   right   of   the   appellant   to   revive
his prayer for grant of special leave against the
High   Court   order,   to   mean   that   he   should  be
relegated   all   the   way   down   to   the   trial   court.
The memorable adage, that procedure is a hand
maiden   and   not   a   mistress   of   justice   rings
loudly in our ears.
38. This   Court   in   Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   Vs.   Public
Prosecutor7, had highlighted that bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment. The requirement as to bail is merely to secure the
attendance of the prisoner at trial. This Court in   Manish Sisodia
referred to and relied upon the aforesaid decision and reiterated
the   salutary   principle   that   bail   is   the   rule   and   jail   is   the
exception. This Court has observed that even in straightforward
7 (1978) 1 SCC 240

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open and shut cases, bail is not being granted by the trial courts
and by the High Courts. It has been held as under:
53.  The   Court   further   observed   that,   over   a
period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts
have   forgotten   a   very   well­settled   principle   of   law
that   bail   is   not   to   be   withheld   as   a   punishment.
From   our   experience,   we   can   say   that   it   appears
that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt
to   play   safe   in   matters   of   grant   of   bail.   The
principle   that   bail   is   a   rule   and   refusal   is   an
exception   is,   at   times,   followed   in   breach.   On
account   of   non­grant   of   bail   even   in   straight
forward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded
with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding
to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial
courts   and   the   High   Courts   should   recognize   the
principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.
39. Bail   jurisprudence   is   a   facet   of   a   civilised   criminal
justice system. An accused is innocent until proven guilty by a
competent   court   following   the   due   process.   Hence,   there   is
presumption   of   innocence.   Therefore,   this   Court   has   been
reiterating again and again the salutary principle that bail is the
rule and jail is the exception. As such, the courts at all levels

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must ensure that the process leading to and including the trial
does not end up becoming the punishment itself. 
40. This   Court   has   emphasized   and   re­emphasized   time
and   again   that   personal   liberty   is   sacrosanct.   It   is   of   utmost
importance   that   trial   courts   and   the   High   Courts   remain
adequately alert to the need to protect personal liberty which is a
cherished right under our Constitution.
41. That   being   the   position   and   having   regard   to   the
discussions   made   above,   I   am   of   the   unhesitant   view   that   the
belated arrest of the appellant by the CBI is unjustified and the
continued   incarceration   of   the   appellant   in   the   CBI   case   that
followed such arrest has become untenable.
42. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the
High Court dated 05.08.2024 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 1939 of 2024 is
clarified to the above context while the judgment and order of the
High   Court   dated   05.08.2024   in   Bail   Application   No.   2285   of
2024 is set aside.
43. Consequently, it is directed that the appellant shall be
released   on   bail   forthwith   in   the   CBI   case   i.e.   RC   No.
0032022A0053   dated   17.08.2022.   In   so   far   bail   conditions   are

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concerned, this Court in the ED case i.e. in Criminal Appeal No.
2493 of 2024 has imposed several terms and conditions including
clauses   (b)   and   (c)   vide  the   orders   dated   10.05.2024   and
12.07.2024   which   have   been   incorporated   in   clause   (d)   of
paragraph 47(ii) of the judgment delivered by Justice Surya Kant.
Though I  have  serious  reservations  on  clauses (b) and  (c) which
debars the appellant from entering the office of Chief Minister and
the Delhi Secretariat as well as from signing files, having regard to
judicial   discipline,   I   would   refrain   from   further   expressing   my
views   thereon   at   this   stage   since   those   conditions   have   been
imposed   in   the   separate   ED   case   by   a   two   judge   bench   of   this
Court. 
44. Both the appeals are accordingly disposed of.
  ………………………………J.       
                                                           [UJJAL BHUYAN]
NEW DELHI; 
SEPTEMBER 13, 2024.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3816 OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.11023/2024)
ARVIND KEJRIWAL         … APPELLANT
Versus
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION      … RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3817 OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.10991/2024)
   
O  R  D  E  R
1. Leave granted.
2. In view of the separate order passed by Hon’ble Mr.Justice
Ujjal Bhuyan, however, there being a concurrent opinion that the
appellant is entitled to be released on bail, subject to the terms
and conditions mentioned in para 47 of the order, authored by
Hon’ble Mr.Justice Surya Kant, the Criminal Appeal challenging the
legality  of  arrest  (arising  out  of  SLP(Crl.)No.10991/2024  is
dismissed,  the  Criminal  Appeal  arising  out  of
SLP(Crl.)No.11023/2024 is allowed and while setting aside the
impugned judgment of the High Court dated 05.08.2024, the appellant
is directed to be released on bail, subject to the following terms
and conditions:
a. the Appellant is directed to be released on
bail  in  connection  with  FIR  No.  RC0032022A0053/2022

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registered by the CBI at PS CBI, ACB, upon furnishing bail
bonds for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 /- with two sureties of
such like amount, to the satisfaction of the Trial Court;
b. the  Appellant  shall  not  make  any  public
comments on the merits of the CBI case, it being sub judice
before the Trial Court. This condition is necessitated to
dissuade a recent tendency of building a self-serving
narrative on public platforms;
c. however, this shall not preclude the Appellant
from raising all his contentions before the Trial Court;
d. the  terms  and  conditions  imposed  by  a
coordinate  bench   of  this  Court  vide  orders  dated
10.05.2024 and   12.07.2024 passed in
Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024, titled Arvind Kejriwal v.
Directorate of Enforcement , are imposed mutatis mutandis
in the present case;
e. the Appellant shall remain present before the 
Trial Court on each and every date of hearing, 
unless granted exemption; and
f. the Appellant shall fully cooperate with the 
Trial Court for expeditious conclusion of the 
trial proceedings.
 
 
.........................J.
(SURYA KANT)
.........................J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
      
NEW DELHI
DATED: 13.09.2024